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Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎117v] (240/312)

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The record is made up of 1 volume (150 folios). It was created in 07 Sep 1878-19 Oct 1878. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

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in hand. Laat year Sir S tafford N obthcote
expressed his individual opinion against the ,
propriety of extendinfir our frontier iu the
direction of Afghanistan at a time when
steps had already been taken which could only be
regarded as preparatory to such an extension.'
Colonel S tanley's -words aeem to imply the
same opinion when an extension policy hua
been more openly developed. It is so far eatis-
tory to know that there aro members of the
Cabinet who object to what has been declared to
be the common policy of Lord L tstton and Lord
B baconsfield in relation to Afghanistan, but it is
a drawback to this satisfaction that a Minister
cannot express his individual opinion without its
being very generally accepted as the united
opinion of the Cabinet. An individual utterance
may thus serve as a screen for the action of those
who have the practical direction of affairs till such
time as it suits their purpose to exhibit
their policy without disguise, by which time
they may have already committed the nation to
it beyond possibility of retreat. Within the last
two years we have again and again seen the mode
rate members of the Cabinet used as stalking
horses for a policy with which their own indi
vidual declarations were far from being in accord.
Such a state of things is consistent neither with
their own self-respect nor with the loyal working
of representative institutions. Colonel S tanley
ignores facts which were seini-officially communi
cated to the public before the repulse of Sir
N eville ' C hambeblain's mission, when he
speaks as if the policy in pursuance of which
that mission was despatched had been adopted in
I consequence of an attempt on the part of Russia
j to obtain possession of the key of the Ameer of
A fghanistan's house. Whatever may be the
nature of Russian intrigues with the A meer , it
does not follow that they are to be met by an
English occupation of his territories. But, apart
from this, it is misleading to speak as if the
proposals carried by Sir N eyillb C ham-
beblain had been conceived after it be
came known that S heee A li had given
a friendly reception to a Russian envoy. The
same proposals were made two years ago, and
the author or authors of them must have bu,t a
very indifferent confidence ia their value if they
try to back them up, not by cool reason, but by
clap-trap attempts to enlist prejudice and pas
sion in their favour. Colonel S tanley expressed
no opinion, individual or otherwise, as to the ex
chequer from which the costs of the Afghan expe
dition ought to be paid. His audience might not
have cheered so loudly at the moment if they had
been told that, as this expedition had grown out
of the Imperialist policy of the Government, it
was England and not India that ought to defray
the charges of it. But he would have earned
a better title to their gratitude in the future
when these unwelcome facts are brought home.
TTT-R AFGHAN" WAR.
to anrk editob ov raa daily news.
S ib ,—As I have lately seen something of the
countries bordering upon Afghanistan, I kope I nsay be
acquitted of presumption in expressing my concurrence
in the advice you haTe given to the Sovsrnment. The
clearness and vigour of your policy in this important
matter have been remarkable and convincing. Your
repeated and unwavering counsel has been that whatever
action is taken with regard to Afghanistan it must be
direct and continue as. Elsewhere it has been urged, and
the design has apparently entered into the counsels of the
Government, that dependence may be had on demonstra
tions ; that we should wait on accidents; that there !
should be an advance succeeded by a halt for a season,
with the underlying expectation that, if these things be
done, the Ameer will give way, and that the difficulty
may thus be ended.
In support of your arguments, I should like to put the ;
qasation, Why did Shere Ali insult our envoy? Was it
not because he had been led by a variety of circumstances
to believe tiat our Government meditate the occupation
©f his territory and the extinction of vhis independence F
Will this suspicion be extinguished by the capture of
Ali Musjid or of Oandahar t" Certainly not; it will rather j
be confirmed. The Ameer would probably be strengthened
by an advance folio wed by a halt of the British at any
point remote from his capital. He and his chiefs would
become desperate m their defence. Time would be given
them to proclaim a desperate warfare, and above all to
make desperate bidding for alliance. If our forces
enter Afghanistan and do not proceed, as you say, " in a i
genuine movement forward," we shall in all likelihood be
giving, indirectly, aid and strength to our enemy. The
Ameer Shere Ali Khan is not a Sultan of the Bosphorus.
It will not be safe to count upon his cowering before a
demonstration. Near the mountains which overshadow
