Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎134av] (277/312)

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THE AFGHAN [ CAMPAIGN,
TO THE EDITOR OF THE STANDARD.
Sm,—As you do not, I perceive, iully concur
; with my opinion expressed in your paper of yester
day, that the attack upon Cabul should be made by
« j the direct route through the Khyber Pass, I will
|iigj give you my reasons for so thinking more in detail.
Cabul is the seat of Government, and always has
been, and still is, the most important city in
Afghanis an. The Ameer is there now, or on the
road between it and the Indian frontier. The
atiront passed upon us came from the capital ; and
if we now shirk the direct attack, and march upon
more distant points, our action will be attributed,
both in India and among the Afghans, to timidity
and a want of confidence in our own power.
In all the struggles in former \ ears among
members of the Royal Sudo;ye family, and also
i among the various Baruckzye Sirdars Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. , the possession
of Cabul itself has been considered the chief aim,
■and it has always conferred a paramount position
upon the immediate ruler there, though he may not
'have possessed any actual authority at Candahar,
•Herat, or Peshawur.
I do not consider that the loss of Candahar would
: affect Shere Ali materially. But perhaps the most
jimi ortant point to be considered with reference to
the manner in which our attack should be made is
J the time that will be occupied by the various
•■routes. Cabul is scarce 190 miles from our
a frontier at Jumrood, and could be reached
c easily in a month. < n the other hand,
cQuettah is 230 miles from Dera Gha?i (as a corre-
vspondont writes in your paper of the lOih), from
Quettah to Candahar is 126 miles, and from the
last place to Cabul upwards of 800 miles ; making
' ca total oi 655 miles, which would occupy three
cmonths, or perhaps more. For if it be intended
0 tliat this column should operate through the motin-
Itains from Dera < .ha/i to the Valley of Shd, the
f route is almost unknown, and 1 apprehend there
may be considerable difficulty in the transport of
''guns. Ihavenoknowledgeof this road, butl conclude
c it must pass through the Bolan and reach (yuetrah
t via Sir-i-at; the Bolan, however, is a defile of no
j difficulty, though atiguingand very devoid of fm-age.
I In 1840 Major Clibborn, with some guns and Bom
bay Infantry, met with a terrible disaster in the
' hills between the Indus and the Bolan, in an
" attempt to relieve the fort of Kahun, which is on
< the road from Dera Ghazi to Dadur, at the southern
i gorge of the pass. Captain Browne, however (I
{ hope I have his name right, but 1 am writing irom
. memory), the defender of the fortress, subse-
' quently, with his brave garrison, cut his way
^through the mountains. There cannot be any
^ doubt, if time be an object, that the direct route
a has very greatly the advantage.
j Is ext let us consider the su I iject of supplies. If
g the invasion be made from Peshawur, we h e that
. rich valley and the whole of the upper part of the
II Funjaub whence to feed our corps d'nrmie. Moro-
^ over, the northern provinces of Afghanistan proper
ii (that is south of the Hindu Koosh; are more pro-
|; ;; C ductive than the country below Candahar ; the
( valley of the Cabul River, in the ueishbourhood of
a Jellalabad, and also around the capital, the Valley
of Maidan, and those of the Kohistan and Loghur,
are all well cultivated and abound in streams. I do
u not, of course, desire to indicate that our troops
n could safely trust to the resources of the coutrry ;
C but it would be or great aid that our march should
■(-; be through a fruitful district,
y Now, as regards a march from the south upon
Candahar, Upper Scinde is by no means a produc-
-5^ tive country—the Bolan Hills are bare rooks—
and the country south of Candahar, between the
Kojuck Pass and the Durrye River, is sterile and
■ f, dry. In 1839 our troops suffered much from want
c , of water. We had great difficulty in getting any at
all, and the little we did get was filthy and un- |
wholesome. In May, 1839, our army at Candahar
" was close upon starvation. We had only two days'
b supply of half rations. In Scinde, too, between
ii Shikavpoor i -nd Bagh, we traversed fifty miles of
A desert. The country has probably, with the aid
j s of irrigation, been much improved since that time,
"i But, with every allowance for an improved state of
■ affairs, it is certain that supplies for a force operating
n vi& Candahar would have to be carried a far longer
si distance than would be the case if it be determined
s< to advance by the shorter i-oute.
