'Persia, Herat, and Seistan' [‎79v] (2/28)

which these considerations would lead, that any
advance on the part of England would be recipro
cated at Teheran, and might secure, for a time at
least, the possession of a sensible influence over the
Persian Court.
“ The recent communications of the Kussian
Ambassador at Teheran appear to imply that the
acquisition of a commanding power over the
Turcomans by an advance in the direction of Merv,
is a policy largely occupying the thoughts of the
party of action in Russia at this moment. There
is every reason to believe that no such expedition
could meet with even a temporary success unless it
were provisioned by Persia. Any counteracting
influence at the Persian Court means, therefore, the
loss of the essential condition of a Russian advance
along the Attrek, This consideration alone appears
to Lord Salisbury to establish the advantage of a
good understanding at the present time between
England and Persia. Lord Salisbury has directed
that these matters should be brought to the notice
of Lord Cranbrook, because the impending settle
ment in Afghanistan offers an opportunity which
may not speedily recur of establishing a hold upon
the goodwill of the Shah, on easy terms and in an
efficacious manner. The passion for an increase
of territory, which is strong with all Oriental
Sovereigns, is believed to have a special power over
his mind, and accounts for the bitter disappoint
ment which, in common with Shere Ali, he felt at
the award of the Seistan Arbitration.
If a rectification of frontier in his favour were
made one of the conditions of the approaching peace
between this country and Afghanistan, an advan
tage would be gained which would be qualified by
no sensible drawback. Our relations with Afghan
istan are likely in future to be too solid to run any
risk from the _ feelings with which a small portion
of the population might view such a measure. The
Shah would not only be conciliated, and give us the
benefit of whatever influence gratitude may be
supposed to exercise over his counsels, but he
would obtain an extension of territory which the
loss of our favour would seriously imperil.
Abutting, as it would, upon Khelat and the
country of Candahar, and containing a turbulent
population, it would be an insecure possession
which the British Government might with little
cilort at any time make untenable. " It is not pro
bable that he would have self-restraint to refuse
such a gl f t if it were offered to him ; but in accept!
ITecmitvTor 11 }!- ln reallt V e P i acin S in °ur hands
a security foi his own good conduct.
“ if these considerations recommend themselves
to Lord Cranbrook, it will be possible to give effect
to the policy recommended by them at the present
juncture But it is not probable that the oppor
rumty wdl happen again; and it may very weU be
that at a later period the imperious exigeneies of
her position towards Russia may f„? C e unon
England the necessity of securing at the cost of