Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎129v] (266/312)

england, russia, and afghanistan.
The Saturday Review remarks that while the policj of the English
and Indian Governments with regard to Afghanistan and the plan of
campaign are still unknown, it is not the business of patriots to occupy
themselves in proving that both are hopelessly in the wrong. From
the fact that a Cabinet has been summoned, and that the Ministers
have afterwards dispersed, some of them to distant parts of the country,
it may be inferred that the questions discussed were few and simple,
and that probably it was only necessary to obtain the sanction of
the Government to measures already prepared by those who are most
immediately responsible for the conduct of war or negotiation. The
Ministers would scarcely have left town immediately after the meeting of the
Cabinet if a rupture with a more formidable Power than Shere Ali had been
imminent \ yet, if the temper and policy of the Russian Government are
indicated with even approximate accuracy by the journals of St. Peters
burg and Moscow, it may become difficult to maintain the pretence
of friendly relations. There is no dispute as to [the hostile purpose
of the Russian mission to Cabul. But the policy of menace and insult
may be carried too far. Opportunities of molestation are not entirely
one-sided. While the Russian agents in Roumelia and Bulgaria are
becoming more exacting, the Turks also are on their part probably
not indifferent to the prospect of renewing the struggle with the aid
of a powerful ally. It will be well for both parties to avoid as long as
possible a formidable collision. The Indian Government will be well
advised in dealing as vigorously as circumstances may allow with
the Ameer of Cabul, while he is still ostensibly isolated. The fable of the
dwarf and the giant is a primitive anticipation of the doctrine of responsi
bility. The humbler offender is justly punished for acts which he may
have committed at the instigation of a powerful patron in the background.
There is reason to hope that the English Government has not been found
unprepared. The distribution between England and India of the cost of
the probable war ought to be arranged on due consideration both of the
principle involved and of the respective abilities of the two Governments.
An Indian quarrel is not rendered imperial by the accident of its having
been fomented by Russia.
The Economist finds the contents of Earl Grey's letter to the Times on
England and Afghanistan somewhat disappointing both as to what is said
and what is omitted. The letter ignores the elementary consideration
that, when we find ourselves where we ought not to have gone, it is
very seldom open to us to go back the way we came. Earl Grey
argues not only that an Afghan war would be impolitic, but that we have
no just cause of war with the Ameer. It may be admitted that no
nation has an absolute right to compel the ruler of another independent
nation to receive an embassy. It is, however, at least doubtful whether
a purely capricious refusal to receive an embassy from a particular
State would now be thought tolerable among civilized nations; and
one substantial reason for the doubt is that such a refusal would raise
a vehement presumption of hostile designs. The state of facts we
have before us is that a neighbour who can do us a certain amount
of mischief, and help others to do us more, has entered into an exclusive
alliance with the one Power likely to be our enemy in that part of
the world, and has shown by his own conduct that he considers the
alliance as directed against ourselves. If this be not a sufficient
cause for taking arms in defence of our interests, no war can be
justified in which the party aggrieved does not await an actual invasion.
As for the Ameer himself, he now throws himself in with the fortunes of
Russia, not because he loves Russians for their own sake, but because he
fancies that he has more to gain and less to lose from the Russian alliance
than from ours, and probably also because his observation of the late war
has led him to believe that Russia is stronger than England. If we can
convince him by practical proofs that he is mistaken, there is no reason
to suppose that he will not have worldly wisdom enough to govern himself
accordingly.
The Spectator says two facts/ at all events, come out very clearly in
the week's telegrams from Northern India. The Ameer of Aghanistan is
ready, and Lord Lytton is not. Lord Lytton has, no doubt, been
checked by despatches from home, where the Cabinet is not eager for
an expensive war, and where the effect of a disaster is thoroughly under
stood ; but it is clear, from all the accounts, that if he is acting on a matured
policy, and not on any sudden whim, he either underestimates his enemy
to a dangerous degree, or he is not nearly so ready as he ought to have
been. It is difficult to avoid an impression that the Viceroy thought a
demonstration by the field force, slightly reinforced, would suffice to
frighten the Ameer, and induce him to allow the British a grand diplomatic
triumph. It is evident that the Government look forward to a cam
paign in the spring, or preparations on this side would not be so active.
But the Spectator cannot entirely agree with Earl Grey in his able letter of
objections in the Times. It shrinks, as Earl Grey does not, from the
consequences of retiring now. The loss of dignity may be unimportant
and the loss of prestige exaggerated, but the loss of confidence in
our pledged word might be irreparable. If we pledged our word to
the Khyberees, and we then give up the Khyberees to be punished as
Shere Ali will punish them, and is indeed punishing them now, then we
shall break laith publicly, and thoroughly deserve the distrust with which
thenceforward every hill clan will regard our promises. No such treachery
is possible, and an advance therefore of some kind is altogether unavoid
able.