Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎136r] (280/312)

1839, They arise from an extreme sonBitiveness abaat
the peaceful enjojment of our heritage in Indh, which |
is iueradicable, end will remain tineradioable a? long i
as Great Britain continues to be a Power
' in the foremoBt files of time,' The eventi that
impel us to-day are almost the same as those which itn-
pelled us 40 years ago, but the oonditiona uadar which
we act at present are much mora favourable for us than
they were before. la 1838 our north-west frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. , and
cne of our baEes cf operations, were the river Sutlej,
about 350 miles from Peshawar; and to reach tha
Khyber we had to traverse the territories of
Ihe independent Sikh ruler of Lihore. Oar other
base was the Bombay Presidency The name given to each of the three divisions of the territory of the East India Company, and later the British Raj, on the Indian subcontinent. , and the caluaaa
operating from that side had to laud at Kur- .
rachee, and to extort the sulky acquieaoanca from the
independent Sind Ameers for its pasa&ge up the ladus
Valley to the Bolan Pass. In 1878 oar territory is con-
texminous with the Suleiman barrier, our postd cooamaud
the mouths of all the passes, some of which were not
available for our operations in the first war, and, in
addition, we hold Qaettah at the Affghan end of the
Bolan. We have now at our disposal an unlimitad supply
f races better fitted to stand an ; ^ghan climate, a ad
more accustomed to maintain warfare tban the Poorbeoahs,
Rajpoots, and Mahrattas with which wa marched to
Cabul before ; end we have improved mountain, artillery
and breechloading arms cf precision, against which the
s'ow but tturdercuB jezail has no chance. Profiting by
experience, we shall not repeat the blunder of forcing a
fickle, intriguirg, and ungrateful ally as a ruler on a people
who would not have him at any price. "We shall not, for
leasons cf short-sighted economy, and under a t-jo blind i
confidence, weaken our military hold on any territory we |
shall deem it advisable to retain for cur future sscarlty
by a premature diminution of our troops.
I " In noting the events which influenced Lord Auckland
in mterfeiicg in the affairs of Affghanistan, I cannot
[ do better then quote the words of a well known and
i accomplished writer The lowest of the four classes into which East India Company civil servants were divided. A Writer’s duties originally consisted mostly of copying documents and book-keeping. :—'The siege of Herat by the
Peislans, the interference of Russia In the affairs of
Central Asia, and the proceedings hostile to our interests
j cf the rulers of Candahar and Cabal, which threatened
the peace and security of our north-west frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. , were
} the immediate causes of the expedition into Affghanistaa !
; undertaken by the British Government in India to
restore Shah Shoojah-ool-Moolk to the throne of
his arcestors. Russian influence had been busy
in Persia, and the Government of Persia had not only
introduced a Russian agent to Do^t Muhammed Khan of
Cabul, with letters from the Emperor Nicholaa, but sent
tmissarieB in furtherance of its own affairs connected
v.ith the siege of Herat. . . . Sir Alexander Barnes
was at Cabul on a commercial mission, and received ia-
structions from the Governor-General to endeavour to
promote and establish an amicable underataadiag
between the neighbouring States ; but Russian and
Persian interests appeared to prevail over the Cabul
ruler, or his own ambition had become too inordinate to
admit of the mediation and accommodation suggastad.
The Russian agent, Vicovicb, was then at Cabal, re
ceived and treated by Dost Muhammed Khan ia the
most flattering manner, and Sir Alexander Barnes,
having failed in attaining the obiect of his
original mission, as' well as the end of his
further instructions, immediately took leave and returned
i to India.' In another passage the same author says H
Many inveigh against the principle of the invasion in
favour of Sbah Shoojab, and are of opinion that gaining
over Dost Muhammed to our interests would have
answered every useful purpose, and at a thousandth part
cf the expense to the State. But Sir Alexander Barnaa
t-culd make nothing of the Barukzai Ameer, who was one
of the nonfits, and truly, taking the whole proverb, "Es
quovis ligno non fit Mercurius," he was matarially un-
sueceptible of being converted into the substantial bul
wark required at the time by the British Government.'
All this is curiously applicable to the present phase of the
Affghan Question. Dost Muhammed subsequently ad- j
naitted—takirg the admission for what it is worth—that j
one cf his greatest mistakes was the dismissal of Sir |
Alexander Burnes. Whether his son, Shero All, will be
constrained or not to make the same admission with ra-
gard to hfs refusal to receive Sir Neville Chamborlain
remains to be seen.
" Such being the state of things created by tha obsti
nacy of the Dost, a large force, known in hiitory as the
' Army of the Indus,' was assembled on the Satlej ia the j
latter half of 1838, for the invasion of Affghanistan,
while a Bombay column under Sir John Keane, after
wards created Baron Keane of Guznee, was ordered to
cc-operate from Kurrachee and the Lower ladus basin.
In addition to the above, a contingent of cavalry, infan
try, and artillery was raised and officered by us, to be
known as 'Shah Shoojah's Force,' in order that 'hia
Majesty' might enter Affghanistan ' surrounded by his
own troops.' The Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir
Henry Fane, was to have commanded the whole of the
1 troops ordered for service, but, owing to the retreat, ©f
the Persian army from btlore Herat, circumstances
seemed no longer to require such an imposing
display cf strength as- was at first cent&ca-
plated, so the Army of the Indus was reduced,
and its command devolved on the Bombay Commandbr-
in-Chief, Sir John Keane^. The Bengal division- ol the
army, under Sir Willoiaghby Cotton, preceded l^y Shah
! Shoojah with his owa force, moved down ia.. jSeoezaber,
1838, from Ferozepoie to Buhker, in Sind, ©a, the way to
the Bolan Pass. S&oh fehoojah's force rsaietered 6,000
and the Bengal division £^500 men. To g^sia- some idea
cf the arrangemeatanoeeBsaiy for feeding.an Indian army
in the field, and to account in some msasuxa for the uru
avoidable delsj; attending the concent^tion and advar^o
of our troops to-day, it is only necgaaaxj to glance^ at
the i'rnp'&imenta cf Sir Willouahby Cotton's division.
