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'Quetta-Seistan Railway' [12v] (10/12)
The record is made up of 1 file (6 folios). It was created in 26 Jul 1916-4 Aug 1916. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .
Transcription
This transcription is created automatically. It may contain errors.
solely on this ground. We did not begin a Tigris railway last Novem her
because the military authorities thought that the military operations would
be 1 ini shed before the railway ; and it would be imprudent to rely on
similar expectations in Persia.
In any case it would seem advisable to get on to Dalbandin as quickly
as possible, and be guided by events on getting there.
It may, perhaps, be added that this Department advised the construction
of this line some months ago, but had in mind a light railway only.
27th July 1016.
MINUTE BY GENERAL SIR EDMUND BARROW, G.C.B.
I am concerned only with the military aspects of this case, but even those
embrace such wide considerations that I cannot fully deal with them within
the limited scope of an office “minute.” Happily the ABC of the subject
is tersely expressed in the passages from Lord Curzon’s minutes quoted
above. Quite briefly those elementary considerations emphasize the cardinal
point that Seistan will some day inevitably be necessary to us, not for an
offensive campaign against Russia, but for the indirect defence of India.
It is, in fact, a bastion covering a sally port against either a Russian march
from Herat to Kandahar or a Russian advance to Southern Persia and
the sea.
When the subject was taken up in 1911 in connection with the scheme
of linking up the European and Indian Railways, the Government of
India practically endorsed the views of the military authorities in India that
any connection should be from Bunder Abbas along the sea coast to Karachi,
and not via Seistan and Nushki. I will not waste time b}' going into
the presentation of the case made by the then Chief of the General Staff
(Sir Douglas Haig), but I will merely observe that the General Staff case
rests on the supposition that the guns of the fleet will always be available
to protect our railway along the Mekran Coast, a supposition which will
not bear examination as some new combination, such as a Russo-Japanese
alliance against us, might deprive us of local Naval superiority. Moreover,
I cannot conceive a more inhospitable alignment for a railway than the
Mekran Coast in summer, whether it be for war or commerce. We have
seen lately what the Indus Valley line is like in summer. The Mekran
line would be no better. On the other hand, the Seistan-Nushki alignment
is along the high ground of the Pcrso-Baluch plateau, which, at any rate, is
climatically preferable. I hat line has, however, been condemned by some
of oui militaiv advisers on the ground that it is readily exposed to attack,
and might be seized and utilized by our enemy. In reply, I would only say
that the gicat Napoleon laid it down as an axiom that the greatest military
obstacle in nature was a desert, and I would point out that the northern
flank ol this line is protected by the Dasht-i-Lut, the swamps of Seistan, the
i asht-i-Muigo, and the Registan, so that Napoleon would have considered
it an ideal line for safety from serious attack. I am not talking of the
attacks of a few marauders with a sack full of combustibles.
Assuming then that there are no tenable military objections to a railway
line from Kushlu to Seistan we come to the immediate question at issue.
1 he distance to Robat is 360 miles; therefore at the very least the entire
bno would take 1, years to build, that is to say it would not be ready for
use till the hot weather of 1918, and therefore it is not likely, I trust, to be of
muc i use o us c uimg the present war. lor this reason 1 am inclined to agree
wn i the compromise proposed by the Commander-in-Chief, viz., to continue
e , wa > 0 ft -mik in and trust to motor and camel transport for the
i ^ K ( hstancc is 120 miles onlv and therefore we might
C ,° Vtr tl "j\ dlst;mce m six or seven months,'that is to say by the end
with the waL* C ° C season ’ w ^ en ^ ma y sbH be useful to us in connection
whethlrTe^l diV t0 aU ''L b ^ leuw 'ii l 16 u matter for consideration
1 ‘ oul ' 1 carr y 11 furth( H' for commercial purposes. It is possible
About this item
- Content
This file consists of a report by the Secretary of State for India [Joseph Austen Chamberlain], which is addressed to the Prime Minister [Herbert Henry Asquith]. The report concerns a proposal, made by the Commander-in-Chief in India [Sir Beauchamp Duff], to extend the Quetta–Nushki railway to Seistan, on the grounds that it is a 'cogent military necessity'.
The report includes extracts from a telegram and a minute from the former Viceroy and Governor-General of India in Council, Lord Curzon, dated 4 September 1899 and 28 October 1901, which summarise the history of the proposed scheme and the various political, strategic and commercial arguments and counter-arguments relating to it.
This summary is followed by two telegrams from the current Viceroy [Frederic John Napier Thesiger], dated 26 July and 29 July 1916 respectively. The first of these summarises the current military case for an extension to the line (which was put forward by the Commander-in-Chief in India) as follows: any continuation of the recent Turkish advance into Western Persia may result in the Government of India having to increase its military presence in Eastern Persia, which would require improved communications between Nushki and Seistan; it is further argued that a broad-gauge railway – running from Nushki to at least as far Dalbandin – although more expensive than mechanical transport, would be a preferred solution to the current reliance on camel transport.
The first telegram provides the Government of India's response to these proposals. It argues that the scheme can only be justified on 'cogent military grounds', before adding that the limitation of the extension to Dalbandin would be a half measure which would not provide adequate relief to the current situation, nor aid wider strategic contingencies.
The second telegram details the Railway Board's rough estimate of the cost of extending the line (2,000,000 l ).
Also included in the report are the following three minutes:
- a minute from the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. 's Political Department, dated 27 July 1916, which refrains from expressing an opinion on the strategic implications of extending the line, but concludes that the commercial prospects would be sufficient to warrant constructing a line. The minute opines that an extension as far as Dalbandin would be the more practical of Duff's two proposals;
- a minute, dated 28 July 1916, in which the Military Secretary to the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , General Sir Edmund Barrow GCB, makes the argument that the entire line would take one and a half years to build, and that therefore it is not likely to be of use during the present war. Barrow supports the Commander-in-Chief's suggestion of extending the line as far as Dalbandin, in the hope that it may be of some use in the war effort (the implication being that motor and camel transport could be relied upon from Dalbandin to Seistan);
- a minute from the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for India, Sir Thomas William Holderness, dated 29 July 1916. The minute argues that a decision on whether to extend the line should be made based on the actual or possible necessities of the present war, and that future political, commercial or strategic requirements should not come into consideration.
The Secretary of State for India begins the report with an extract from a private telegram, dated 25 July 1916, from the Viceroy to the Secretary of State for India, in which the Viceroy suggests that the matter requires the advice of the Chief of Imperial General Staff (Sir William Robert Robertson).
The Secretary of State for India informs the Prime Minister that an immediate decision is required on the following:
- whether an extension of the line is a 'cogent military necessity', which should be undertaken at once;
- whether the extension can be carried out in time to be of use for the purposes stated by the Commander-in-Chief;
- whether an extension to Dalbandin would be sufficient.
- Extent and format
- 1 file (6 folios)
- Arrangement
The papers are arranged in approximate chronological order from the front to the rear of the file.
- Physical characteristics
Foliation: the foliation sequence for this description commences at f 8, and terminates at f 13, as it is part of a larger physical volume; these numbers are written in pencil, are circled, and are located in the top right corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. side of each folio. A previous foliation sequence, which is also circled, has been superseded and therefore crossed out.
- Written in
- English in Latin script View the complete information for this record
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- Reference
- IOR/L/PS/18/C152
- Title
- 'Quetta-Seistan Railway'
- Pages
- 8r:13v
- Author
- East India Company, the Board of Control, the India Office, or other British Government Department
- Usage terms
- Open Government Licence