aj In considering the relative advantages of the two
0 modes of attack, I conclude that our present object
' is merely to punish, in some manner, the Ameer
Shere Ali for the deliberate insult which he has
I 1 offered to the Indian Government ; and to do this
ii we must reach his capital. Every Sovereign of the
n country, whether Sudozye Padshah or Barukzye
g Ameer, has ever regarded the possession of Cabul
■ J as the source of real power, and they have been
' often content there to rule for years, while Herat
n and Candahar have been held by other members of
tj the family. In 1837 Dost Mahomed held Cabul,
y Ghtuni, and the northern provinces only; hisbrothers
t held Candahar ; and Kamran, son of Shah Mah-
■I mooii, DouranSe (Shah Shoojah's brother), was
| independent at Herat. The capture of Candahar
: by the British in 1839, had no influence on the
J TorUui'ff of Dost Mahomed, but the fall of Ghuzni
and subsequent near approach of our troops drove
him into flight. After his restoration in 1842 he
brought Candahar, Herat, Balkh, &c., under sub
jection, and thus restored the old Empire in nearly
its original grandeur ; but in the civil wars which
succeeded on his death he who possessed Cabul
itself was the Ameer, though other cities might be
, held by various Sirdars Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. .
It is most probable, I think, that Shere Ali, ii
the event of the capital falling into our hands,
would, as his father did in 1839, as Abdool Rahman
did, as he himself did when unseated by Mali
| Azim Khan, take flight across the mountain
' put himself into communication with his friends
beyond the Ox us—1 was nearly writing new-made
' friends, but I believe he made their acquaintance
1 more than ten years since, for about that time the
then Ameer (Mahomed Azim) said in Council,
' " Shere Ali Khan, should he succeed in retaking
' Cabul, will be accompanied by the Russians ; n
' 1 wish to inform you that I have written to
" British authorities, askina; for assistance aga
' Shere Ali, providing he is assisted by the Russiai
I therefore think that the Ameer would elect
■ this line of flight in preference to tailing back
1 Candahar, especially if we direct a column from
1 Quettah upon the southern capital. Shere Ali
■ once over the Hindu Koosh, it would only be in
i conformity with occurrenr es of former years that
, some powerful Sirdar—a Barukzye most pro' ably —
' should raise his standard at Candahar on his own
' behalf. All these poin s considered, but especially
the question of time, 1 still adhere to my opinion
that our attack should bo direct upon Cabul, and
that other columns should operate from Quettah
and through the Koorum Valley ; but that our
larger corps d'armie, with artillery trains, should
proceed only by the well-known routes through
' the Khyber and Bolan, which are undoubtedly
i those most commonly traversed by the Afghan
i traders, on account, I presume, of their known
i facilities.
I am, Sir, yours obediently,
October 11. E. K.
I have reason to believe that under orders of
Government the Commissariat cattle which had
been collected at Rawul Pindi in some numbers
were discharged two or three months since.
r. —Within the
' " ies have them-
! and collecting
iBlingtou. Bermo:
The*
IX"
economical
three years
example tli
and a
i been
' point of vi
gain I
estry of aildington followed the
, _ _ though from want of ade uate
or<ani ation the first year's experiment showed a balancs
on the wrong side of the account, tlie second year's working
satis tied them that success was within their _ reach. :
B«cently they have taken over their lata central tor's plant,
consisting of horses, water carta, wharves, barges, steam 1
sifting machines, which have all been adapted to the new
system. On Saturday the vestry of the pa ish—a body of
seventy gentlemen, with representatives from many other
.ents. All the dust cfti
p round Paddington gre.
: condition, and newly ]
is of heavy-weight hor
the men appa ei " 1
re they first ins; ectod i
sufficiently I
otf tc 1
1 sc, apings will be received and t
> enable it to be loaded into barges, i
to the3(
h the^ carts'
by a:
inSnCi plane and a platform
dumped, the end projecting over me cauai, ou mai, uusb
can be shot at once nto barges. The moUm opemudi
was illustrated practically, and the long array of carts
then defiled through the yard to the stables. The party
next insi ected the steam silting machinery by which the
contents of the pariah dust bins are resolved into " bree e"
and ashes and loaded directly into barges, the other consti
tuents requiring some manipulation for their separation. ,
Next the stables, the o ; ces, the saddlers', wheelwright and
smiths shops, lofts, and granaries were inspected, leaving i
the impression on the min.l of the visitors that everything i
had been very carefully organised for efficient nnd eco- ,
lomical working. After this tour of inspe tion the party
lartook of a collation in the largest ''slop tank "—i
norphosed into a tasteful mar .me—under 1
if the Vicar. The post prandial congratv
ollowed threw some light on the advantages _
Ih, while favouring the principle of local self-govem-
t seems to offer so nu'.ny ad*antftge» to the ratepayert-
r'wS