Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎144r] (296/312)

Bolan would run over a level plain very similar to that
over which, in Northern Bengal, a railway has just been
made at the rate of a mile a day. Thence to Quettah the
road maybe easily and cheaply improved by keeping parties
of pioneers at work on it, remembering that nothing more
than a practicable road for artillery is needed.
/ " Secondly,well selected English agents should be placed
■jat Herat, Cabul, and Candahar. I still retain my old pre- '
idilection for military officers for such service ; but they
thould be picked men, with good training in the scientific
branches of their profession, hardy, active, good linguists,
and, above all, men of good temper and disposition, calcu.
lated to secure the confidence of the chiefs they have to
deal with. Their policy must be strictly laid out for them;
it must be one of entire abstinence from all meddling with
the internal government of the country, of watchful vigi
lance as regards all that goes on, and actuated by a sincere
desire to support tha Ruler of the country, actively and
efficiently, as long as he maintained friendly relations
with us, and dealt frankly and in a friendly spirit with
the English Government regarding all matters of foreign
policy.
" This need not be a costly proceeding, if we are careful
to avoid the mistake of subsidizing the Prince, so as to !
make him rely more upon our treasury than on his own
thrift and good management.
" But what if the Ameer should object to follow onr ad
vice ? If the matter did not affect his foreign relations, he |
might be left to follow his own inclinations ; but if it
affected such a question as his relations with other Powers
than ourselves, I would give him clearly to understand '
that he must not count on our support unless he followed
our advice. I wOuld not break with him save in Jthe last I
extremity, and after all hope of continuing friendly rela
tions had disappeared ; but I would clear for ac'ion, and !
give him unequivocally to understand that we held our- j
selves free to act as might seem best for our own interests,
which were to give foreign Powers no good ground for in
terference with him or us.
" If, as we are told,the Ameer already evinces dislike and
distrust towards our Government, we cannot too soon come
to a clear understanding with him as to whether he means
peace and effectual alliance or the reverse. If peace, then
I would let no small obstacle hinder our placing a British
j officer, not necessarily in the capital, but in a position to
judge for himself and to report to us all that goes on at
j Cabul. If, on the contrary, the Ameer objects to such a
course, and wishes to keep us at arm's length, I would let
him clearly see we regarded his objection as proof of un
friendliness and were prepared to act accordingly.
"With regard to the present state of affairs at Herat v I
would immediately depute from the Persian side an intell^
gent and scientific military officer, with three or four goqd
assistants acquainted with all arms of the service, and if
the Euler of Herat could be induced to receive them,
I would establish them there permanently. This, no
dpubt, in the present state of affairs, would give '
umbrage to the Ameer of Cabul; but I would
let him clearly understand that we could not sit'
by while he quarrelled with the ablest and most popular ■
of his relations, and possibly successors ; that we must
recognize the actual state of affairs in Afghanistan, and
would not countenance a repetition by him of the process
by which his father wasted his own life and the resources
of his kingdom in establishing his direct rule over Herat.
" In the event of his persisting, I would inform him that
we should withdraw all countenance from him and reserve
to ourselves full liberty to treat as we might think proper
with the ruler of Herat. On the other hand, I would offer
our good offices to both parties to effect such a formal re
conciliation as should save the Ameer's nominal sove
reignty, adjourniag all further questions to the indefinite
period of the next vacancy of the throne. Nothing, of
course, but extreme pressure will induce the Ameer to ac
quiesce in this course, but the pressure ought, I think, to
be applied.
" I need not say I would lose no time in completing the
railway communication, on an uniform gauge, from Kurra-
chee, vid Mooltan and Lahore, to Peshawur, with a branch
from Sukkar to the Bolan Pass.
" In considering this Central Asian question it never
seems to me that either those who are for active measures
on our North-West frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. or their opponents the advo
cates of ' masterly inactivity' fairly appreciate the real
character of the danger to be guarded agaiyg*, or the
respective kinds of strength of the parties concerned.
'' What is our danger in India from Russian advance ?
People talk of a Russian invasion of India. If this means
an expedition, like the expeditions to Khiva and Bokhara,
formally prepared by the Russian Government with Rus
sian forces, and marching from the Russian frontier to
attack us, the danger is perhaps a remote one. No
Russian statesman in his senses would, as matters now
stand, dream of attempting such a thing for a long time to
come ; the Russians have neither the money, the men, nor
the organization necessary for such an undertaking, while
they have an active enemy of great power at sea, able to
worry them in the Baltic and the Black Seas, and on land
all along their line from the Caucasus to the Indus. I
think I could name a round dozen of our officers any of
whom would undertake to stop, and could stop, such an
expedition, or at any rate cut it off from its Russian base,
without moving a single British regiment, if he had the
command of a few hundred thousand pounds, a few good
subordinate officers, and three months' warning. So far I
quite agree with the ' masterly inactivity' advocates, and I
have no doubt whatever of the entire sincerity of all Rus^
sian statesmen and soldiers of judgment when they dis-
claim any idea of such an invasion of India for their own
generation.
" But the danger I apprehend is not of this kind ; it is
twofold.
