Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎147r] (302/312)

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AFGHANISTAN.
REPLY OF THE AMEER.
BOMBAY, O ct . 18.
The Times of India publishes a telegram stating
;hat Gholam Hussein Kha,n I;as returned, and that
the reply of the Ameer, of which hs is the bearer,
is unsatisfactory.
According to despatches received here, f the
M^hmands are dividedj in their allegiance to
f ie Ameer. Nowrog -Khan, the late Governor of
Lilpura, has offered to assist the British.
It is stated that desartions occur daily in the
Afghan army, owing to tjae want of food, clothing,
>nd pay.
! ENGLAND, RUSSIA, AND AFGHANISTAN.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir,—The letter of Sir James Stephen in The Times of
the 16th inst., -while stating clearly his views on the
subject of our North-Western policy in India, appears to
me misleading in some of its military aspects, and I shall
be glad if you will afford me an opportunity of reply.
And first as to the general position of Eussia in Central
Asia. Sir James Stephen in his remarks compares it with
that which we held in India in 1803 under Lord Wellesley,
and, although he does not ignore the isolated and precarious
position of the Russian troops in the Central Asian deserts,
he still appears to think that by raising armies and by
forming alliances they may gradually develope into a great
power there, and thus become a danger to us in India.
But the circumstances are almost entirely different. India
and Central Asia do not compare with each other. The
former is a fertile country, and rich in military resources
—that is, in warlike races, in food, forage, fuel, and, now-
a-days, in its roads and communications. It contains
about 200,000,000 people, of different races and religions,
of which the Mahomedans are a minority. By con
quering India we have, in short, obtained a magnificent
empire ; one which under our rule is daily rising in pro
sperity. Civil government is firmly established, and the
military position is far stronger than ever. Our troops,
both English and Native, are well armed and trained ; the
arsenals are fixed at strategical points ; while our internal
communications by river, road, and rail are comparatively
easy, and our resources are capable of almost indefinite
expansion.
Russia in Central Asia holds in virtual subjection the
three great Principalities of Khiva, Bokhara, and Khokand.
This is not very difficult, as their forces are mere armed
rabble, and if the power of Russia in that part of the world
were measured by mere geographical extent, it would be
formidable ; but, in truth, this very extent is the cause of
great weakness. There is a general deficiency throughout
the whole vast region of food, water, fuel, forage, and
roads. The few rivers are difficult of navigation, and the
transport is almost entirely carried on by means of camels.
This latter point at once indicates the desert nature of the
country, and greatly aggravates the difficulty of massing
troops and stores at their outposts. The whole population
of Central Asia in Russian possession does not, it is said
exceed four millions and a half, consisting chiefly of preda
tory tribes thinly scattered over a vast area. They are
fanatical Mahomedans and bitterly hostile, and I have
never heard that Russia has ventured to raise a single
battalion on the spot. Civil government is in its infancy,
and financially the country is a perpetual drain. The
nearest railway station is at Orenburg, about 1,000 miles
from Samarcand, and the country between the Caspian
and Tashkend is for the most part a hopeless desert. It
isi possible that Russia may in time, to some extent, con
solidate her conquests, but the geographical features and
permanent condition of the country are against her.
I can see no analogy between the precarious position of
General Kaufmann amid barren steppes and that of Lord
Wellesley in 1803 standing in the fertile plains of Bengal.
A consideration of all the circumstances would appear to
prove that the present position of Russia in Central Asia is
not one calculated to afford her a favourable base of
operations against our dominion in India. It is very im
portant to have a clear conception on these vital points of
the comparative power of Russia and England in the East.
As regards our frontier policy in the North-West Pro
vinces of India, Sir James Stephen puts forward military
views which, I believe, are held by many—namely, that
we should improve our position by entering the moun
tains and taking possession of the passes in our immediate
front. In my opinion such an idea is a dangerous delu
sion. Afghanistan is a country of mountains, and the
Suliman range which forms our boundary is merely the
first of a series of great ridges, running down south
westerly from the Hindoo Koosh.
If we enter the country and merely hold the nearest
passes, we shall at once find ourselves in a maze of moun"
tains, with dozens of other passes and strong positions in
our front. Not only that, but we shall become involved
with other tribes ; and as soon as our flag is seen flying
within the Afghan mountains our influence will begin to
extend ; political and military complications will arise,
and we shall inevitably be carried forward. In short,
there is no tenable military position such as that imagined
by Sir James Stephen. Afghanistan must be viewed as a
whole ; we cannot halt, nor can we tolerate that Russia or
any other Power than ourselves shall exert military and
political supremacy to the southward of the Hindoo
Koosh. If these military considerations are sound ; if the
mountains of Afghanistan are onr real barriers against
external attack, the broad outlines of our policy would
appear to be defined by the very geographical features of
the country.
