Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎114v] (234/312)

TIMES, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 10,
LONDON* THURSDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1878.
We seem to be on the brink of a war with
Afghanistan, but it is still open to us either to take
or to decline to take the last decisive plunge.
What choice are we to make in the matter, and by
what reasons are we to be determined in making
it ? On these important questions we publish
letters this morning taking very opposite views.
Earl G rey and Sir C harles T revelyan are for
maintaining peace with Afghanistan. War, they
argue, would be alike unjust and impolitic.
" P olitical ," on the other hand, assumes that war
has become inevitable, and he is well pleased at
the chance thus offered us of settling the Afghan
question, once and for ever, on terms favourable to
ourselves. It is worth while to examine the argu
ments by which these very different conclusions are
leached. We will deal first with Earl G rey's
letter, as the longest and the most exhaustive.
The questions it raises go pretty well over the
whole ground. S here A li , Earl G rev declares,
has given us no such cause of offence as can justify
us in declaring war upon him. His rejection of
our Mission was within his right as an independent
Prince, and so, too, was his acceptance of a Mission
from Russia. If there was any discourtesy shown
in the manner in which our Mission was turned j
back, it was provoked by previous discourtesy on
our part. As long, therefore, as S here A li
abstains from aggression or from menace of ag
gression, wo can force no quarrel upon him for any
thing that has as yet passed. The conclusion to
which Earl G rey is thus led is further supported
by a comparison of the gain and loss that might be
expected from an Afghan war. If our arms were
as triumphant as we could wish, if we were to over
run and subjugate Afghanistan without encounter
ing any reverse of fortune, and almost, indeed,
without resistance, we could, Earl G rey thinks,
make no use of our conquest. To hold Af
ghanistan, if it were not a task beyond our
power, would at all events cost far more than
it was worth. To depose S here A li and
set up some other native ruler in his place is
eimilarly an attempt against which we are warned
in advance by our previous failure. We placed
S hah S hoojah on the throne, but we could not keep
him there, and we could expect no better result
now from a repetition of our old mistake. In what
ever way the end came, and whatever might be the
incidents and immediate consequences of an Afghan
war, the end sooner or later would be that we
should find ourselves compelled to retire from
Afghanistan. We should thus lose the prestige
about whiclf we are at present so anxious, and
should have succeeded only in making the Afghans
and their rulers more than ever hostile to us, and
better than ever suited to be made tools for the ag
gressive designs of Russia, supposing such designs
to exist. These are the reasons of justice and of
policy which lead Earl G rey to pronounce against
war with Afghanistan. Our position, he admits, is
a difficult one. We have said and done so much
that we can hardly draw back with credit, but even
bo we shall lose less by drawing back at once than
by going on in a wrong course, and making our ill-
success more conspicuous in the end. Sir C harles
T revelyan adds the advice to spend the money
which a war would cost on improving our commu
nications with Afghanistan, and developing the
Afghan carrying trade between India and Central
Asia. A tenth part of the money would, he thinks,
be sufficient, and the result he promises for it is
that we should have the Afghans as attached and
useful allies, instead of what a war would leave
them—jealous and suspicious neighbours.
The policy of an Afghan war may fairly be treated
as an open question. But we were not, we must
confess, prepared to hear that such a war at the
present moment would be unjust as well as im
politic. Earl G rey's assumption of the indepen
dence of Afghanistan is neither in agreement with
the facts of the case, nor would it be sufficient for
his purpose even if it were granted more fully than
the facts warrant. In our past relations with
Afghanistan we have always been accustomed to
claim a right of interference so far as was necessary
for our own safety. This claim has not only been
made, but has been so far submitted to that we must
deal with it as an accomplished fact. As far as we
have waived it in any degree it has been from motives
of mere convenience, and not from any sense that we
had not the full right to insist upon it. Our agree
ment with Russia that she was not to consider
Afghanistan as an open field for her diplomacy or
her arms was, by itself, an infringement upon the
full sovereignty of the country from which Russia
was thus excluded, and which we thus, in a certain
sense, preserved for ourselves. Nor, whatever we
may think thus far about Afghanistan, can we regard
S herb A li as in any real sense its sovereign. His
power is limited by the kind of subjects over whom
it professes to be exercised. We have to do, in
Afghanistan, not with a settled nation, but with a
loose, shifting congeries of independent or semi-
independent tribes, some owning a mere nominal
allegiance to S herb A li , and some, as we have
already seen, ready to take arms against him, if we
will promise them our protection. If it was in an
attack by S here A li on the Khyberees that the
first blood was shed, would Earl G rey still assume
that we had no right to take up the quarrel and
move to the defence of our allies ? Yet, as
we point out in another column, it is by
no means improbable that it will be in this
way, or in some such way as this, that
the war will begin. Even if it does not, we
should by no means feel bound to admit that our
case was much weakened. An uncivilized State has
never been held to have a right to what we may
term the full comity of nations. It may, from its
geographical position, be drawn into the vortex of
civilization whether it wishes it or not, and it is
liable sometimes to rough treatment while the in
evitable process is going on. Earl G rey is a bold
champion of the independence of Afghanistan. But
has he, we would venture to inquire, the courage
of his opinions ? What is true now of Afghanistan
vwould have been equally true of other countries in
the East over which our sovereignty has been
established. Is Earl G eey prepared to argue that
we should redress the wrongs we have thus done ?
Would he stake the maintenance of our Indian
Empire on the result of a general plebiscite of the
Indian people ? Would he, three quarters of a
century ago, have allowed Ireland to be an inde
pendent State in alliance with America or with
France ? He must either go as far as this, or he
must consent to modify his views as to the inde
pendent rights of our troublesome and lately sub
sidized neighbour, Afghanistan.
But if a war with Afghanistan is impolitic, the
mere fact that it would be just is no good reason
why we should enter upon it. It may, indeed, as
we have shown more fully in another column,
be forced upon us, whether we wish it or
not. A passage by S here A li over our frontier,
or an attack upon any of our allies beyond
our frontier, would leave us no alternative.
But, apart from this, the position in which we find
ourselves already placed is one from which it is not
easy to retreat. We have received an open insult,
whether, as Earl G rey thinks, we have drawn it
upon ourselves or not. We have called the atten-
| tion of the whole world to it. We have expressed
j our resentment at it. We have announced our in-
| tention of punishing it. We have, in consequence,
1 marched our troops right up to the gates of
i Afghanistan. We are told now that there is
j nothing for it but to march back again, to lay down
our arms, and to confess practically that we have
been in the wrong all through. This may be sound
I advice, but it is very questionable on the face of it.
j If we were to act as Earl G rey thinks wo ought,
what effect should we produce on both sides of our
frontier line ? It would, we fear, not be for any
long time that a war could be thus avoided. We
should be left more ready to take offence than ever,
and S here A li , we may be sure, would be not less
ready to give us offence. In such circumstances
war must come,
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ran J esneoeq os guxop raoij nre^squ j ^nq 'jfoijod
unipui ijueoea ano jo s^nt^ oq^ sb pxeSei j Q/sqAV
uo sjp'Baiej eraos ppn oi). pBfS ueeq eAisq p^noqs j
•pe^ita
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gurarexfoj jo edoq uiua eq^ tpm esanoo esmun eures
eq^ ui de^s jeq^ouu Gjpui pjnoqs oav unqij
u'B^stu'BqSjY 03. pj^Sej q^tA\ pansand 0^ jo OA-eq
eA\ ibqod ueqt^sini eq^ iCq soajosjuo uodn ^qSnoiq
•OAtjq eAV ^psui eq? o^ qiuiqns o^ je^eq jbj oq
p^noM ^1 -oan^rej e^mm^n o^qissod s^i raoaj q.jns9j
PinoM qoiqAV ^■eqq. q?m ptre'-rBM ^snCun ue SutS bav jo
|TA9 eq^ qim uosuBdraoo m t? 9q ppoAV oSnraBp
sxqq. ^q^ pue^uoo j rjng; 'ji gni^u9S9j ^noq^iM j9ao
p9ss'Bd 9q pjnoqs iCoAug; ano jo uorpatei eq^ *9nop
pun pres uggq sBq ^eq^ 'jt uoi^ndea juo 0%
oStJurBp pea ure^sns jj'Bqs 9^ ^qi SupCuep raoaj auj
uib 1 'erax^ guibs gqq, •a^qBsnoxeui 9q 'uonndo
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Xq i/qrior^ip 9q^ jo qno gag o^ jegunp smq gtnja noui
TIMES, THURSDAY, OCTOBER 10,
LOUDON, TBVBSDAY,OCTOBER 10, 1S78.
We seem to be on the brink of a war with
Afghanistan, but it is still open to us either to take
or to decline to take the last decisive plunge.
What choice are we to make in the matter, and by
what reasons are we to be determined in making
it ? On these important questions we publish
letters this morning taking very opposite views.
Earl Grey and Sir Charles Trevelyan are for
maintaining peace with Afghanistau. War, they
argue, would be alike unjust and impolitic.
" Political ," on the other hand, assumes that war
has become inevitable, and he is well pleased at
the chance thus offered us of settling the Afghan
question, once and tor ever, on terms favourable to
ourselves. It is worth while to examine the argu
ments by which these very different conclusions are
leached. We will deal first with Earl Grey's
letter, as the longest and the most exhaustive.
The questions it raises go pretty well over the
whole ground. Shere Ali , Earl Grev declares,
has given us no such cause of offence as can justify
us in declaring war upon him. His rejection of
our Mission was within his right as an independent
Prince, and so, too, was his acceptance of a Mission
from Russia. If there was any discourtesy shown
in the manner in which our Mission was turned |
back, it was provoked by previous discourtesy on
our part. As long, therefore, as Shere Ali
abstains from aggression or from menace of ag
gression, wo can force no quarrel upon him for any
thing that has as yet passed. The conclusion to
which Earl Grey is thus led is further supported
by a comparison of the gain and loss that might be
. expected from an Afghan war. If our arms were
as triumphant as we could wish, if we were to over
run and subjugate Afghanistan without encounter
ing any reverse of fortune, and almost, indeed,
without resistance, we could, Earl Grey thinks,
make no use of our conquest. To hold Af
ghanistan, if it were not a task beyond our
power, would at all events cost far more than
it was worth. To depose Shere Ali and
set up some other native ruler in his place is
similarly an attempt against which we are warned
in advance by our previous failure. We placed
Shah Shoojah on the throne, but we could not keep
him there, and we could expect no better result
now from a repetition of our old mistake. In what
ever way the end came, and whatever might be the
incidents and immediate consequences of an Afghan
war, the end sooner or later would be that we
should find ourselves compelled to retire from
Afghanistan. We should thus lose the prestige
about whiclf we are at present so anxious, and
should have succeeded only in making the Afghans
and their rulers more than ever hostile to us, and
better than ever suited to be made tools for the ag
gressive designs of Russia, supposing such designs
to exist. These are the reasons of justice and of
policy which lead Earl Grey to pronounce against
war with Afghanistan. Our position, he admits, is
a difficult one. We have said and done so much
that we can hardly draw back with credit, but even
so we shall lose less by drawing back at once than
by going on in a wrong course, and making our ill-
success more conspicuous in the end. Sir Charles
Trevelyan adds the advice to spend the money
which a war would cost on improving our commu
nications with Afghanistan, and developing the
Afghan carrying trade between India and Central
Asia. A tenth part of the money would, he thinks,
be sufficient, and the result he promises for it is
that we should have the Afghans as attached and
useful allies, instead of what a war would leave
them—jealous and suspicious neighbours.
The policy of an Afghan war may fairly be treated
as an open question. But we were not, we must
confess, prepared to hear that such a war at the
present moment would be unjust as well as im
politic. Earl Grey's assumption of the indepen
dence of Afghanistan is neither in agreement with
the facts of the case, nor would it be sufficient for
his purpose even if it were granted more fully than
the facts warrant. In our past relations with
Afghanistan we have always been accustomed to
claim a right of interference so far as was necessary
for our own safety. This claim has not only been
made, but has been so far submitted to that we must
deal with it as an accomplished fact. As far as we
have waived it in any degree it has been from motives
of mere convenience, and not from any sense that we
had not the full right to insist upon it. Our agree
ment with Russia that she was not to consider
Afghanistan as an open field for her diplomacy or
her arms was, by itself, an infringement upon the
full sovereignty of the country from which Russia
was thus excluded, and which we thus, in a certain
sense, preserved for ourselves. Nor, whatever we
may think thus far about Afghanistan, can we regard
Shere Ali as in any real sense its sovereign. His
power is limited by the kind of subjects over whom
it professes to be exercised. We have to do, in
Afghanistan, not with a settled nation, but with a
loose, shifting congeries of independent or semi-
independent tribes, some owning a mere nominal
allegiance to Sherb Ali , and some, as we have
already seen, ready to take arms against him, if we
will promise them our protection. If it was in an
attack by Shere Ali on the Khyberees that the
first blood was shed, would Earl Grey still assume
that we had no right to take up the quarrel and
move to the defence of our allies ? Yet, as
we point out in another column, it is by
no means improbable that it will be in this
way, or in some such way as this, that
the war will begin. Even if it does not, we
should by no means feel bound to admit that our
case was much weakened. An uncivilized State has
never been held to have a right to what we may
term the full comity of nations. It may, from its
geographical position, be drawn into the vortex of
civilization whether it wishes it or not, and it is
liable sometimes to rough treatment while the in
evitable process is going on. Earl Grey is a bold
champion of the independence of Afghanistan. But
has he, we would venture to inquire, the courage
of his opinions ? What is true now of Afghanistan
iWould have been equally true of other countries in
the East over which our sovereignty has been
established. Is Earl Geey prepared to argue that
we should redress the wrongs we have thus done ?
Would he stake the maintenance of our Indian
Empire on the result of a general plebiscite of the
Indian people ? Would he, three quarters of a
century ago, have allowed Ireland to be an inde
pendent State in alliance with America or with
France ? He must either go as far as this, or he
must consent to modify his views as to the inde
pendent rights of our troublesome and lately sub
sidized neighbour, Afghanistan.
But if a war with Afghanistan is impolitic, the
mere fact that it would be just is no good reason
i why we should enter upon it. It may, indeed, as
we have shown more fully in another column,
be forced upon us, whether we wish it or
not. A passage by Shere Ali over our frontier,
or an attack upon any of our allies beyond
our frontier, would leave us no alternative.
But, apart from this, the position in which we find
i ourselves already placed is one from which it is not
easy to retreat. We have received an open insult,
whether, as Earl Grey thinks, we have drawn it
upon ourselves or not. We have called the atten-
{tion of the whole world to it. We have expressed
our resentment at it. We have announced our in
tention of punishing it. We have, in consequence,
marched our troops right up to the gates of
Afghanistan. We are told now that there is
nothing for it but to march back again, to lay down
our arms, and to confess practically that we have
been in the wrong all through. This may be sound
j advice, but it is very questionable on the face of it.
If we were to act as Earl Grey thinks wo ought,
what effect should we produce on both sides of our
frontier line ? It would, we fear, not be for any
long time that a war could be thus avoided. We
should be left more ready to take offence than ever,
and Shere Ali , we may be sure, would be not less
ready to give us offence. In such circumstances
war must come, and it could hardly fail to come at
some time less favourable to ourselves than the
present time. We have our hands free, and we are
in readiness, or very nearly in readiness, to inflict a
decisive blow. We may put aside the doubts and
difficulties which Earl Grey suggests towards the
close of his letter. There can be no question of
our power to do what we please with Afghanistan.
For the course we may deem it wise to follow we
must wait for the guidance of events. It is pre
mature to determine the exact conditions on which
we may by and by insist. The duration of the war,
i the behaviour of the Ameer's subjects, the
behaviour of the Ameer himself, the point we had
I reached when the first proffer of submission
was made, and the terms in which it
was made—all these would enter as factors
into the calculation, and we cannot as yet
foresee any of them with certainty. What we
need not doubt is that if the war with which we are
threatened does come, we shall do our utmost to
insure that it shall be the last. The settlement of
our relations with Afghanistan must be made
partly on military, partly on political grounds. They
will be so made as to secure that Afghanistan shall
: no longer be a menace to India. We have been led
| by degrees to the point at which we are now
' standing, and the only result of drawing back from
it would be that we should have to retrace our
steps. Most glad should we be to avoid a
war with Afghanistan, but we can accept peace
only on conditions of our own choosing. As
long as these are refused us, we cannot admit
either that war would be impolitic or that it would
be unjust. The burden is so great in any case that
we have no wish to add to it by vain and perplex
ing doubts about the rectitude of our cause, or
about the wisdom of supporting it by arms, if
| arms, unhappily, are needed.