Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎137v] (283/312)

ENGLAND AND AFGHANISTAN.
1ht,Times correspondent at Calcutta states that the following is the official
list of the troops who are to take part in the frontier operations " Kuram
Column, Major-General F. S. Hoberts, V.C., C.B., commanding : Three bat
teries artillery, a squadron of icth Hussars, 12th Bengal Cavalry, the 17th
Foot, six regiments native infantry. Mooltan Division, Lieutenant-General
Donald Stewart, C.B., commanding : Eight batteries with siege train, 15th
Hussars, two regiments of Bengal Cavalry, 59th and 60th Foot, and five native
regiments. The Quetta Column, Major-General A. S. Biddulph, C.B., command
ing : Two mountain and one field batteries, three regiments of native cavalry,
the 18th Foot, apd six regiments native infantry. Sappers and engineers are
attached to each column." The correspondent also states that the Mhairwarra
battalion has volunteered for frontier service, and their offer has been accepted by
the Government. He adds :—" The great hindrances in the way of the advance
of troops are the defective commissariat arrangements and the deficiency in the
means of transport. It is estimated that nearly 6,000 camels alone are required,
without taking into account other various and numerous means of transport indis
pensable before anything like a §trongadvance along the frontier can be attempted.
It is no light task to have to make arrangements for supplying an army of 30,000
men, exclusive of camp followers, with all the necessaries of life while making
a hostile march into an enemy's country which is almost^ompletely barren."®
The same correspondent sends the following particulars of the interview
between Major Cavagnari and the Ameer's commandant at Ali Musjid, on the
21 st of September :—
The mission started at 1 o'clock a.m. from Peshawur for Jumrood, a picturesque
fort lying just within British territory, and held for us by the chief of a village in
the neighbouring plain. Our camp was pitched to the east of the fort. The total
number accompanying the mission amounted to not quite 1 ,000, of whom eleven were
British officers, four native gentlemen, and 234 fighting men. The rest were camp
followers. The carriage consisted of 315 camels, 250 mules, and forty horses. The whole
formed a cortege considerably over a mile in length. Conflicting reports had reached
Peshawur as to the intentions of the Ameer, It was known that the Mir Akhor, or
Master of the Horse of the Ameer, was present at Ali Musjid, and as he was known
to be possessed with a fanatical hatred of the English, it was deemed unwise to send
the whole convoy into the pass until accurate information should have been obtained as
to the intentions of the Commandant. Major Cavagnari was, therefore, directed to ride
forward, taking with him a small escort of the Guides and the head man of our own
frontier villages and of the friendly Khyberees. Directly they were perceived, the fort walls
were manned, and shortly afterwards a number of troops lined the opposite ridge. After
considerable delay a messenger arrived and announced that the Commandant would
come out to meet Major Cavagnari and three others at a spot indicated by the side of the
stream, half way between the two ridges. Shortly afterwards he was seen approaching,
and Major Cavagnari, taking with him the commandant of the Guides and two of his
escort, and accompanied by the head man of the tribes, went forward to meet Faiz
Mahomed, the rest of the escort remaining on the ridge. On his way, the chief of one of
the other Khyber tribes friendly to the Ameer attempted to stop him, on the plea that
he was accompanied by more than the stipulated number. Major Cavagnari, however,
put him aside, saying that he had come to talk not with him but with the
Ameer's officers. On meeting Faiz Mahomed, Major Cavagnari shook hands with him,
and the two parties sat down, surrounded by a couple of hundred of Faiz Mahomed's
soldiers. The conversation, after the usual friendly greetings, was opened by Major
Cavagnari, who said that both he and the Commandant were equally servants of their
respective Governments, and, therefore, only carrying out their orders. There was, there
fore, no necessity for the discussion being carried on in any but a friendly spirit; that he,
Faiz Mahomed, must be aware of the intended advance of the mission, and that Sir
Neville Chamberlain had sent him on to ascertain from his own lips whether he had
received orders relative to the reception of the mission. If there were any latitude in the
terms of his orders, he felt sure that the Commandant would be aware of the heavy
responsibility he would incur by preventing the advance of the mission, as his act
would be accepted as the act of the Ameer. Faiz Mahomed replied that he him
self was actuated by friendly feelings towards Major Cavagnari, in proof of which
he pointed out that, instead of coming down to meet him, he might have ordered
his men to fire on his party when it appeared. He proceeded to say that he had
already been severely reprimanded for allowing the Viceroy's envoy, Nawab An honorific title; an official acting as a provincial deputy ruler in South Asia; or a significant Muslim landowner in nineteenth century India. Gholam
Hussein, to pass, and that, therefore, he could not permit the advance of the mission.
