'Monograph on the Aden Hinterland as touching the States of Dthala, Yafa', Alawi, etc., by Major H F Jacob, late Political Agent, Dthala.' [‎8v] (21/48)

8
iiistructions received by the Residency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, established in the provinces and regions considered part of, or under the influence of, British India. were in favour ot a minimum of inter
ference. It was thought possible that interference spelled serious complication
in Arab affairs, and that this might postpone, or even impede, our withdrawal.
To one on the spot it was apparent that our failure to step in and adjudicate
in the Amiri-Jihafi fracas was provocative of much lasting mischief and has
tended considerably towards hastening the breaking up of the Amir’s authority
in that direction. A demonstration as suggested by me was vetoed as unpalat
able to Government. I bid bold to say that by it the relative positions on that
Hill of Amir and tribesmen might at one time have been amicably and finally
settled for 1 possessed the requisite local knowledge for this purpose. The Amir,
as admitted to me by the Saiyid of the Hill, might by Koranic sanction have
received dues from the people if they were w illing to acknowledge his suzerainty
and if he utilised these collections not solely for himself as he had tried to do,
but as in detail prescrib°d by the Code of Islam. In spite of all I have
said above of Arab predilection and the tribal practice of democracy, it was
possible at one time for us to have dovetailed expediency and propriety with
usage in such a way as to have attained our purpose and have main
tained order. TVb should have avoided the undesirable volte-face where w’e
started by bolstering up the Amir and then suddenly left him to his
fate, ourselves standing by as impassive spectators of his crumbling inheritance.
Time may effect some'sort of compensation and the pendulum, as years go on,
may swing to the other extreme, hut the idea now predominant in the Amir’s
mind is that we have raised him up only to let him fall perhaps lower than
he was before wx' came up. This is not solely my private opinion. It is the
universal verdict of the people and of the Rulers from Aden upwards,
and throughout the entire country side. Moreover, although the language is
somewhat strong it is true that many a chief seeing our Janus-faced policy of
interference-cum-non-intervention has argued that the friendship of Govern
ment while it offers much to attract is amenable to change and modification,
and that suddenly. To use a common expression, they do not know, many
of them, just how "they stand. “ We note the Amir is no longer your friend.
Declare for him and the whole country will come round to your view. Is that
how you treat your friends ? ” Such expressions have been bandied about of
late at Dthala, and eisewdiere.
18. I have tried to stand in the background and have suggested reforms
to the Amir and have at times succeeded in getting him to make concessions
which finally emanated as his own ; but in Amir Shaif’s case to have adopted
the unadulterated role of mere adviser, on the Indian plan, was impracticable,
and if strictly adhered to in practice, we should long since have found our
selves in a position in which, while falling short of the accomplishment of those
administrative reforms wdnch it was a desideratum to secure, w r e should as
surely have suffered the indignity and loss of prestige caused by open failure
of our efforts in that direction. Amir Shaif was expected, on our arrival, to set
his house in order, and to give a ready ear to political advice, but the peculiar
nature of the Arab social structure rendered the task almost Herculean, if the
instruments for its execution were to be sought in the armoury of the Dthala
Amir. We, how ever, did not go far enough. In the words of Lord Lawwence
“ Clubs not spades were the trumps ” we should oflentimes have played. A
demonstration on Jabal Jihaf w^ould have cleared the political horizon
and this could have been arranged without wounding tribal
susceptibilities, for the Amir would have been made to coniine himself
thereafter strictly within his own preserve. We have before rescued the Amir
from the dunghill and set him among Princes. It w^as our prerogative to call
the tune since we have all along paid the piper so liberally. What I have depre
cated was the change in our policy. We might have accomplished so much :
we have accomplished so little. “It is not necessary to change our road,”
says Ilazlitt, “ in order to advance on our journey.” It had been better to
have adhered to our original principles than to halt between two opinions.
Enlargement, correction, and consolidation were preferable.
Iff. It may De asked w'hat after all has been effected in Vthala affairs.
Jabal Jihaf is still recalcitrant and have made a compact .with the ShairU to
withstand the Amir if be prove aggressive. Erom June 1900 to the beginning