'File 19/109 VI (C 45) Bahrain Relations with Foreign Powers' [‎25r] (66/520)

e mg himself had taken part together with several of the princes. According
o one account this was the sequel to a demonstration by Meccans on the previous
day, the reception of which by the King proved to be favourable, whereupon the
Kings own JMejdis, of whom a great number would appear to have come back
with him from Rmdh, asked to be allowed to perform. This happy accident
theory is discounted by the fact that a dance of the same kind, though on a smaller
scale, was a leature of the celebration of the King's accession at a sort of official
J He champet re between Jedda and Mecca on January 9th. Anyhow the Neidi
dance was done again at a Bedouin review in Jedda on February 27th. On this
occasion the King was present but only the princes took part led by the Emir
JFeisal, who performed very gracefully in front of the diplomats accredited to the
Government in which he is Minister for Foreign Affairs. Next day the Jeddawais
a; ked to be allowed to shew what they could do and for several days demonstrations
on a considerable scale took place outside the Palace.
10. These events have probably a political significance. The Nejdi dancing
is a revival of a practice, which has it seems been in abeyance for 15 or 20 years^
although the skill shewn by the dancers proves that it must have been kept up
somehow, even though not officially countenanced. It may be taken as a wor kin g
theory, provided it be not assumed too confidently, that Ibn Sa'ud is anxious to
efface some of the differences between the Hejaz and Nejd and is prepared to ride
his subjects in both Kingdoms on a looser reign than is admitted by the extreme
tenets of Wahhabism. Drums were a notable feature in the dancing demons
trations and even more musical instruments have of late been tolerated. " Ibn Sa'ud
built formerly on an aggressive Wahhabism, which was turned against him by
the rebels of 1929. He would now appear to be building on compromise with
a world in which it pays to seek popularity and a flesh which in the Hejaz at least
has always been weak. But he remains too good a Moslem to have much use for
the devil, at any rate the foreign devil.
11. —FRONTIE R QUE STlONS .
Tmnsjordan.—■MacDonnell Investigation.
11. No information reached Jedda during January and February regarding
the action taken by His Majesty's Government on Mr. MacDonnell's report ; nor
was any reply returned to the Hejazi Government's Note of December 24th regard
ing the Beni Atiya [December Report, Section 5 (a)].
12. Current raiding. —The lull noted in the December report. Section 5
continued until late in January. Trans-Jordan complained of one raid from
Nejd on January 25th. Up to the end of February the Hejazi Government had
alleged a raid from Trans-Jordan on a date between February 3rd and 7th and two
others on February 10th and 13th. On three occasions His Majesty's High
Commissioner for Trans-Jordan drew the attention of the Legation at Jedda to
reports of preparations for raids. These reports were duly communicated to the
M ini stry of Foreign Affairs. The Hejazi Government suggested that the first report
had its origin in certain measures taken to collect taxes in the Wadi A seasonal or intermittent watercourse, or the valley in which it flows. Sirhan. They
indignantly denied the later report and ascribed them to the activities of Captain
Glubb, the desert control officer in Trans-Jordan who had been appointed in pur
suance of the programme adopted by His Majesty's Government last autumn.
13. Correspondence also passed regarding various "raids alleged to have taken
place in the latter part of 1930. In this, as well as in the correspondence relative to
the raids and rumours of raids mentioned in the last paragraph, the Legation
sought to impress on the Hejazi Government the importance of taking measures
on their side as efficacious as those adopted in Trans-Jordan and more especially
of arranging for direct communication between the authorities on both sides of the
frontier, as provided in Article 3 of the Hadda Agreement. The correspondence
thus bore not only on particular raids and rumours but on the general situation.
Its details were, however, submerged in the crisis to be described in the following
paragraphs.
14. General Frontier Situation. —While the correspondence mentioned in the
two preceding paragraphs was proceeding, the visit of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin to