File 1421/1908 Pt 2 'Persia: oil; Ahwaz oil guard' [‎122r] (243/482)

[This Document is the Property of His ^Britannic Majesty’s GovermaeM.}
PERSIA. [September 30.]
OONEIDENTIAL. Section 14.
[32484] No. 1.
Sir C. Spring-Rice to Sir Edward Grey.—[Received September 30.)
(No. 209.)
_ Gulahek, September 13, 1907.
I HAVE already drawn your attention, in my telegram No. 253 of the 10th instant,,
to the grave situation in which the European'employes of the Oil Syndicate find
themselves owing to the aggressive attitude of the tribesmen in the neighbourhood of
the borings, the utter failure of the Bakhtiari guards to afford them adequate protection,
and the dilatoriness of the Bakhtiari Chiefs in administering punishment, and then
only under the strongest pressure, to the authors of the various outrages committed in
the last few months. I now have the honour to transmit copy of a report on the
subject which I have received from His Majesty’s Vice-Consul at Abwaz.
Captain Lorimer has had a long experience of the temper of the tribesmen and of
local conditions. I feel convinced that he would not adopt the pessimistic tone which
inspires his despatch without good reason, and that he has not exaggerated the dangers
of the situation. I cannot, therefore, help regarding with grave apprehension the
possibility of a renewed and more serious outbreak by which the lives of British subjects
and the valuable property of the Oil Syndicate in those regions would be threatened
with destruction, and the creation of a situation in which decisive action on the part of
His Majesty s Grovernment would become imperatively necessary, equally for the
protection of British subjects and interests as for the signal vindication of European
prestige among these semi-barbarous tribes.
Upon hearing of the assault in July last on Mr. Harris, I at once made strong
representations to the Persian Government, with the result that pressing instructions
were sent by the late Attabek ordering the Bakhtiari Chiefs immediately to take steps
for the arrest and punishment of the offenders. On receiving Captain Lorimer’s latest
report I renewed my representations privately, and to-day received a reply from
Saad-ed-Dowleh, the new Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the effect that fresh instruc
tions have been telegraphed to the Shahab and Samsam-es-Saltaneh to see justice done.
In view of the fact that the orders of the Attabek, who was known to command the
respect of the Khans, were either evaded or so obeyed as to produce no moral effect
whatever, I am not at all sanguine that the instructions of a Minister, whose recent
appointment to office has been by no means viewed with general approval, will be fruitful
of result.
The impotence of the Central Government to deal with these and similar cases is,
1 venture to think, amply demonstrated by the series of reports I have had the honour
of addressing to you, and I accordingly submit that, in order to avert what would be at
best a situation of extreme embarrassment, there are two courses open to His Majesty’s
Government—either to recommend to the Oil Syndicate the complete withdrawal of
their employes from Persia, or to afford them adequate protection in the places where
they are conducting their operations.
The disadvantages of the latter alternative, both on the ground of the general
policy pursued by His Majesty’s Government in regard to this country and in view of the
lately accentuated dislike of foreign enterprise and suspicion of foreign intervention in
Persia, are too evident for it to be necessary for me to dwell upon them. I venture,
however, to call your serious attention to the grave consequences which would be
involved by the withdrawal of the Syndicate’s representatives. A probably fatal blow
would be struck at British prestige, for whatever be the ostensible reason for withdrawal,
the^ tribesmen and their Chiefs will ascribe to it no other motive than fear. The
borings with their costly engineering plant would have to be abandoned; the sums
expended by the Syndicate in experimental labours, amounting, I believe, to some
100,000/., would be lost, for even were the responsibility fixed on the Persian Govern
ment, and they would usee very effort to shelve it on the ground that they had not
recognized the Agreement between the Syndicate and the Bakhtiari Khans, they would
be utterly unable to meet the claim; lastly, a possible supply of neutral petroleum,
under neither American nor Russian control, would be lost or indefinitely postponed.
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