" If we suppose Afghtmistan only so far Russianized that
! Russian travellers freely move about the country ;
Russian officers and men, not necessarily in the pay of the
Russian Government, but deserters possibly or vagabonds
from Russia, drill the Ameer's troops, cast his cannon, coin
his rupees Indian silver coin also widely used in the Persian Gulf. , and physic him and his subjects, what would
be the effect in India ? Can any man in his senses who
knows anything of India doubt that the effect now, and for
many years to come, must be to disquiet every one in
India, except that great majority of the cultiva
tors who will go on cultivating without talking politics
till the crack of doom ? Every Englishman, from
^ + Giavernor-General downwards^ wili to dw- 1
quieted ; they will teel that a greatioreign Power has
| almost as much to say to the proceedings of all the trou-
| blesome classes as the Viceroy and his English officials.
•Every prince and chief will see in the Russians a possible
Ualternative claimant for empire in India; all the disaffected,
dangerous, and criminal classes ■ will be on the que vive,
!| ready to stir at a moment's notice, and all the millions who i
, still have some martial spirit left will furbish their swords !
: and believe that another era of fighting and fair contest for
t martial renown and plunder is at hand. All these elements
; may be stirred into strife any moment by a Russian pro-
■ ] clamation issued at Cabul, or even by a false report of one,
, for it is not necessary that the report should be true to set
{ some of these restless elements in motion.
; • * Now, this danger, to be reasonably apprehended from
a Russian Minister established at Cabul and Russian sub
jects quietly permeating Afghanistan, is a danger which is
never many weeks removed from the present time. I have
no doubt that the good feeling of the existing Government
m Russia would prevent their taking any steps towards
it if we seriously remonstrated with them at the
present moment; but we must recollect that the
Sgj 11101(3 materiaI P art of such a step may be taken
v; at any moment by a daring Russian frontier com
mander who chooses to run the risk of formal disavowal
and recall, and that, once taken, the step would be, or
might be said by the Russians to be, irrevocable. If the
Ameer chooses to invite a Russian officer of rank, if he
promises and affords friendly protection to all Russian
visitors, in what form at the present moment could we put
our complaint, and what could we say, in answer to the '
^Russian reply to our remonstrances, if they said, ' Our
frontier is now conterminous with that of the Ameer. It
is absolutely necessary, in order to avoid disputes and com
plications, that we should have an accredited representa
tive at the Ameer's right hand, and we see no other way of
j avoiding continual grounds of dissension and offence, and
of ^ enabling us to observe our moral obligations as good
neighbours to the Ameer and his friends the British Go
vernment of India' ?
" Looking to the time it took"to move the Foreign Office
and our friends the Turks in the matter of the Turkish
aggressions near Aden, years may elapse before the negotia
tions and correspondence on such a subject could come to a
; , j pomt; and if we found the Russians firm, what are we to
, do ? Do you think the English people could or ought to
i be roused to declare war on Russia merely because the
Russians obtained from our semi-barbarous ally an amount I
of friendly protection for their representatives and subjeccs '
which the Ameer declares he cannot afford to us 2 I think
£ the English people would be very likely to say, ' If you;
. must declare war with sokie one, declare war against the' >
M- m eer ; he is the real offender, and the first person to bej
1,punished. If the Russians help him, we will think about!
jfleets to the Baltic and Black Sea. Meantime you Indians \
Wave only your own blundering politicians to blame if you
; are in a worse position at Cabul than the Russians are.'
" This, it seems to me, would be the case if a Russian ■; i
Minister were established, either formally or informally,
at Cabul,and friendly relations prevailed between Russians
ana, Aighans, while we are in the present state of apparent
peace in Europe. But how would it be if we were engaged '
in any discussions such as have occupied our diplomatists :
during the last ten years, about Danish or Cuban ques- j
tions, or Luxemburg questions, or Spanish, or Swiss, or :
(Italian questions, in which Russia wished us either to sup-
port her actively, or in which she desired to neutralize our
i voice against her V She would then only have to instruct
1 her Minister at Cabul to show his teeth, to hold language
insulting or offensive to us, and to get the Ameer to make
ostentatious preparations for war. If subsequently peace
were patched up in Europe, the Minister might be re
called, in satisfaction of our remonstrances ; but mean
time, what would be the effect in India ? Should we be
able to withdraw a single regiment or gun ? Should we
not be probably called on to increase our Indian army and
g et ready for war ? All this, remember, may be done
without our actually breaking with Russia.
rJ " But the case would be far more serious if matters vyent
fa, little further. I haye never seen any difficulty in a Rus-
ssian agent impelling upon us in India hordes of Asiatic
barbarians, more or less disciplined by renegade Russian
| and Indian soldiers, many of them deserters from our cfah
jarmy, followed by a vast train of undisciplined maraud^s
jsuch as followed Nadir Shah and Ahmed Shah almost
[within living memory. When people doubt the possibility
of such a move, and talk of want of commissariat, &c.,
they speak in entire ignorance of the mode in which an '
Asiatic marauder, or even a regularly paid soldier of an
Asiatic Power, habitually travels. Of course, such a force
would be met as soon as it appeared in India, and we may i
hope it would be defeated, if not annihilated. But what
.will take place in the meantime? How much expense
fwill be incurred in repelling them ? How many outbreaks
| will occur in India itself ? And who can tell what will
happen when once the rolling stone is put in motion ? And
all this, it seems to me, may be done without Russia com-
' mitting herself to a clear casus helld, or being in any way
actively unfriendly.
I " We are always sure of having in the Russian councils ,
| one large and influential party sincerely opposed to any . -