Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎111v] (228/312)

macy. It can hardly be her aim to provoke a
war between England and Afghanistan, in which
war she will have no pretence for giving help to the
latter, and out of which England must emerge with
a considerable increase of power and of influence,
if not of territory, in the very direction in which
Russian interests are supposed to be involved. The
position of the Russian Agent in Cabul must, indeed,
soon become insupportable. If he should attempt
to dissuade the A meer from his warlike purpose
he will lose all the fruits of his diplomatic triumph |
over his British rival. If he should encourage
S here A li in his insane purpose he will be involved
in the consequences of his failure, and Russian
prestige will receive a blow more serious than any
which it has yet sustained in Asia. For a Russian
Agent in Cabul to be neutral during war with
England is impossible. As to the threat of making
Afghanistan into a new Servia, from which
" unofficial war" may be waged against India,
that is an extravagance which could only be
engendered in the brains of those who confound
England in India with Turkey in Europe. We
need hardly point out to those who are concerned
i in the maintenance of the Russian interest in Asia
what are the dangers which beset a policy of
friendly neutrality in that quarter. The delusion
that a friendly neutrality can be practised by
Russia inAfghanistan is of a piece with the specula
tions which are based upon the presumed disaffection
of England's native soldiers and the ill-disguised
hostility of the Indian Princes. The Princes and
people of India may love us little, but they
assuredly will not exchange the dominion of
England for that of Afghanistan under Russian
protectorate.
The announcement of what Russia proposes to do
in the event of the English arms being successful in
Afghanistan deserves more attention, as indicating
what is in accordance with the whole scheme of
Russian policy. The occupation of Afghanistan by
the English will be met, we are threatened, by an
immediate advance of Russia upon Merv and
Balkh, in which case we are told that " the
fiction of a neutral country intervening between
English and Russian sentinels will cease." That
fiction is one of which the authorship belongs not
to England but to Russia. It is Russia who a few
years ago proposed to establish a neutral zone
between her territories and those of England, but
the scheme came to nothing, owing to the peculiar
notions of neutrality entertained by Prince G orts-
chakoff . His proposal that Afghanistan itself
should be the neutral zone would, if accepted, have
permitted Russia to absorb not only the whole terri- i
tory of Bokhara up to the Oxus, but all Afghan- |
Turkestan to within a hundred miles of Herat,
while England would be restricted from punishing
a Wuzeeree raid upon her own frontier. A neutral
zone, however the lines were drawn, would be an
impossibility, and in no case could we consent to
include Afghanistan within it, seeing that nearly
the whole of the country lies south of the great
barrier which nature has drawn in this region, and
that geographically as well as politically it belongs to
the system, not of Turkestan, but of India. Lord
M ayo's substitute for the Russian proposal is the
only one which is practicable or consistent with
justice. "If Russia," he wrote in 1869, "would
only consent to place herself in the same position as
regards Khiva, the unconquered part of Bokhara,
and the independent tribes along her frontier (if
she has a frontier), as we are willing to do as
regards Khelat, Afghanistan, and the territories of the
Kush-begi—that is to say, to recognise and secure
their independence, but to continue to exercise
over them friendly influence, with an unquestioned
power of punishing them or their subjects if they
misbehaved—if Russia would consent to this and
j agree to a joint solemn public declaration with us
to that effect, binding on the honour and the good
faith of the two Governments, I am inclined to
believe that the Central Asian question would
cease to exist for your time and mine," Such a j
scheme was no wild vision in 1869. At the present
time we are forbidden to hope in its practicability.
trauuejc) guiABei uodu '^ bzq 'ss9|0qqa9A9
•e^j ooj eraoo p^q uoi^ueAje^ut usissnjj
•.fop oqq. poureS p^q 'aoaaduig eq^ poo
qoiqAV jo p'eaq eq; 'mprajj ut ifyxed eouad' ei
Sanqsje^a^ •q.g pisq a 'eqq. eaojeg; '^sixa ^qSr
Jtsai joj ejisep jfuu jpeqo o^ aieia
q^iM. q^OT ©q; uo nqjeg; ut paAij.
q^oq puq oqAV 'Aio^Bqoe^aoQ eouuj pt
aepuBxejy aojeduig eq^ qjiM. euq eures
0 W Pinoo ejj •edoang; jo eoead eqq. o^ aeSuie
enoues Xub jo aoAe^qM Sujqqou aiou ?[ oqiv 'esu
-Jtns ifq uespj^ uura ■b jo ^xed oq^ o^ o^qB o^tt
SBAI sfojurasiff eouu^r 'saoiAass pooS eig paaaj
THE AFGHAN ARMY.