For many years past that policy has been consistent, and
may be described as one of conciliation, of mediation, and
of subsidies. Acknowledging the strategical importance of
Afghanistan, our object has been to gain the confi
dence and friendship of the Afghan and Belooch rulers,
and also of the independent frontier tribes, in the hope
that should external danger ever arise they would be on
our side, and be ready to become the joint defender!
with us of their mountain ranges. I always contemplate
the possibility of our having to enter the country for our
own defence, and it should be prepared for by con
ciliating and not by attacking our neighbours.
" Masterly inactivity "is the expression commonly used to
denote the policy which for many years has prevailed. It
is a misleading term, as it conveys the idea that we have
washed our hands of our neighbours' concerns, whereas the
real circumstances are very different. It is true we have
refrained from interference in their internal feuds and
battles. Unless invited to mediate, we have left them to
settle their own affairs, being only anxious to see strong
and quiet Governments established on our borders. With
half-savage, fanatical people like the Afghans and
Beloochees, great difficulties have naturally arisen, but on
the whole we have been successful. For instance, so long
ago as January, 1857, Sir John, now Lord Lawrence, made
a treaty with Dost Mahomed, Shere Ali's father, and by a
large subsidy and present of muskets induced him to drive
the Persians from Herat; but another result indirectly
followed from this successful effort at conciliation. The
great mutiny broke out in May, 1857 ; but although we were
in dire extremity, and although the Punjab was con
siderably denuded of troops for the siege of Delhi, Dost
Mahomed, though much pressed by his people, refused to
allow a single Afghan to attack us in our hour of danger.
That, to my judgment, is a Very pregnant instance that
conciliation and kindness are as likely to bo successful with
Afghans as with other people. Again, in 1869, the late
Lord Mayo received Shere Ali with honour at Umballa,
and by gifts of money and arms gave practical proofs of our
friendship ; and although Shere Ali may not be as reliable
or as great a man as his father, there is no reason to believe
that Lord Mayo's policy was other than prudent and suc
cessful. Again, in 1873, after a long diplomatic corre.
spondence, Lord Granville induced the Russians to accept
our view of the northern boundaries of Afghanistan, by
which Badakshan and Wakkan were secured to Shere Ali.
This was a further-proof of our friendly intervention, and
throughout the correspondence Prince Gortchakoff fully
acknowledged that Shere Ali was legitimately under our
influence and beyond that of Russia. In all our dealings
with the Belooch and Afghan frontier tribes, the same
general policy has been followed for years past and with
considerable success. The border throughout its length is
far quieter now than in years gone by. Occasional acts of
outrage and robbery are treated as matters of police.
Many of the men of the Afghan tribes beyond the border
now enter our service, and do their duty well. Some hold
positions of trust and settle inside our territory. There
fore I maintain that a conciliatory policy has been in a
great measure successful, and was leading straight to the
object we had in view, although time, patience and for
bearance are required-before the results become palpable
and confirmed. I do not propose to discuss the exceptional
causes which have led to our recent rupture with Shere
Ali. As regards the military operations which now appear
imminent, the main difficulties lie in the necessity for col-
ecting the supplies of food, munitions, and transport at
our frontier posts before wo can enter the country.
Whether we ad vanes by the Khyber or the Bolan, our lines
of communication will lie through rocky defiles, and over
stony desert tracts, deficient in food, forage, fuel, and often
in water. Sir John Keane, in 1838, is said to have
lost 20,000 camels betwepn the Indus and Candahar,
although his march was virtually unopposed. Looking at
the fleeting nature of Afghan internal politics, to the
perpetual discords which arise between the ruler at Cabul
and his insubordinate chiefs, I think it very possible that
Shere Ali may find he is not backed by his people, and that
he may still make such concessions as will save him from ■
the inevitable ruin which his present conduct will other
wise bring upon him. Should we, however, be compelled
to advance in force and enter on a campaign, its cost will
beexcessive, and the worst feature is that our chief
difficulties will arise when we find ourselves in possession
of the country with the feelings of the people roused
against us. I must not, however, enlarge on these subject
bow . If my letter should in any way throw light on
the present military aspects of the situation on our North- i
West Frontier, my object will have been accomplished. 1
I have the honour to be, Sir, your most obedient servant !
JOHN ADYE, Major-Geheral.
AFGHANISTAN.
The news from India points merely to a general
concentration of forces, Afghan and British on
the respective frontiers. The Ameer, on the one 1
hand, is reinforcing Candahar, Kuram, and Ali
Masjid, in order to ward off the coming blow ; we
on the other, are strengthening Quettah, Thull'
and Peshawur. For the former place the 2d Pun
jab Cavalry, the 2d Punjab and 30th Bombay In
fantry have already marched, so that by the middle ■ '
of next month the troops on the Khelat border will
probably number about 3,500 men, a force quite
sufficient to defend Qnetfcah from any threatened
attacks from the direction of Candahar, though far
too small to admit of anything but defensive action
being taken in that quarter until the arrival of
, General Biddulph's brigade.
At Thull, on the Kuram frontier, are at present 1 ■
massed the 5th Punjab and 12th Bengal Cavalry,