Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎128v] (264/312)

THE WAE WITH AFGHANISTAN.
TWO facts, at all events, come out very clearly in the week's
telegrams from Northern India. The Ameer of Afghan
istan is ready, and Lord Lytton is not. So far was Shere
.A li from acting in ignorance, or believing that he could affront
the British with impunity, that the moment he had repulsed the
Mission he summoned the Chiefs of the Hill clans to council—
thereby, among other objects, securing most important hostages
—and despatched six thousand troops, with six guns, to protect
Ali Musjeed, the little fort which, until it is taken, bars all
passage through the Khyber, and a powerful force to defend
the Koorum. He at the same time called on the Momunds,
a fighting clan occupying hills on both sides of the Khyber,
who have given us in times past endless trouble, to assist
his troops, and punish the Khyberees for having agreed
: to protect the British Mission into Afghanistan. The
Momunds, who can turn out 15,000 daring brigands, obeyed
his summons, and we suspect that the rumours of an " Afghan "
■ attack on the Khyberees are true, and that the Momunds are
' punishing their treason to Islam with fire and sword. This
daring move, which is virtually a declaration of war, and
renders negotiation almost hopeless, has for the moment
» checkmated the Government of India. It had been decided,
apparently, to seize Ali Musjeed, and a force of 5,000 men, under
General Boss, had arrived at Jumrood, where it was ordered by
telegraph to stand fast, news having been received of the
arrival of Afghan reinforcements, and of the necessity for
protecting the Trans-Indus plain. So complete had been
the confidence of the authorities in this " dash," that the
Indian papers, which would not expect a check if we were
moving on Tobolsk, announced that Ali Musjeed had fallen.
It is not probable that the Afghans themselves will make any
advance beyond Ali Musjeed, as once outside the Pass, without
artillery or transport, they would, unless Peshawur, which is
Afghan in sentiment, rose in insurrection, be speedily destroyed;
but some of the Hillmen may descend, and the Government of
India cannot forget—and never does forget—its duty to
secure its subjects against raids. How far Shere Ali can
follow up this bold attempt to protect his frontier, can threaten
Quettah, or protect the Pass which intervenes between
that fortress and Candahar, we are quite unable to
decide. We should imagine from his previous his
tory that, having had time to call in his garrisons,
and being exempt by the war itself from the danger of
insurrection, he would have the disposal of 40,000 troops,
equal to Indian Irregulars, and very formidable behind cover,
though quite unable to face European fire, and liable to
be panic-struck by the rockets, which, as Theodore him
self acknowledged, took the heart out of the Abyssinian King.
Behind these troops, again, would stand double their number of
hardy rufifians from Central Asia, half armed, hardly intelligible
to each other, and scarcely disciplined, but useful to fill up
vacant places among tbe .soldiers, and daring enough when
plunder is to be obtained. The Staff itself admits, however,
its lack of information on the force at the Ameer's disposal,
and we confess to profound distrust of all estimates, our own
I included, knowing well that a success, however momentary,
I would double the Ameer's numbers, while a reverse, however
, slight, would be followed by endless desertions to the Hills.
Lord Lytton has, no doubt, been checked by despatches
from home, where the Cabinet is not eager for an expensive
war, and where the effect of a disaster is thoroughly under-
| stood ; but it is clear, from all the accounts, that if he is act-
• ing, as we presume, on a matured policy, and not on any
| sudden whim, he either underestimates his enemy to a danger
ous degree, or he is not nearly so ready as he ought to have
been. In the rush to Jumrood there were not 1,000 Euro
peans. In the dangerous cantonment of Peshawur, where
more than in any place in India we are " holding the
wolf by the ears," where 50,000 inhabitants dislike us
because they were once Afghan, and where every riot
is an emeute, we can trace only 2,500 Europeans, amid
8,000 native soldiers.—a proportion far too small for an Afghan
war. The very able and moderate writer The lowest of the four classes into which East India Company civil servants were divided. A Writer’s duties originally consisted mostly of copying documents and book-keeping. who, in the Times,
follows the movements from day to day, stated on Thursday
that " the total strength of our forces on the immediate
frontier, from the sea to Abbottabad, including Kurrachee,
Hyderabad, Jacobabad, Raj an pore, Dera Ghazee Khan, Dera
Ismail Khan, Bunnoo. Kohat, Peshawur, Hoti Mardan, Now-
shera, Attock, Abbottabad, together with the reserves at
Eawul Pindee, Sealkote, Jhelum, Lahore, Umritsir, Ferozepore T
Mooltan, Jullunder, and the advanced post of Quettah,.
