File 948/1909 'Persia: Situation in the South; Condition of the Roads. Attack on Mr Bill. Road Guard Scheme.' [‎328r] (660/744)

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to recover confidence on any symptoms of weakness; and it is, in my opinion, of great
importance to establish at the start the fundamental principle that all forms of impost
on internal trade are and must remain absolutely abolished. The only form of pecuniary
advantage which might properly be offered to the local khans and nomad chiefs is a
percentage—say 5 per cent.—on the pay of the gholams recruited by their means.
By an adroit use of this bait the recruiting officers might contrive to attract to the
support of the force a sufficient proportion of the chiefs to make a strong hostile
coalition impossible. But the only solid foundation for the scheme, which will certainly
be unpopular at the start, is fear; and as there is nothing in Persia for the tribes to be
afraid of, it must be fear of the British Government.
The numerical and financial proposals set out below must be considered in the
light of the above statement. They represent the lowest estimate upon which it can
reasonably be hoped that the task, as above limited, can be performed, at any rate at the
outset; but it will probably be admitted that an annual expenditure of 7,0001. on the
protection of a trade of an annual value of over 1,000,00(B. over a route 490 miles in length
is exceedingly moderate, and admits of considerable expansion before rejecting it on the
exclusive ground of.cost. On this point, however, a caveat should be entered; it must
not be imagined that a force of this character, by mere numerical expansion, can be
made capable of undertaking tasks for which its organisation does not fit it. Any
expansion in the cadre as proposed should be directed to enabling the force more
completely to fulfil the limited functions assigned to it above, and no increase ot
strength would enable it to undertake punitive expeditions or the policing of the
district as distinct from that of the telegraph line and road. It is very doubtful
whether the former task could be satisfactorily performed by any Persian force
whatever; but if it is to be attempted it must be by a force organised by military
officers on a military basis. That is another proposal which might, if required, be
elaborated; the object at present is to make clear that the scheme at present proposed
is not of a military but essentially of a civil character.
The proposals must of course be taken as absolutely experimental, and based on
the broad circumstances of the road. It is probable that experiment would speedily
prove the necessity for numerous modifications on points of detail. Moreover, as the
conditions on different sections of the road differ radically according to the season, it
must be understood that the fullest latitude would have to be practised in the temporary
transfer of men from one section or post to another according to the position of the
nomad tribes. The reasons for the suggested distribution will be found in the following
detailed examination of the conditions of the road from north to south:
2. Distribution. '
(This is shown in tabular form in Table 1 ).
Section 1.—Ispahan-Khaneh Khurreh—175 miles; seventy men; head-quarters
Abadeh
On the northern, or Irak, portion of this section I am not competent to repoit.
It would, however, appear from the Ispahan diaries that serious robberies aie not very
frequent on this part of the road ; but it is likely that energetic patrolling from Abadeh
to Yezdikhast might divert the attention of the Boir Ahmadi marauders to the Irak
portion of the road, and for this reason alone it would be necessaiy to apply the scheme
to the entire route. How far twenty men at Kumisheh would suffice for this His
Majesty’s consul-general at Ispahan will be in a position to estimate.
The stretch from Yezdikhast to Abadeh is the most directly dangerous part or the
whole road. It is the happy hunting-ground of the Boir Ahmadi tribe, have been
entirely beyond control for many years. They have no recognised chief, the last two
having been killed by members of the tribe, and no connection with Shnaz, so t at
there is no means whatever except force of putting pressure on them. reir win er
rendezvous, and market, is Behbehan, which is seldom or nevei undei e e ec ive
control of the Persian authorities. They are a small tribe, but enjoy a giea repu a-
tion for bravery and marksmanship among the arrant cowards w o compose, wi ew
exceptions, the rest of the population of Pars. In October 1908 a party of them
waylaid a caravan guarded by Khusrau Khan, Kalantar of^ Surme , wo was e on y
headman in that neighbourhood who had shown any capacity foi lesis mg ie _ 10 e . rs ^
and after prolonged rifle-fire killed Khusrau himself and two o iers, an came
off a caravan of some sixty mules. They might thus be expec 6 0 0 61 1 ° I K a d llse
resistance to the establishment of the new r force, and fifty men e ween ^ a e ai j c
Yezdikhast would be none too many to hold them in check. In tact, fifty men would