File 2626/1905 ‘Persia:- Military Attaché at Meshed’ [‎14v] (33/532)

6
Inclosure 2 in No. 1.
Major Sykes to Government of India.
(Secret.) Meshed, September 7, 1905.
WITH reference to Colonel Mincliin’s letter dated the 9th February, 1905, to
the Government of India, and Sir Arthur Hardinge’s letter dated the -Ind May, 190a,
to Lord Lansdowne, I have been awaiting the Minister’s arrival before addressing you
on this very important subject. „ ^ -n x t> • ,1 in
2. I consider that Meshed, as the chief town -of North-East Persia, and a holy
city visited annually by thousands of pilgrims, is a unique centre^ for spreading a
network of intelligence all over Central Asia. I also hold that it is equally unique
as a training centre. # .
In case of the invasion of India by Russia, which is, after all, the only military
problem of first-rate importance which confronts the Government of India, the
r61e to he played by the Meshed staff, whether actually at Meshed or not the
Russians might occupy the city—would he one of the utmost importance. This
is so self-evident that I need not enlarge on it, but will at once come to my
point.
3. Briefly I recommend that Meshed should he considered to be a field section
of the Intelligence Branch, and that its present scale should be expanded with
caution but yet with determination.
I hold that Intelligence men should not be trained in India, but should be
selected from among our picked agents who have proved their capacity. They could
be sent to India for special training and study of the various kinds of armaments,
&c., and thus be able to report with certainty whether a battery was composed of
siege or field guns and so forth. They would be encouraged while at their posts to
become proficient in Russian and the languages of Central Asia. If money was
forthcoming for this scheme we should be training men to do the same work in peace
as in war, and this is universally acknowledged to be extremely desirable. I think
that the results already obtained by Captain Smyth are such as to warrant the
presumption that, given a larger budget, still better results may be anticipated.
4. To organize such a corps, and, still more, to secure continuity of working which,
in my opinion, is vital in handling such delicate mechanism, I think that an
assistant in the shape of an officer in the Intelligence Branch might well be
appointed to Meshed. He would, in any case, obtain most valuable training in
dealing with all sorts and conditions of Asiatics, not to mention Russians and
Belgians.
As much of the intelligence work is necessarily of a preparatory nature,
surely the milieu of Meshed would be ideal.
5. A translator (on a salary of 150 rupees Indian silver coin also widely used in the Persian Gulf. per mensem, rising to 250 rupees Indian silver coin also widely used in the Persian Gulf. per
mensem) should be appointed to this office under the Native Attache. This man
would deal with the accounts and translate the numerous letters, besides, of course,
assisting in the dispatch of the agents.
. 6- In my opinion and that of Captain Smyth, both the Military Attache and the
Assistant should be, as is now the case with Captain Smyth, under the orders of the
Consul-General. I differ in this from Colonel Minchin, who advocated a separate
establishment. Experience is, however, against creating an imperium in imperio, and
any separation would, I fear, lead to friction much greater than any that need be
apprehended under the scheme outlined by me. At present there is no friction,
the system by which Captain Smyth increases his usefulness at the expense
or the Consulate-General is only possible as a temporary measure. In this connection
I agree with what Colonel Minchin has written on this subject, and would refer to
his full and lucid explanations.
7. I also agree as to the Secret Service budgets being separated, with the reser
vation that one budget be allowed to aid the other, if in a position to do so. Of
course if my views be accepted the cost would be greater than at present, but, in my
opimon no money could be better spent. The lessons of the recent war constitute an
indisputable proof of the above.
m , ?* I 1 iia ^ e “? t allu(led to the possibility of the establishment of a Consulate at
betorM wfit-lT P ° Sltl( ? n f Meshed - « founded no intelligence system could
be worked from it at any rate for some years—as the Consulate would be full of
informers and watched by the secret police. Moreover, men working from a pilgrim
w