! amounts to 800 British and 7,000 Native Cavalry, 12,000
British and 21,000 Native Infantry, with 102 guns;,
many of these being at stations which it is obviously
j impossible to denude of British troops." In other words,
i there has been no concentration of troops northwards, as there
j would have been if war had been expected, and no gradual
I pushing-up of the three armies towards the scene of expected
hostilities. All this has still to be done, as well as the despatch
of drafts from England ; and the summons to all officers to
give up furlough and repair to their places without delay, is only
out this week. Nor was either the Transport or Commissariat
ready. The inspired correspondent of the Times telegraphs
that there are delays in the collection of provisions and of
transport animals which cannot be overcome. This, we agree
g with the Times, is not the fault of the Departments,
which_ are most efficient, but can do nothing without
fair warning, but it increases our wonder at the loud -
fanfare with which Lord Lytton announced to earth and 1 -
heaven that the suppression of the Ameer was at hand.
There must have been a dozen men round the Viceroy who
knew that Afghanistan could not be entered without camels-
and mules, and that neither had been purchased yet; while the
Lieutenant-Governor, at all events, must have been well aware
that the stock of pack-animals in the Punjab had been ;
running low. It is difficult to avoid an impression that
the Viceroy thought a demonstration by the Field Force,
slightly reinforced, would suffice to frighten the Ameer,,
and induce him to allow the British a grand diplomatic
triumph. If that is the case. Lord Lytton should produce his. :
instructions, or the criticism when Parliament meets will be of
the most galling kind.
It is evident that the Government look forward to a cam
paign in the spring, or preparations on this side would not be :
so active, and we cannot entirely agree with Earl Grey in the
able letter of objections which he published in the Times of
Thursday. It was most foolish, unless we wanted a
quarrel, and with it an excuse for " rectifying our
frontiers," and taking possession of both sides of the
Suleiman, to ask the Ameer to receive a Eesident. It.
was still more foolish to send forward a grand Mission, all fuss
and feathers, with Indian Princes in it, and a huge escort,
before it was known whether Shere Ali would consent to receive
one or not. And it was most foolish of all to trumpet over
Europe the intention of Britain either to reduce the Ameer
to vassalage, or to annex Afghanistan. But we confess
we shrink, as Earl Grey does not, from the conse
quences of retiring now. The loss of dignity may be unim
portant, and the loss of prestige exaggerated, but the loss of
confidence in our pledged word might be irreparable. Did we,
or did we not, give that word to the Khyberee clan, if they
would be on our side, and pass the Mission safely through the
Hills ? The bulletin-writers said we did, at ail events,
and have not been contradicted. If that was so, and we
then give up the Khyberees to be punished as Shere
Ali will punish them, and is indeed punishing them
now, then we shall break faith publicly, and thoroughly de
serve the distrust with which thenceforward every Hill clan
will regard our promises. No such treachery is possible, and
we regard an advance therefore of some kind as altogether un
avoidable. Only we cannot see why, if the general advance
is postponed, as it ought to be, and apparently will be—unless the
Indian Government, as is possible, is concealing its intentions—
till spring, we should not postpone it altogether ; why we should
go forward with this isolated movement on Candahar, which,
so far as appears, is to continue. It may be all mere talk,
but we notice in all the accounts a reserve upon the
expedition to Candahar. Let us reinforce Quettah, by all
means. Let us conciliate Khelat, by all means. Let
| us by all means accumulate force at Sukkur, as we
are said to be doing. But why should we press on to
Candahar, in order that an isolated and small corps d'armee
should remain there waiting through the long winter ? Shere
Ali will not feel the loss of Candahar, and his people will feel,
I the intolerable provocation offered to their pride. We can take
j Candahar when we want it just as well as now, and can convince
India that we are in earnest without running the risk involved |
in so half-hearted an invasion, and encamping a weak army in a
valley as completely cut off from India during winter as if it:
were in another planet. Of course, if the experienced soldiers;
I consulted at Simla and in London sav that it is necessarv
for military reasons, there is an end of the matter. We at
least are not so ill-advised as to reject the opinion of strategists
on a question of that kind, and though we cannot always be
saying so, offer every criticism in perfect deference to the
opinion of experts. But war is, after all, a business in which
common-sense has some place, and there is no visible common-
sense in occupying a position of that kind before we are ready
even to defend it, much less to carry out the whole plan of which
this particular movement is but an important detail. We are
going to hold Candahar, and so paralyse the Ameer's hostility,
even if he allies himself with Russia ? Very well, but granting
that plan to be wise—and it did not turn out So before—what
compels us to carry it out in this red-hot hurry ? Unless the
possession of Candahar is essential to a spring campaign, where
is the advantage of taking it and defending it under most
disadvantageous conditions six months before the true campaign ;
begins ? It is just as if the Russians had crossed the Danube
into the Dobrudscha six months before they were ready for
the general invasion of Turkey, with no view except that of 1
convincing the Sultan that a serious invasion was at hand. [
Can that be good policy, even if we are fighting for prestige ? I
I