his country I have heard the proverb, "If you meet a
cobra and an Afghan, kill the Afghan''—one of many sig
nificant hints of the ferocious bravery of those whom he
I can lead to battle.
j You touch, also, to-day upon the very serious question—
! why have wa an Aighan war ? There can, I think, be
no doubt as to the answer which every intelligent mind
must give—It is one of the first fruits of the Eastern
policy of Lord Beaconslield. " The fiasco of Cyprus,"
followed by a tragedy of Afghanistan, may cause the less
fanciful members of the Gavemment to arrest the Asiatic
career of the Prime Ministea*. But if their prudence and
the gravity of events produce no check, then, perhaps, we
shall have all Asia, from Beyrout to Burmah, upon our
hands.
I do not feel certain that this i has not been
throughout the design of Lord BeaconsJiold. It may
well he that SLere Ah has read aright the move
ments of a mind which, has undeniably more natural
affinity with his own race than with the Anglo-Saxon.
And if it be so; if the p'oHcy which Lord Lytton has
pushed forward at the arder' of Lord Beaconsfield be a
policy as dark and dangerous as that which your corre
spondent, Mr. Forbes, has so ably denounced under the
title of " The Fiasco oi Cyprus/' then we cannot wonder
at the repulse of our armed mission of 1,000 men. I would
advise doubting followers of the Government to read with
attention the letter which Lord Lawrence addressed to
one of your oonteiaporarics on the 8th of January, in
vrhich ha records the- ©pinion of Sir Neville Chamberlain
himself against taSdng possession of Afghanistan; in
which he points to tihe occupation of Quetta as the first
step in the minds of the Afghans "towards the subjuga
tion of their country in which he says, "I believe the
great majority of the Afghans to be vehemently opposed
to this movement^ and that the apprehensions which have
been raised have dene much to destroy all the good that
has flowed from the conciliatory and kindly disposition of
the British Gov«mment towards them during the last
twenty years." As for the presence of a Kussian envoy
at Cabul, he wsuld not hare bean there but for such
language as thuwt which Lord Beaconsfield held towards
Russia at the Goiildjiall;. he would not have been there
had not our Government sustituted a vain policy of
menace for the, concert of Europe ; he would not have
been there had there been no exhibition oi that language
aud policy wh*ch have received their most severe con
demnation in tfce stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin.
We must go forward now ; we must have an Afghan
war. Lord Sandhurst calculated that 30,000 troops would
be necessary for the Amter's overthrow, and as the former
war is estimated to have cost 13,000,00uZ. with a very
insufficient force, this may cost 20,000,0 01. But the
time is coming when those who have brought this trouble
and burden upon us will surely have to stand up for
judgment by the country. A# an opponent of his admin
istration, I should feel great confidence m asking any
sensible Englishman, Irishman, or Scotchman whether
Lord Beaconsfield ia exactly the sort of person with
whom—as seen in his Asiatic policy —he would like to go
i into business, and how far we can trust such men as Mr.
Cross and Sir Stafford Northcoie, when wa see theia
lending themselves so readily to the costly and visionary
schemes of their chief. I fancy the reply will exhibit an
opinion like that of Lord Derby, that under such a cap
tain the ship is not safe, and that the pressure which must
be yet greater of " bloated armaments," and consequently
depressed trade, will lead many hack to the more w'lole-
some Liberal policy of peace, retrenchment, and reform.
—Your faithful servant, AE.THUB ARNOLD.
45, Kensington-park-gardens, W., Oct. 8.

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Content

Press cuttings from British and Indian Newspapers regarding the Afghan War (today known as the 2nd Afghan-Anglo War), negotiations in Cabul [Kabul], the British Government's policy with regards to the Indian Frontier, and the movements of the Russians during the war.

The cuttings have been taken from a number of newspapers including the Pall Mall Budget , The Pall Mall Gazette , The Globe , The Times , The Pioneer Mail , The Standard , The Daily News , The Daily Telegraph , The Evening Standard , The Saturday Review , The Spectator , The Morning Post and The World .

Extent and format
1 volume (150 folios)
Arrangement

The cuttings have been arranged in the scrapbook in chronological order and the pages of the book have been tied into three bundles ff 1-46, ff 47-96 and ff 97-142

Physical characteristics

Foliation: This file has been foliated in the top right hand front corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. of each folio with a pencil number enclosed in a circle.

Written in
English in Latin script
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Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎117v] (240/312), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, Mss Eur F126/24, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100024093681.0x000029> [accessed 2 January 2025]

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