The rapidity with which Shere Ali has concen
trated a force in the Khyber Pass sufficiently
proves that he does to some extent possess that
plaything of despots, a regular army. It is
possible to glean some idea of the composi
tion of that army from the reports of our
border officials, and from the narratives of
the few English travellers who have visited
Afghanistan since the final triumph of Shere
Ali. The records in the possession of the
Russian Central Staff Office are misleading, for
they only bring down the story to, at the very
latest, the beginning of 1870. They are based
on the old travels and observations of Vemjukof
and Fedchenko, but they have been corrected and
amplified by the narrative of Kosteukho, who
visited Afghanistan in 1869. But, although the
Russian information upon the subject was meagre,
and is misleading at the present moment. General
Stolieteffs reportwill place at their disposal a much
more detailed and accurate synopsis of the army of
Shere Ali than any that is to be found among the
archives of our Indian Foreign Office. At this crisis in
! affairs, when we are on the threshold of an advance
through the passes, even if we do not go further,
it is absolutely essential that we should realise
that the army of Shere Ali is quite a different j
thing to the old force of Dost Mahomed. .
When Shere Ali came to Umballa in 1869 he had
just triumphed over the confederacy that his elder
brothers had formed against him, and he owed that
triumph to a small regular army in the formation of
which he had no share. The campaigns from 1864
to 1867 were lost or won on either side by a miscel
laneous following of the chief sirdars Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. . With the
exception of the artillery, which was very limited,
the armies of Shere Ali and of his rivals, Ameen
Afzul, Azim, and Abderrahman Khans, were mere
heterogeneous masses, which fought often with the
most desperate courage, but which more often
abandoned the field of battle the instant one of
their leaders fell. The result of those early
campaigns was disastrous for Shere Ali, and he was
compelied to flee to Herat, leaving the rest of
Afghanistan in the possession of his rivals. His
flight to Hej'at was really an advance towards
success. He had followed the old Afghan mode of
fighting; he had relied on brute force alone,
and he had failed. He was almost in despair of
success, and meditated a flight to Persia. He
was, therefore, eminently in a fit state of mind to
listen to temperate counsels and to follow the new
plan which his son Yakoob Khan laid before him.
During the four years that Shere Ali had been
waging war round Cabul and Candahar, Yakoob
Khan had been administering authority in Herat
and Ferrah with rare ability. But he had been
doing more. He had been forming a regular army.
Sultan Jan, of Herat, a scion of the old Sudosye
family, who died in 1863, on the eve of the sur
render of Herat to Dost Mahomed,- had formed an
army out of the brave Heratees, by means of
which, and the watchfulness of England, he
had preserved his independence for long
against both Persia and Cabul. That army
probably numbered 5000 men. There were
five regiments of foot with an average strength of
500 to the regiment, five of cavalry, some 2000
sabres, and about 500 artillerists. With this force
Sultan Jan held Herat against the vast host of
Dost Mahomed, at the summit of his career, for
ten months, and then starvation alone compelled
him to surrender. When Yakoob Khan was left
there as governor, in 1864, he found in the relics
of Sultan Jan's army the only military force on
which he could rely, for the necessities of |
Shere Ali compelled him to summon all
his Afghan troops to Candahar. But on
that base Yakoob Khan proceeded to erect a
! more imposing superstructure. The old principle
of Sultan Jan was maintained, and the Heratees
were liable to universal conscription. By stringently
enforcing this law Yakoob Khan soon had a regular
army, fairly provided with muskets and well
drilled, and numbering some 15,000 men. It was
incomparably the most effective force within the
borders of Cabul, and it was with it that Yakoob
Khan.overthrew Azim and Abderrahman Khans on
several occasions, and restored to his father the king
dom which he had lost. The lesson which Yakoob
Khan had first learnt from Sultan Jan, and then had
taught Shere Ali, was not lost upon the Afghan
Ameer. When he came to India and saw our troops
that lesson was impressed upon him in a manner
I which his previous residence amongst us thirty
I years before had not suggested. He went back to
his country with many new ideas and new aspira
tions, some erroneous, many exaggerated, and all
unrealised save one, and that was the resolve to
form a regular army. He had reached that stage
in his career when all the evils of ruling a turbu
lent people divided into hostile tribes, and par
celled out among independent sirdars Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. , were most
apparent to him, and the one way out of the
I dilemma, the only mode to acquire tranquillity and
' durability for his dynasty, was to create a regular
army sucli as that of his son Yakoob Khan, or as
that of the Feringhees, the efficiency of which had
! been so deeply impressed upon him.
