'Memorandum on the Drafts of Despatches regarding the Affairs of Muscat and Zanzibar' [‎27r] (3/24)

3
*N.B. This neces
sity can only be
postponed, and its
cost lessened, it
cannot be entirely
obviated.
(c.) Muscat and Zanzibar to agree to effective
arrangements to stop the slave trade, and
to prevent a revival of piracy.
(rf.) Zanzibar to receive such further payment
from the Government of India as our
Envoy may find to be reasonable, as a set
for the loss of slave labour. This pay
ment to continue for one or two genera
tions, as may be found equitable.
(e.) The charge of such arrangements to be
be divided between India and England,
as a reasonable payment for lessening to
India* the cost of resuscitating a local
navy for the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , and for
enabling England to reduce the East
African squadron.
I believe, by some such plan, we might stop the
slave trade as effectually on the east, as has been
done on the west, coast of Africa, and content both
Zanzibar and Muscat, without paying heavily for
the attainment of both those great objects.
As to the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. and Persia’s share in these
disputes, I would defer action till such an officer as
Captain Lynch has visited Teheran, as proposed in
the departmental Memorandum, and can tell us
distinctly what Persia wants to do in the Gulf, and
how, and why.
M e must remember that Persia, thwarted and
overridden on every possible occasion, to the north
and north-east by Russia, and on the Turkish fron
tier, is glad of any opportunity to fancy herself
independent towards Khorassan and the seaboard.
In this she is encouraged by Russia, whose interests
are equally served whether Persia makes way or
gets snubbed by the English in those directions.
1 his plan of a navy in the Gulf may be either a
plaything of the Shah’s, or a serious effort, such as
from time to time is suggested by some of the more
intelligent Persian ministers to strengthen their
position, but it can in no way diminish our neces
sities or obligations as a naval power in these seas.
If two men like Sir William Coghlan and Captain
Lynch were to report, the one from the Persian, the
other from the Muscat, point of view, we should
know more exactly what it may be best to do in the
way of advising or aiding Persia as to getting up a
navy for herself in the Indian seas.
On the general question, I cannot add much to
what I have often said, in one form or another, to
the Governor General and Secretary of State, e.g.,
in a letter to Sir J. Lawrence, of the 23d March
1866, of which and of other correspondence on the
subject extracts are annexed.
It is difficult, if not impossible, now to retrace
the false steps we then took, and since have taken,
in recognizing Salim, and thrice interfering when
we prevented I oorkee and Majid from opposing
Salim, and actively aided Salim to suppress the
tribes of Oman who had revolted against him. All
we can now do is to prevent making more mistakes
of the same kind.