'Zanzibar, Muscat, and Persia. Memorandum by Political Secretary' [‎18v] (2/6)

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had been his part to receive, instead of to pay, the
subsidy, the “ non olet” doctrine would have been
1 s; he would have pocketed the 40,000 dollars
without smelling a brother’s blood.
As a mere question of justice and good faith
between the two branches of the family, I do not
see that anything can be said in favour of releasing
the Sultan of Zanzibar from his engagement.
As a question of policy, in which the British
Government is concerned, it is to be observed, that
Sir William Coghlan says “ In my estimation, it
“ would have the worst possible effect throughput
“ Oman and the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , if the British Govern-
“ ment allowed the plain terms of its arbitrament to
“ be set aside by such flimsy pretexts.” The
Government of India, in their last letter, state dis
tinctly that the good faith of the British Govern
ment is involved in the maintenance of the award,
and only a little time ago they were thinking of
sending a ship of war to compel the Sultan of
Zanzibar to act in accordance with his agreement.
On the other hand, it is to be observed that the
Sultan of Zanzibar is greatly impoverished, that he
is much in debt, that he can with difficulty pay the
subsidy, and that his financial exigencies compel
him to derive profit from the importation of slaves.
It has often been stated, that if he were released
from the necessity of paying the subsidy, he would
fall readily into an arrangement for the entire sup
pression of the slave trade in the territories and
waters subject to him.
It is at this point that the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. and the
Foreign Office come into conflict with each other.
The former wish to maintain the present relations
of Muscat and Zanzibar, as a point of good faith.
The latter wish to annul the present compact, so as
to obtain more readily the good offices of Zanzibar
for the suppression of the slave trade.
Now, Zanzibar may be embarrassed by the pay
ment of the subsidy; but Muscat must be equally,
if not more, embarrassed by its non-payment, as it
is an item of revenue, to the punctual ‘payment of
which it was fairly entitled to look. And, as long
as it is unpaid, Muscat will allege its non-pavment
as an excuse for disorders of all kinds, including
non-fulfilment of money engagements to others, and
irregular means of levying revenue, by piracy, &c.
These irregularities have commenced, and Persia is
complaining of them. Of these Persian complica
tions I will presently speak more in detail.
Apart from these considerations, it has been
shown that we are bound, in good faith, to insist
upon the payment of the subsidy to Muscat, or
else, it may be said, to pay it ourselves. 1 do not
howeevr, think that this would meet the diffi
culty. For, by relieving Zanzibar from the nominal
payment, we should break down the whole compact
between the Chiefs, and Muscat would be at liberty
to make war on Zanzibar, and the States of Oman
would thus revert to the unfortunate condition in
which they were held before Coghlan’s arbitration