Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎148r] (304/312)

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LONDON, FRIDAY, OCTOBER 18.
Uneasiness, according to a telegram of yester
day's date from Simla, is being caused by the
mustering of Afghans in the Khyber Pass,
their disposition and intention being unknown. 1
The Peshawur and Kohat garrisons are being re
inforced and placed in a state of readiness.
Our Pera correspondent telegraphs that the
Sultan has written to Shere AH, advising pacific
conduct on the part of Afghanistan towards
England.^
ENGLAND AND CABUL.
LETTER FEOM THE SULTAN.
[BY INDO-EUROPEAN TELEGRAPH.]
[from oub special coerespondenx.]
PERA, T hursday E vening.
The Sultan has written to Shere Ali, advis
ing pacific conduct on the part of Afghanistan
towards England.
[reuter's telegrams.]
SIMLA, O ct. 17.
The mustering of Afghans in the Khyber
Pass is causing uneasiness, their disposi
tion and intentions being unknown. The
Peshawur and Kohat garrisons are being rein
forced and placed in a state of readiness.
Three Punjab regiments have reached Thull.
The Afredi soldiers are rejoining the Punjab
regiments.
It is reported that Ali Musjid and Canda-
har have been largely reinforced.
CONSTANTINOPLE, O ct. 17 (11.15 a.m.)
The Sultan yesterday informed -Sir Henry
Layard that he had despatched a letter to the
Ameer of Afghanistan calling upon him as a
good Mussulman to come to an amicable ar
rangement with the English Government.
According to a telegram forwarded through '
I Baron R euter's Agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. , the assemblage of
j Afghans in the Khyber Pass has caused some
! uneasiness at Simla, because the disposition and
> intentions of S here A li's levies were unknown.
J As a consequence, the garrisons of Kohat and
Peshawur have been reinforced, and we are aware
that a reserve has been ordered to concen
trate at Hassan Abdul. These indications,
coupled with the firm language used by Mr,
C ross at Southport last night, show that the
Supreme Government, fully alive to the emer
gency, is prepared to repel any rash onset, as well
as to carry out the plans implied in the gathering
of forces upon the selected lines of operation.
That the troops in the Peshawur valley should
be augmented follows from the situation created
by the Ameer and his Russian friends ; be
cause it is not improbable that the neighbour
ing tribes may be set on to make a diversion by
raiding on the frontier, and because it is essen
tial to maintain a commanding body of troops
at a point whence an extensive, if not predo
minant, influence is exercised over the whole
region of the Five Rivers. Even were it not
likely that any forward movement ivould be un
dertaken, no Indian Government would leave
Peshawur without the means of striking offensive
blows against the mountaineers, who are always
on the alert at the first symptom of trouble. Inde
pendently, therefore, of other projects involving
hostilities with S here A li, it is most imperative
to hold in adequate strength the mountain-girt
j lowlands which give access to the plains o|.
I Northern India. The troops stationed at Hassan
Abdal will, as we have already explained, be
available either for Peshawur or Kohat. It should
not bo forgotten th at the frontiar pogfo hatra lost
none of their usual garrisons, and that the
columns for active service have been drawn from
the interior cantonments. The line beyond the
Indus is consequently as strong as it was before
the occurrence of the dramatic incident and
grave political event in the mouth of the Khyber
Pass. Provided due diligence and something
more have been displayed in collecting and
equipping the forces destined for Quettah, the
Khurrum Valley and Sukkur, the Government
should Ije in a position to act immediately, and
without a moment's delay, so soon as the
letters brought Ijy our Cabul Envoy have
been received and considered. These may, of
!-course, contain ample satisfaction, and express
a ready compliance with our demands; but,
judging from the past conduct of the Ameer,
and remembering who are near him, no such re
sult can be reasonably expected. Meanwhile
the season for operations in the highlands is
slipping away, and it is obvious that no further
time can be allowed for delusive parleys. The
issues between the Afghan and the Indian Go
vernments—Russian at their source—have grown
to such a dangerous magnitude that common
prudence, as well as sound policy, require their
prompt, entire, and solid settlement, not at
some future date, but now.