He begged that Sir Neville Chamberlain would halt till he could communicate with
Cabul. This, Major Cavagnari replied, was not only impossible but unnecessary, as the
Cabul authorities had long been aware of the approach of the mission. The conversation
continued in this strain for some little time. Major Cavagnari urging the weight of the
responsibility Faiz Mahomed would incur, and the latter repeating his inability to allow the
mission to pass without a permit from Cabul. At last, on Major Cavagnari again pointing
out the friendly nature of the mission, the Afghan, showing for the first time some warmth,
said the object of this friendship was merely to stir up dissension in the Ameer's dominions
by bribing his subjects to disobey his orders—"by bribing you and others" (herealluding
to the negotiations with the Khyberees for the safe conduct of the mission.) At this an
ambiguous murmur was heard from the soldiers, and Major Cavagnari replied that that
was not a subject for subordinates to discuss, and that if the Ameer had any com
plaint to make, no doubt the Government would give him a satisfactory reply. He
then asked for a final answer, whether he was distinctly to understand that the mission
would be resisted by force. Faiz Mahomed replied that he had no alternative if the
mission were pressed. On this Major Cavagnari asked the chiefs with him whether they
considered this a sufficiently clear answer, to which they replied that it was perfectly
clear. He then thanked Faiz Mahomed for his courtesy, and expressed a hope that they
might again meet in more agreeable circumstances. He again shook hands with him
and departed. It was then perceived that the Ameer had no possible intention af
receiving the mission, andlt was accordingly dissolved.
THE PANIC IN GAS SHARES.
The Financier says :—" A further sensible rally took place on Saturday
in the shares of some of those gas companies which have recently been
subjected to chief depreciation. As the whole of the selling which has taken
place cannot have been for delivery, and as the settlement is now at hand, the
recovery is hardly surprising. There is an impression, too, that the i scare' is
getting overdone." The same journal states that three " limited" companies
were registered last week which have for their object the introduction and
development of the electric light.
Our Bristol correspondent writes on Saturday :—The panic in gas stock has
reached this city. The Bristol Limited Gas Light Company swallowed up all
the other companies several years ago, so that there is only one stock quoted in
the local share list. This has fallen more than 25 per cent, during the week.
Always paying the maximum dividend of 10 per cent, allowed by law, the shares
have for years stood at a very high premium—^100 shares being regularly
quoted 202 to 204, except when ex div., when the figures have been 195 to
198. At the beginning of this week the shares stood at 193 to 195 ex div.
On the day the news of Edison's discovery was published and to-day the
^quotation is 165 to 170, or a fall of ^25 per ^100 share within six days. There
are nearly a thousand shares on the market, and brokers say that no one will
look at them. The stock, having a kind of Government security, has been
largely purchased by trustees.
and often spreads to the boldest and bravest as quickly as to the weak and
timid ; but it is necessary to provide that even the panic-stricken shall be
duly protected. Not only should the outlets from a theatre or music-hall
be easy of access and sufficient in number, but they should always be avail
able at a minute's notice. Not a door should be needlessly locked when
once the entertainment has begun; nor should any barricade like that
which is said to have wrought such mischief at Liverpool be allowed
to stay in its place when the audience are once seated. No partitions or
other obstacles should be permitted to interrupt the way to any main
exit; and each portal should be so constructed that it can be thrust
open by any person without an instant's delay, and used by the crowd
without difficulty or danger. Above all, the upper parts of the house
including the galleries and balconies, should be fully provided with stair
cases. There can be no reason for confining the public in any buildino- so
that in the event of an alarm, whether false or real, they are practically
entrapped and rendered liable to the gravest of injuries. The terrible
scene which has just been enacted in Liverpool should result in the
adoption of such steps for the future as to render the recurrence of a
similar spectacle as nearly impossible as can reasonably be expected.
The Standard says the lesson which the catastrophe teaches is as
intelligible as the circumstances which led to the shocking result are
simple. The whole loss of life was evidently due to the position between
two swing doors of an upright beam or post upon which they closed.
Had the post not been there, the doors would have swung open, or
have been burst, leaving a channel of egress some five feet and a
half in width. Under such circumstances it is doubtful whether, even I
had the panic been worse than it was, life need have been sacrificed '
Let us be again warned in time, and insist in future that all places of
public amusement shall have exits so wide than no crowd can block
t i! ei11 * ^■ ean ^ me there is yet a further lesson which each member of
the public cannot too strongly impress both upon himself and upon
others. Under such circumstances as those at Liverpool, be we
where we may, our one hope is to remain calm. Should we be in
the direct path of the crowd itself escape is hopeless, and we must
take our fate. Otherwise our sole chance consists in masterly inactivity.