macy. It can hardly be her aim to provoke a
war between England and Afghanistan, in which
war she will have no pretence for giving help to the
latter, and out of which England must emerge with
a considerable increase of power and of influence,
if not of territory, in the very direction in which
Russian interests are supposed to be involved. The
position of the Russian Agent in Cabul must, indeed,
soon become insupportable. If he should attempt
to dissuade the Ameer from his warlike purpose
he will lose all the fruits of his diplomatic triumph j
over his British rival. If he should encourage i
Shere A li in his insane purpose he will be involved
in the consequences of his failure, and Russian
prestige will receive a blow more serious than any
which it has yet sustained in Asia. For a Russian
Agent in Cabul to be neutral during war with
England is impossible. As to the threat of making
Afghanistan into a new Servia, from which
" unofficial war" may be waged against India,
that is an extravagance which could only be
engendered in the brains of those who confound
England in India with Turkey in Europe. We
need hardly point out to those who are concerned
i in the maintenance of the Russian interest in Asia
what are the dangers which beset a policy of
friendly neutrality in that quarter. The delusion
that a friendly neutrality can be practised by
Russia inAfghanistan is of a piece with the specula
tions which are based upon the presumed disaffection
of England's native soldiers and the ill-disguised
hostility of the Indian Princes. The Princes and
people of India may love us little, but they
assuredly will not exchange the dominion of
England for that of Afghanistan under Russian
protectorate.
The announcement of what Russia proposes to do
in the event of the English arms being successful in
Afghanistan deserves more attention, as indicating
what is in accordance with the whole scheme of
Russian policy. The occupation of Afghanistan by
the English will be met, we are threatened, by an
immediate advance of Russia upon Merv and
Balkh, in which case we are told that " the
fiction of a neutral country intervening between
English and Russian sentinels will cease." That
fiction is one of which the authorship belongs not
to England but to Russia. It is Russia who a few
years ago proposed to establish a neutral zone
between her territories and those of England, but
the scheme came to nothing, owing to the peculiar
notions of neutrality entertained by Prince Gorts-
chakofp. His proposal that Afghanistan itself
should be the neutral zone would, if accepted, have
I permitted Russia to absorb not only the whole terri- i
tory of Bokhara up to the Oxus, but all Afghan-'
Turkestan to within a hundred miles of Herat,
while England would be restricted from punishing
a Wuzeeree raid upon her own frontier. A neutral
zone, however the lines were drawn, would be an
impossibility, and in no case could we consent to
: include Afghanistan within it, seeing that nearly
; the whole of the country lies south of the great
barrier which nature has drawn in this region, and
that geographically as well as politically it belongs to
the system, not of Turkestan, but of India. Lord
Mayo's substitute for the Russian proposal is the
only one which is practicable or consistent with
justice. "If Russia," he wrote in 1869, "would
only consent to place herself in the same position as
regards Khiva, the unconquered part of Bokhara,
and the independent tribes along her frontier (if
she has a frontier), as we are willing to do as
regards Khelat, Afghanistan, and the territories of the
Kush-begi—that is to say, to recognise and secure
their independence, but to continue to exercise
over them friendly influence, with an unquestioned
power of punishing them or their subjects if they
misbehaved—if Russia would consent to this and
agree to a joint solemn public declaration with us
to that effect, binding on the honour and the good
faith of the two Governments, I am inclined to
believe that the Central Asian question would
cease to exist for your time and mine." Such a
scheme was no wild vision in 1869. At the present
time we are forbidden to hope in its practicability.
Russia, byherinterferencein Afghanistan, in express
violation of the pledge given by Prince Gortschakofp
to the British Government in January, 1874, has
revived pretensions which throw us back to the old
era of intrigue and conquest. But then, it is
asked, has Russia no right to send her Envoy
wherever she pleases 1 She can do so, of course,
if she is willing to take all the responsibilities
which the exercise of such a right involves in such
a country as Afghanistan. England can also send
her Envoys to Bokhara and Khiva. But England
has kept to the spirit of the understanding, which
excludes these countries from the province of British
diplomacy, and it is certainly not too much to
ask that Cabul, which is of far nearer interest to
us than Bokhara or Khiva can be to Russia, shall
be kept free from the presence of Russian agents.
In any case we are equally in our right when we
insist that the same privilege shall be extended to
us as has been given to Russia, and when we treat
the repulse of our Mission as an indignity which
the presence of the Russian Envoy at Cabul renders
it absolutely impossible for us to suffer.
THE AFGHAN AEMT.
