Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎150ar] (309/312)

2
PALL MALL GAZETTE.
[October 19, 1878.
EPITOME OF OPINION IN THE MORNING JOURNALS.
england, russia, and afghanistan.
The Morning Post observes that the public have little cause for com
plaint at the lack of information on the question of Afghanistan. There
is, however, one grievance in this respect, and it well deserves the considera
tion of the Foreign Office. It is not a little singular that though the public
have learned from unofficial sources the frlsh promises which Russia has
made to the present Government, the latter, should refrain from carrying
out their undertaking given to Parliament in the early part of August,
and let the world know in what respect the pledges of the Czar and his
Ministers have been broken. The more light that can be thrown upon
the actions and policy of the Russian Government in Central Asia the
greater the encouragement which our own Government is likely to
receive in the energetic course upon which they seem to have embarked.
Supremacy cannot be gained by permitting Russia to regard Afghanistan
as within the sphere of her influence, or by allowing Shere Ali to receive
Russian envoys. Nor can it be obtained without the use of British
Residents at the Cabul Court and at other strategical points in Afghan
istan, like Balk, Herat, and Candahar. These are the least of the courses
which can secure what Mr. Cross declares to be the essentials of our
policy. Should the Ameer's answer fall short of these proposals, and show
a temporising spirit in order to gain time for further preparations, or for
securing the indirect assistance which Russia will not hesitate to give, the
Indian Government will be justified in commencing their advance.
The Dai'/y Neivs, discussing a letter ^hich it prints from Sir Henry
Havelock upon the danger of Russia's presence in Afghanistan and
the necessity to England of an offensive and defensive alliance with
the Ameer, says it fails to see the efficacy of such an alliance
forced upon Afghanistan by threats or 1 by military operations. The
influence of Russia, which now is described as supersubtle and
all-pervading, could surely not be exorcised by the magic of a treaty
with Shere Ali. Apparently the Ameer is not quite convinced of our
friendly intentions even now. A little force would doubtless compel
him to yield, but would hardly buy his confidence and secure his affection.
If it be found necessary to have a treaty with the Ameer let us have it,
but let no statesman or soldier be weak enough to think that we have
by virtue of that mere engagement secured a perpetual friend and put
an impassable barrier in the way of hostile influence. In truth, the best
plan, if not the only plan, of winning and keeping the confidence of a
population like that of Afghanistan is by proving that we are not aggressive;
that we are not selfish; that we will not allow every momentary alarm to
force us into being unjust and unscrupulous towards our weaker neigh
bours. However we are to get out of oui: present difficulties, the News
does not believe that extension of frontier or annexation of territory will
do anything more for us than to help us into new complications.
austria and the porte.
The Standard finds it rather startling to be told that, now the Court
of Vienna has received and answered the communication of the Porte
concerning the Austrian occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
relations of Austria and Turkey are greatly improved. Yet the politics of
the East are so fertile in paradoxes that it would not be wise to deny that
the semblance of a better understanding may ensue from these curious
recriminations. Nevertheless, Austria and Turkey cannot possibly trust each
other; and one of them at any rate has the best reasons for viewing the
other with suspicion. What is Austria aiming at ? That is a question much
debated in Austria itself, and still more earnestly in Hungary; but no one
seems able to find a definite and certain answer to the question. English
statesmen flatter themselves that Count Andrassy is consciously and inten
tionally assisting them to erect a barrier against the designs of Russia
upon the Turkish Empire, and against the Panslavic idea generally. But
Austria is itself a Slav Power; and the approbation which the entry into
Bosnia has met with in Croatia is a significant symptom. The occupation of
Bosnia is a step towards the completion of a political and military position,
whence Austria could either co-operate in checking Russia's territorial
aggrandisement in the direction of Constantinople, or could procure for itself
strategical compensation for tolerating that aggrandisement within certain
limits. This circumstance it is, doubtless, which renders the Porte uneasy.