We have only to ask ourselves, supposing that the theatre in which
we are sitting has taken fire, how long will it be before the flames
reach us, and_ how long the theatre itself will take to empty, to see
at once that, if we but remain for ten minutes where we are, we shall
most probably be able to make our way safely out; while, if we allow our
selves to be swept into the crowd, our lives are at once in the most
imminent peril.
CORRESPONDENCE,
LORD NAPIER OF MAGDALA'S VIEWS ABOUT AFGHANISTAN.
To the Editor of the Pall Mall Gazette.
, , S ir ,—The nonsense talked by ordinary members of Parliament
about India may, while we still have an independent as well as free press,
be safely treated with the contempt of silence; but Mr. Adam the
Opposition "whip," is a man of sound political training and special
Indian experience, whose opinion has weight with members in a
division; and therefore whatever he may say on this subject deserves
attention. Now, he is reported to have said the other day that it
was most dangerous " our venturing beyond that impregnable moun
tain barrier which bounded our Indian Empire." I would ask. What
impregnabie mountain barrier bounds our Eastern Empire against
Afghanistan, that is, against Russia ? The Spectator has, indeed, during
win ^ w- 0r 1 0Ur re P e ? tedI y asserted that Afghanistan lies
beyond the Himalayas; but now, in order to support its argument for
throwing the cost of the present war on India, it states truly that it lies
SdoV a 8ird J e 0f the Himala y as (the Hindoo Koosh
section)—-a fact which, however, does not bring it one whit within our
Indian " frontiers." Afghanistan, the Cabul Valley, is but Ae upper
dominatmgsechonofthe Indus basin; and strategically and historically,
fact tL In^r'S Part ^ and E arCel 0f India - A ^ani3tan is, in
fact, the India of Alexander, who never, in an easterly direction
got very ™ uc h beyond Afghanistan. It was always part and parcel of
India m Buddhistic and early Hindoo times ; and the first Mahommedan
nSan The Shlfl vV^ C , 0nc l uered hut ruled ^dia from Afgha-
vl A t ? VaUey, m fact, so completely commands the lower
^ ndus ' ^ ^l ams of ^ he Punjaub and Scinde, that the very
us either to HiSf v a ggressive enemy in Afghanistan would compel
us either to dislodge him or abandon Peshawur and fortify the line of the
BerHn frontier, strategically, financially, and morally. A
Berlin telegram lately informed us that this is the opinion of the hLhest
military experts of Berlin and St. Petersburg. It is said to be thdr o|aTon
that the mere presence of a Russian agent in Cabul will force us at
length to fall back from Peshawur behind the Indus, a frontier which
sumless millions could not convert into a military defence and our
all nretenr^H f would be morally equivalent to an abandonment of I
a 1 pretence of empire m India. Mr. Adam, referring to his residence in
greater'Te thL^th^ 0 " 8 ^ » P ? ideaS 0f Indian stat esmanship of a
" P^h T^,' » t^ .(present —this a g e of the infatuated school of
rnoni^nf f Politicians ! Now I had the pleasure of being intimately
cognizant, from January, 1855, to September, 18^8, of Mr Adam'{
surroundings as private secretary to Lord Elphinstone He
over, was private secretary from 1853 to 1858. Well'the S
ErereV^r durin gJ that Period were the ideas of fohn Jacob
frtlro ^ ^ wlm . son ' which the Government of India is now tardilv
W v m Mr ' Adam was cer tainly brought up in Bombav
but which he now condemns. John Jacob and Sir Henry RawH^S
views and opinions have since been collected in books, and can now be
read by every one. Sir Bartle Frere's still remain scattered through
unedited letters and official minutes; but they are known to be essen
tially the same. The only eminent authority on the other side is Lord
Napier of Magdala. He was always opposed to the occupation of
Quetta, for he never believed in the possibility of a Russian invasion of
India. But his views have gradually been changed since then; and what i
they are at present I am fortunately able to state almost in his own words,
spoken in 1876. He said:—"In the first place, instead of an army
marched against India, we find Russia itself advanced towards our empire, I
not by an expedition, but by absorption of territory. Her bold advances
have greatly alarmed our neighbours and tributaries, who regard our |
quiescence as timidity. By remaining shut within our border we leave
all that is outside necessarily to fall within the views of a bold
advancing Power, and our own people inside and our neighbours outside
are losing confidence in us. I have therefore come to the conclusion that
we have remained quiescent long enough. I am therefore of opinion now
that there is less danger in advancing than sitting still. If all had been
done that might have been done during the last ten years, India would
have been much more secure; but the necessary measures have been
neglected because the money was withheld. Our quiescence has actually
led the Russian papers to ask what we mean by going to Khelat or
Quetta that fact alone is sufficient to vindicate our right to be there"
It seems to me that this citation may be useful just now, in answer not
only to Mr. Adam, but to some other authorities who agree with him.— *
I am. Sir, your obedient servant,
October 12. Iran.