The rapidity with which Shere Ali has concen
trated a force in the Khyber Pass sufficiently
proves that he does to some extent possess that
plaything of despots, a regular army. It is
possible to glean some idea of the composi
tion of that army from the reports of our
border officials, and from the narratives of
| the few English travellers who have visited
Afghanistan since the final triumph of Shere
Ali. The records in the possession of the
Russian Central Staff Office are misleading, for
they only bring down the story to, at the very
latest, the beginning of 1870. They are based
on the old travels and observations of Vemjukof
and Fedchenko, but they have been corrected and
amplified by the narrative of Kosteukho, who
visited Afghanistan in 1869. But, although the
Russian information upon the subject was meagre,
and is misleading at the present moment. General
Stolieteff's report will place at their disposal a much
more detailed and accurate synopsis of the army of
Shere Ali than any that is to be found among the
archives of our Indian Foreign Office. At this crisis in
affairs, when we are on the threshold of an advance
through the passes, even if we do not go further,
it is absolutely essential that we should realise
that the army of Shere Ali is quite a difierent j
thing to the old force of Dost Mahomed, .
When Shere Ali came to Umballa in 1869 he had
just triumphed over the confederacy that hia elder
brothers had formed against him, and he owed that
triumph to a small regular army in the formation of
which ho had no share. The campaigns from 1864
to 1867 were lost or won on either side by a miscel
laneous following of the chief sirdars Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. . With the
exception of the artillery, which was very limited,
the armies of Shere Ali and of his rivals, Ameen |
Afzul, Azim, and Abderrahman Khans, were mere }
heterogeneous masses, which fought often with the
most desperate courage, but which more often
abandoned the field of ^battle the instant one of
their leaders fell. The result of those early
, campaigns was disastrous for Shere Ali, and he was
compelied to flee to Herat, leaving the rest of
Afghanistan in the possession of his rivals. His
flight to Hej'at was really an advance towards
success. He had followed the old Afghan mode of
fighting; he had relied on brute force alone,
and he had failed. He was almost in despair of
success, and meditated a flight to Persia. He
was, therefore, eminently in a fit state of mind to
listen to temperate counsels and to follow the new
plan which his son Yakoob Khan laid before him.
During the four years that Shere All had been
waging war round Cabul and Candahar, Yakoob
Khan had been administering authority in Herat
and Ferrah with rare ability. But he had been
doing more. He had been forming a regular army.
Sultan Jan, of Herat, a scion of the old Sudosye
family, who died in 1863, on the eve of the sur
render of Herat to Dost Mahomed,- had formed an
army out of the brave Heratees, by means of |
which, and the watchfulness of England, he
had preserved his independence for long
against both Persia and Cabul. That army
probably numbered 5000 men. There were
five regiments of foot with an average strength of
500 to the regiment, five of cavalry, some 2000
sabres, and about 500 artillerists. With this force
Sultan Jan held Herat against the vast host of
Dost Mahomed, at the summit of his career, for
ten months, and then starvation alone compelled
him to surrender. When Yakoob Khan was left
there as governor, in 1864, he found in the relics
of Sultan Jan's army the only military force on
which he could rely, for the necessities of
Shere Ali compelled him to summon all
his Afghan troops to Candahar. But on
I that base Yakoob Khan proceeded to erect a
1 more imposing superstructure. The old principle
of Sultan Jan was maintained, and the Heratees
were liable to universal conscription. By stringently
enforcing this law Yakoob Khan soon had a regular
army, fairly provided with muskets and well
drilled, and numbering some 15,000 men. It was
incomparably the most effective force within the
borders of Cabul, and it was with it that Yakoob
Khan.overthrew Azim and Abderrahman Khans on
several occasions, and restored to his father the king
dom which he had lost. The lesson which Yakoob
Khan had first learnt from Sultan Jan, and then had
taught Shere Ali, was not lost upon the Afghan
Ameer, When he came to India and saw our troops
that lesson was impressed upon him in a manner
j which his previous residence amongst us thirty
I years before had not suggested. He went back to
his country with many new ideas and new aspira
tions, some erroneous, many exaggerated, and all
unrealised save one, and that was the resolve to
form a regular army. He had reached that stage
in his career when all the evils of ruling a turbu
lent people divided into hostile tribes, and par
celled out among independent sirdars Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. , were most
apparent to him, and the one way out of the
| dilemma, the only mode to acquire tranquillity and
' durability for his dynasty, was to create a regular
army such as that of his son Yakoob Khan, or as
that of the Feringhees, the efficiency of which had
i Jbeen so de anlv impre ssed upon him.