Despite, ©f Sir Henry Fane's asder about su.perflaoaa
baRg>2e and oamp-followers^ there were ahont 38,000
of ihe latter, and most of the officers too many
Ofemels for their own use, owing to too much baggage
and too large tents. The column carried 30 days"
supplies of all kie^s gM a lftug^tw oattle for two
and a half montbp. Additlona.- supplied were aMi hf
water, and depots tad to be fornfcsd at vaiious places on
the route, besides a reserve depet at Fero?{epore of
ijOCO^COlb.tf gieinandtwomcntbs'auppliesofotSerklndi.
There were 14,235 caxcels with the column for carrfsge of
supplies alone, and forage could not always be obtslned
fi r them in iufficient quantity. Oa the 26!;h Decetn^y
flu could not have been less, it is calculatad, thae
25,t 00 to 30,000 camel?, public aad private, with tha
force. The nnited Bengal and Bombay divisions of the
Army.^f the Indus and the Shah's fore® lost ia 14 months*
from ov e cause or other, 30,000 cauaefe, 1,564 horses,
2c4 yahoos or ponies, and 633 bullocks. The attitude of
(he Sind Ameers catssed some delay at Bakker, aad
it was not; iuiitil the middle of February, J389i.thit Sir
Willenghby Cotton creased the Indus by the bridge of
boats at Rohi ee, where SS? Henry Fane took leave- of the
Army of the Jndus. The Bombay column had'not yeb
arrived, and on February 22 ths Bengal troops advanced
towards Dadnr, 10 marches' distast, at the mouth'of the
Bolan Pass, which was cleared m six marches, after con»
tiderabie annojancen here aad''th«re from the pi ud siring
attaeks of the Brahoois, Murrheeff, and Kauksra;. on,
March 21. The descent from irhe top of the- pass tU-
Dusht-i-bedowlut was not vejy g-reat;, and endad in a
plain covered with wild thyme sad' snow-covered hills itt'
the distance, whence a piersiag; norfeh-aaster tem
pered the fierce rajs of the mm. Quetta, 24J
miles further, was reached Mbrch 26, and on
April 6 Sir John Keane arrived ancJassumed the command 1
cf the Army of the Indus. The uniited force, after
leaving a part of a brigade under Grene^ral Nott, to
I arrison Quetta, continued its adyanoe on Candahar oa
April 7. On the 14th the ascent of the Kcjnak P ass , the
summit of which is 7,457 feet abov&'the sea and 1,780
feet above the valley, wss commenced. Thore are three
reads through the defele which meet at the exit, bat
owing to some blundering orders, a scene of^indescribable
confusion ensued from the crowding of koops and
baggage, which luckily no enemy was at band to take
advantage cf at the time. The Bombay colutan did not
reach the Kojuk till the 25th, though the head-quarters
arrived at Candahar on the 26tb. All through the
march there was no serioss opposition offered,, and what
there was was confined to- desultory attacks on baggage,
camp followers, and isolated detachmenfei. 'No
grain, no forage, bad water,' was the- general
refrain cf the commks&siat during the march.
The Bengal troops had been on half rations for
48 days, and the horses oa the same for 32j nevertheless
j there was a surprisingly small amount of jsicknesa among
| men. On the 4th Msy the Bombay column, under General
Willshire, arrived at Candabar.. On June 27, aSter in-
Btalling Shah Shoojah as Bovereign, and taking measures
to consolidate as much as possible his power, the army
moved on Cabul, via Ghuznee—22' marches to the first
and 29 to the latter place. At Ghuznee the firat real
fighting of the campaign took plane, ending in the capture
by storm of the town and citadel, after the gates had'been
blown in by the engineers on July 23. The nature of
this brilliant feat of arms will be best appreciated
by reading Sir John Keane's despatch on the sub
ject, cur loss being 17 killed, and 18 officers
and 147 nos-commlssioned officers and rank and
file wounded. The garrison of 3,500 Affghans was
commanded by Muhammed Haddar, a son of the
Barnkzai usurper; and although Afeul, the eldest son,
had been sent by his father to his brother's aid, he did
nothing but hover about in the distance—the whole of
the leaders, in short, displaying the very meanest mill-
I tsry capacity. On July 30 Sir John Eeane continued his
j advance to Cabul, before which place he arrived August
6. The next day Shah Shoojah, accompanied by Sir W.
M'Naghten, Sir John Keane, and the principal military
end political officers of the Army of the Indus, entered
be city. 'The people were very orderly; there were
immense crowds. As the King advanced they stood up,
and when he passed on they re-seated themselvest'
This was the sum total of the public ovation as far as
bis own subjects were concerned. The Army of the
Indus bad reached its goal, and the object of the Indian
Government seemed to have been effected much easier
than bad been anticipated. The Bengal column of the
army bad made 132 marches from Eumal, its first place
cf assembly, to the Bala Hissar, being an average of more
than 11^ miles a day, and this had been effected between
November 8, 1838, and August 6, 1839—less than nine
months, the total distance traversed being 1,587 miles.
To-day, the whole distance from Peshawur to Cabul
through the Kbyber which our army will have to march