The tendency of the moment at Constantinople seems to be to accept
with cheerful resignation what has been done in Bosnia, and to
dissuade Austria from carrying the operation further. But the Treaty of
Berlin conferred on that Power larger rights than have yet been exercised
under it. And there are those who think that Austria's advance will not
finally cease until it finds for itself a natural limit at Salonica.
mr, cross in lancashire,
The Times, commenting upon Mr. Cross's speech at Southport, says
that on the question of finance he seems to have displayed a wise
courage. He has, so to say, taken the bull by the horns. There
has been a good deal of uneasiness felt as to the great increase which
has been going on in our public expenditure. Here was likely to be
the weak point of the present Government. They have spent money
freely, and this at a time when trade is bad and when the revenue has
ceased to be elastic. Mr. Cross on this matter displays some skill
in choosing his line of defence. But when all has been said that
Mr. Cross has to say, the fact remains that there has been a very large
increase in our expenditure, and that this will have to be met by a corre
sponding increase in our burdens. It is not enough to prove, in such a
case as this, that the country ought to be tolerant of the new weight
which will be thrown upon it. The weight has not yet begun to be
felt, yet there is already a good deal of grumbling in advance over the
prospect of next January, and there is no reason to suppose that anything
will happen in the course of next April to lessen it. If there is a rock
ahead of the Ministry in any direction, it is in the matter of finance that
it may be looked for with most certainty. The country, no doubt, can
bear all that will be laid upon it. It is less certain how far it will like
the infliction, or what amount of gratitude it will display towards those
whom it will hold responsible for it.
the speech of the italian prime minister.
The Daily Telegraph remarks that great expectations had been
excited throughout the Continent generally, in anticipation of the address
which the Italian Premier, Count Cairoli, has at last delivered. The
unsatisfactory condition of affairs in Italy, the machinations of those
advocating " Italia Irredenta" principles, the tension in the relation
between the Quirinal and the Papacy, and the irritating demonstra
tions in which Italians of late have indulged, combined to render |
the Premier's speech of more than ordinary significance, and it was 1
hoped that Count Cairoli's oration would enunciate with clearness
and decision the policy, internal and external, which his Govern
ment have resolved to adopt. Anticipation has, however, been unplea
santly disappointed. Irresolution, except in respect of one particular
impost, is everywhere apparent. Beneath the impracticable and senseless
cry of "Italia Irredenta" will be found something more dangerous to
the peace of Italy than even a rupture with her Northern neighbours.
And it is to be regretted that Count Cairoli's speech at a critical time
like the present should have contained no condemnation of the pro
ceedings of the Irredenta association. His own connection with the
movement is likely to be misconstrued, and any injudicious pandering to [
the predilections and aspirations of the organization are calculated seriously i
to imperil the urgent interests of the country.
OP FN ION IN THE WEEKLY REVIEWS.
afghanistan.
The Saturday Review remarks that every day which in passing reduces
the interval between early autumn and winter diminishes the probability of
an immediate advance of the English army into Afghanistan. Some of
the reasons which might justify a consistent policy, insufficiently explain
an alleged change of purpose. It is said that the Ameer has placed in
the fort of Ali Musjid an unexpectedly strong garrison; but it is
scarcely possible that any responsible officer can have allowed his
plans to depend on the strength of the force which the enemy
might place at any single post. There is happily no ground for
further solicitude as to the fate of the Nawab An honorific title; an official acting as a provincial deputy ruler in South Asia; or a significant Muslim landowner in nineteenth century India. Gholam Hussein Khan, who
has returned to the frontier with the Ameer's answer to the Viceroy;
but if the temporary possession of a hostage has given the Ameer \
the incalculable advantage of postponing a conflict for several months,
it is difficult to condemn too strongly the rashness which placed the
envoy in his hands. It would have been easy to forward letters
through the frontier posts without incurring the alternative of exposing
a valuable public servant to great personal risk, or enabling the enemy to
choose his own time for beginning the war. The despatch of Sir Neville
Chamberlain's mission still requires explanation. It was highly probable
that, as the event proved, Shere Ali would profit by the opportunity to offer
a public affront to the English Government. That a whole winter should be
allowed to elapse before redress could be exacted is an inconvenience
which seems to have been wantonly encountered. Time has now been
allowed for the Russians to organize resistance, and to prosecute intrigues
with native Indian potentates.