It needed not the letter of S^B artle F rere,
published yesterday in the columns of a contem
porary, to show how long those issues have
been maturing, or how frequently their steady
j growth has been emphatically placed before suc-
j cessive Governments. Sir H enry R awlinson
three years ago published the famous " Me
morandum" which, in 1868, he addressed to the
Indian Secretary of'State, who duly forwarded
( the document to the Governor-General. No one
could mistake the tenour, although it was easy
to disregard the warnings, of that powerful paper.
In the yery same year a " Punjab Official" pub
lished a pamphlet at Lahore specially intended to I
| set forth the perils of "masterly inactivity,". I
j and point out whither it would inevitably
lead. " To sum up," he wrote, " the result of
our continued inaction and abstention from in
tervention in the affairs of Cabul and Central
Asia has been to disturb the minds of our Indian
subjects with apprehensions of all sorts of im
pending dangers and disturbances, to shake the
confidence of all the bordering tribes and na
tions in our power and prestige, to encourage
Russia in the boldness of her aggressions, and
to impair the integrity of Afghanistan as a
j buffer between our Indian Empire and Russia."
Such were the effects produced at that period,
j and what was to follow ? "If longer perse-
| vered in," our author averred, " this policy must
[ result in the desertion by Cabul from our alliance
| and her subordination to Russian interests, with j
^ the unknown perils that these are calculated to |
| lead to." Ten years ago the presence of Russian !
influence in Cabul was thus distinctly foreseen. 1
I What would the writer The lowest of the four classes into which East India Company civil servants were divided. A Writer’s duties originally consisted mostly of copying documents and book-keeping. who raised his voice have
I said could he have known that Russia would
annex Khiva, dictate terms of peace at the gates
I of Constantinople, and retain as prize of war
Kars, Ardahan, and Batoum ? We are told, and
j the view is ably expounded by Sir B artlb j
j F rere, that Russia has absorbed Asiatic terri-'
| tory because she is a civilised, living, and growing
| Power, unable, i'f she were willing, to stop her
: own expansion. Granting the truth of this I
j apology, surely it only increases our peril, be- !
j cause the vital expansive forces with which she
! is credited are directed by a settled policy,^
1 the aim of which is to bring her into contact
with England's Eastern realnis. The reduction
of the Caucasus, and the successive expeditions in
Central Asia, were undertaken and carried out i
expressly for the purpose of providing embar- j
rassments for us in case an opportunity offered !
of pushing a traditional policy on the Bosphorus.
That end has been attained, and, as foreseen, i
Russia is in Cabul. There is no real analogy
between the whole motives actuating our pro
ceedings in India and those'governing the move
ments of Russia. When we reached the foot of
the hills we did not threaten her Empire or
! possessions, and our object in conquest was not
to injure her. She, on the contrary, has deli
berately acquired territories that are and always
have been a costly burden, which her people are
i made to bear, because the districts annexed are
; regarded as stepping-stones to domination on the
; Straits and in Asia Minor, and as means of
disturbing British rule in the East. The fruits
of political and military designs worked out'
uninterruptedly for a quarter of a century are
visible in the Treaty of Berlin, " the desertion
of Cabul from our alliance, and her subordina
tion to Russian interests." The attack, as a rule,
is more powerful than the defence. "Russian
policy in Asia," says Sir B artle F rere, " is, as
we all see, positive, active, and aggressive," and
has naturally prevailed over one that has been
" purely negative."
An evil deep-rooted, long-neglected, yet sig
nalised at every stage by men who, putting
phrases aside, kept their eyes steadily on the cen
tral fact, has now <jome to a head. We are
bound to meet it effectually, or tamely submit
to defeat; but we must recognise the veritable
agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. which has brought about the disturbance,
or the measures adopted will be futile. The
partial devices which might have served our
purpose four years ago will no longer suffice.