File 345/1908 Pt 1 'Mohammerah: situation. British assurances to Sheikh.' [‎204v] (413/416)

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question of Mohammerah was only a part of a much wider problem. I added that I
could not discuss with him our attitude in the.event of certain hypothetical contingencies
in relation to which he wanted me to define it, such as the overthrow of the Kajar
Dynasty, the break-up of Persia, &c., pointing out that it must necessarily depend upon
as yet unknown circumstances and conditions respecting which we could now predicate
nothing. ^ A
He mentioned incidentally in the earlier part of our conversation that the Russians
were quite ready to give promises of protection, and I think it not improbable that if we
withhold our support from him, he may be persuaded to enter into some secret arrange
ment with them.
His Confidential Agent, Haji Reis-et-Tujar, showed me a letter frotn the Russian
Consul-General at Bushire promising to visit Mohammerah, and announcing that he had
obtained permission from the Shah to confer upon Sheikh Khazal a very high Russian
decoration.
The letter did not state what the decoration was beyond that it was one usually
given to “ Ministers.” It is for this reason that, reluctant as I am to recommend a
measure which will certainly exasperate the Shah, I ventured in my telegram of the
Hth instant to advise that, in the last resort at any rate, we should be prepared to
"Upport the Sheikh if need be by a forcible demonstration against the Persian Govern
ment, and should let him know that we are ready to do so. I would, however, ur^e unon
him, and I have intimated that we should certainly require this, to exhaust all the
resources of diplomacy and negotiation before taking action which could bring about a
rupture.
If we decide to inform the Persian Government that we shall not allow the use of
coercive measures against the Sheikh, we can, I think, very plausibly, and, indeed,
reasonably, argue that our interests in A abistan, and particularly on the Kanin, would
be so seriously imperilled by the outbreak of disorder that we cannot be indifferent to
the adoption of measures calculated to provoke it.
The territory governed by Sheikh J^hazal is one of the few portions of the great
united Province of Arabistan and Luristan, nominally ruled by His Royal Highness the
Salar-ed-l)owleh, in which our merchants can trade in security. The whole region to
the north of Dizful is now closed to them owing to the revolt which the actions°of the
Persian Government have occasioned, and the compliance of our Road and Transport
Company, with the terms of its Concession, has been made impossible by the existence
of a state of anarchy, ti e end of which seems as distant as ever. We cannot be
expected to acquiesce in the extension of this deplorable condition of things to the
Karun Valley, and we must, therefore, insht that the provisions of the Shah’s Firm m to
the Sheikh, and the promises given him by M. Nans, shall be scrupulously adhered to by
the Customs Department, and that no further steps shall be attempted of a nature to
arouse the suspicion and jealousy of the Arabs. But we may require, in addition to
putting f 01 v\aid the above considerations, to intimate pretty plainly that if our advice is
disregarded we may have to send a ship to Mohammerah to prevent anv collision
between Arabs and Persians.
We have already, in a formal note sent about a year ago (I have no means here of
giving exact references) to the Persian Government, reserved in diplomatic but unmis-
takabie language our right to do so should we judge it necessary.
It is, of course, very unlikely that we shall have to speak so strongly to the Persian
Government, If the Sheikh is firm —and he will be firm as soon as he feels that he has
either the British or the Russian Government at his back—the Persians will probably
desist from their efforts to tamper with the arrangement made with him last year, more
especially if a hint is conveyed to them that ive are watching the prooress of events at
Mohammerah, and may possibly interfere in them. "
We have a very strong position, in view of the fact that we urged the Sheikh two
years ago to come to terms over the Customs question with the Persian Government,
and that, though we were not formally parties to the Agreement, its acceptance by the
Arabs was in the main the result of our advice. This circumstance is. I think, o-enerally
known, and at Koweit Sheikh Mubarek told me that he had advised the’sheikh of
Mohammerah to resist the Persians rather than submit, but that Sheikh Ghazal had
replied that he had yielued owing to the representations of His Majesty's Legation
The reopening of the question seems to afford us a favourable opportunity for recovering
the confidence in us on the Sheikh’s part which has been shaken by the events of two
years ago, and securing his friendship for and dependence upon us against all attempts
of our rivals to tamper with it. r ^
Our support would, of course, be conditional upon our advice being followed by him
at each stage of his discussion with the Persian Government.
I have, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR H. HARDINGE.