The Spectator says the policy finally adopted by Lord Lytton, and the
arguments presented by Sir James Stephen to the country, through the
Times of Wednesday, both point to the same conclusion—that it is expe
dient for Great Britain to conquer Afghanistan. England and Russia must
meet, and the question to be settled is the place of meeting most advan
tageous for the British. Sir James Stephen believes that this would be the
Hindoo Koosh, with Afghanistan in our own hands. One single but immense
fallacy underlies his whole argument. He assumes that in taking military
possession of Afghanistan, the Government of India will have changed its
position in regard to Russia; the Spectator asserts that it will not have
changed it at all, except for the worse. We shall, when Afghanistan is
held down by "military positions," or annexed, be just where we are
now, or rather, where we should be if Cabul were a dependency of
Russia—that is, we shall be behind a vast mountain-chain, pierced by
few passes, and held on the other side by a possible enemy of great
military resources. This chain, the Hindoo Koosh, is not yet proved
to be stronger on the Russian side than the Suleiman—which just
at this^ moment is keeping us out in the most suggestive manner
—while it is weaker on the Persian side, Persians having repeatedly
invaded, and once at least conquered and held, Afghanistan. We should,
therefore, have to do in Afghanistan precisely what Sir James says we
must otherwise do in India, and do it in a country 400 miles
further from our permanent base, the sea, so rugged that railways would
either be hopeless or excessively costly, and so raised into the air that^ the
Sepoys Term used in English to refer to an Indian infantryman. Carries some derogatory connotations as sometimes used as a means of othering and emphasising race, colour, origins, or rank. of the plains are cowed, and almost paralyzed by the winter
climate. Moreover, the Afghans do not want to be conquered, or con
trolled, or officered by Russians, any more than by Englishmen. The
Russians could no more rule them than we can without annexing them,
nor could she let them loose for plunder in India without rousing India
into a hearty cordial fighting adherence to us, which in a week would
make India impregnable.
the position of the republic in france.
The Economist observes that some surprise has been expressed in this
country at the moderation of M. Gambetta's speeches at Grenoble as
compared with the one delivered at Romans, Those, however, who
express this feeling fail to appreciate fully what has occurred in the
interval. In the first place, the Ministers who were censured, or
rather advised that censure might be forthcoming, have, for the most
u=
PALL MALL
[October 19, 1878.
morning journals.
vfghanistan.
mblic have little cause for com-
icstion of Afghanistan. There
id it well deserves the considera-
; singular that though the public
;sh promises which Russia has
ir. should refrain from carrying
: in the early part of August,
ie pledges of the Czar and his
light that can be thrown upon
vernment in Central Asia the
iwn Government is likely to
they seem to have embarked.
; Russia to regard Afghanistan
3y allowing Shere Ali to receive
d. without the use of British
ler strategical points in Afghan-
ese are the least of the courses
>s to be the essentials of our
irt of these proposals, and show
for further preparations, or for
ia will not hesitate to give, the
mencing their advance.
'hich it prints from Sir Henry
presence in Afghanistan and
; and defensive alliance with
efficacy of such an alliance
by military operations. The
(escribed as supersubtle and
sed by the magic of a treaty
is not quite convinced of our
force would doubtless compel
idence and secure his affection,
with the Ameer let us have it,
enough to think that we have
ed a perpetual friend and put
e influence. In truth, the best
d keeping the confidence of a
iving that we are not aggressive;
[low every momentary alarm to
•us towards our weaker neigh-
; present difficulties, the JVe7vs
or annexation of territory will
to new complications.
porte.
0 be told that, now the Court
e communication of the Porte
Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
improved. Yet the politics of
would not be wise to deny that
may ensue from these curious
urkey cannot possibly trust each
e best reasons for viewing the
ig at ? That is a question much
aestly in Hungary; but no one
5wer to the question. English
drassy is consciously and inten-
against the designs of Russia
Panslavic idea generally. But
(probation which the entry into
nt symptom. The occupation of
1 political and military position,
n checking Russia's territorial
nople, or could procure for itself
; aggrandisement within certain
jvhich renders the Porte uneasy,
tinople seems to be to accept
;n done in Bosnia, and to
on further. But the Treaty of
s than have yet been exercised
that Austria's advance will not
1 limit at Salonica.
ashirk.
ross's speech at Southport, says
ns to have displayed a wise
5 bull by the horns. There
as to the great increase which
liture. Here was likely to be
it. They have spent money
^ad and when the revenue has
s matter displays some skill
when all has been said that
tat there has been a very large
will have to be met by a corre-
not enough to prove, in such a
)e tolerant of the new weight
ght has not yet begun to be
grumbling in advance over the
eason to suppose that anything
) lessen it. If there is a rock
s in the matter of finance that
it may be looked for with most certainty. The country, no doubt, can
bear all that will be laid upon it. It is less certain how far it will like
the infliction, or what amount of gratitude it will display towards those
whom it will hold responsible for it.
the speech of the italian prime minister.
The Dat'ly Telegraph remarks that great expectations had been
excited throughout the Continent generally, in anticipation of the address
which the Italian Premier, Count Cairoli, has at last delivered. The
unsatisfactory condition of affairs in Italy, the machinations of those
advocating " Italia Irredenta" principles, the tension in the relation
between the Quirinal and the Papacy, and the irritating demonstra
tions in which Italians of late have indulged, combined to render
the Premier's speech of more than ordinary significance, and it was
hoped that Count Cairoli's oration would enunciate with clearness
and decision the policy, internal and external, which his Govern
ment have resolved to adopt. Anticipation has, however, been unplea
santly disappointed. Irresolution, except in respect of one particular
impost, is everywhere apparent. Beneath the impracticable and senseless
cry of "Italia Irredenta" will be found something more dangerous to
the peace of Italy than even a rupture with her Northern neighbours.
And it is to be regretted that Count Cairoli's speech at a critical time
like the present should have contained no condemnation of the pro
ceedings of the Irredenta association. His own connection with the
movement is likely to be misconstrued, and any injudicious pandering to
the predilections and aspirations of the organization are calculated seriously
to imperil the urgent interests of the country.
OP FN I ON IN THE WEEKLY REVIEWS.
afghanistan.
The Saturday Review remarks that every day which in passing reduces
the interval between early autumn and winter diminishes the probability of
an immediate advance of the English army into Afghanistan. Some of
the reasons which might justify a consistent policy insufficiently explain
an alleged change of purpose. It is said that the Ameer has placed in
the fort of Ali Musjid an unexpectedly strong garrison; but it is
scarcely possible that any responsible officer can have allowed his
plans to depend on the strength of the force which the enemy
might place at any single post. There is happily no ground for
further solicitude as to the fate of the Nawab An honorific title; an official acting as a provincial deputy ruler in South Asia; or a significant Muslim landowner in nineteenth century India. Gholam Hussein Khan, who
has returned to the frontier with the Ameer's answer to the Viceroy;
but if the temporary possession of a hostage has given the Ameer
the incalculable advantage of postponing a conflict for several months,
it is difficult to condemn too strongly the rashness which placed the
envoy in his hands. It would have been easy to forward letters
through the frontier posts without incurring the alternative of exposing
a valuable public servant to great personal risk, or enabling the enemy to
choose his own time for beginning the war. The despatch of Sir Neville
Chamberlain's mission still requires explanation. It was highly probable
that, as the event proved, Shere Ali would profit by the opportunity to offer
a public affront to the English Government. That a whole winter should be
allowed to elapse before redress could be exacted is an inconvenience
which seems to have been wantonly encountered. Time has now been
allowed for the Russians to organize resistance, and to prosecute intrigues
with native Indian potentates.
The Spectator says the policy finally adopted by Lord Lytton, and the
arguments presented by Sir James Stephen to the country, through the
Times of Wednesday, both point to the same conclusion—that it is expe
dient for Great Britain to conquer Afghanistan. England and Russia must
meet, and the question to be settled is the place of meeting most advan
tageous for the British. Sir James Stephen believes that this would be the
Hindoo Koosh, with Afghanistan in our own hands. One single but immense
fallacy underlies his whole argument. He assumes that in taking military
possession of Afghanistan, the Government of India will have changed its
position in regard to Russia; the Spectator asserts that it will not have
changed it at all, except for the worse. We shall, when Afghanistan is
held down by " military positions," or annexed, be just where we are
now, or rather, where we should be if Cabul were a dependency of
R uss i a _that is, we shall be behind a vast mountain-chain, pierced by
few passes, and held on the other side by a possible enemy of great
military resources. This chain, the Hindoo Koosh, is not yet proved
to be stronger on the Russian side than the Suleiman—which just
at this moment is keeping us out in the most suggestive manner
—while it is weaker on the Persian side, Persians having repeatedly
invaded, and once at least conquered and held, Afghanistan. We should,
therefore, have to do in Afghanistan precisely what Sir James says we
must otherwise do in India, and do it in a country 400 miles
further from our permanent base, the sea, so rugged that railways would
either be hopeless or excessively costly, and so raised into the air that the
Sepoys Term used in English to refer to an Indian infantryman. Carries some derogatory connotations as sometimes used as a means of othering and emphasising race, colour, origins, or rank. of the plains are cowed, and almost paralyzed by the winter
climate. Moreover, the Afghans do not want to be conquered, or con
trolled, or officered by Russians, any more than by Englishmen. The
Russians could no more rule them than we can without annexing them,
nor could she let them loose for plunder in India without rousing India
into a hearty cordial fighting adherence to us, which in a week would
make India impregnable.
the position of the republic in france.
The Economist observes that some surprise has been expressed in this
country at the moderation of M. Gambetta's speeches at Grenoble as
compared with the one delivered at Romans. Those, however, who
express this feeling fail to appreciate fully what has occurred in the
interval. In the first place, the Ministers who were censured, or
rather advised that censure might be forthcoming, have, for the most