Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [105v] (215/312)
The record is made up of 1 volume (150 folios). It was created in 07 Sep 1878-19 Oct 1878. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .
Transcription
This transcription is created automatically. It may contain errors.
ENGLAND AND CABUL.
CONCENTRATION OF TEOOPS.
NATIVE VOLUNTEERS.
[BY IKDO-EUEOPEAN TELEGRAPH, via
TEHERAN. j
[FROM OUR special correspondent.] |
SIMLA, O ct . 7' (4.45 p.m.) i
The Mhairwara battalion has unanimously
volunteered for service on the frontier, and the |
offer has been accepted.
The rumour of a British advance on Ali
Musjid is quite unfounded. Similar reports
may be expected at a time when excitement pre
vails at every station.
Meanwhile, the Government is steadily pur
suing its settled programme, and rapidly concen
trating troops at Quetta and Kurram.
[reuter's telegram.]
SIMLA, OCT. 7. i
The Indian newspapers publish despatches
announcing the capture of Ali Musjid.
A proclamation, making known the intentions
of the Indian Government, is expected to-day.
The Ameer of Afghanistan has summoned the
tribal councils. All tribes, even the Jowakis,
are sending representatives.
The news published by the Indian papers, that
the Fort of Ali Musjid had been captured by the
British troops, is contradicted.
T ime will soon show whether the policy
which has been adopted by the Home and In
dian Governments in response to the affront
put upon her Majesty's flag will suffice to meet
the exigencies of the crisis. That policy, which
our Simla Correspondent tells us is being steadily
pursued, aims at securing certain commanding
positions which would facilitate subsequent j
measures of a larger and sterner kind, and, by
massing considerable forces round the Ameer's i
dominions, seeks to intimidate him if possible
, into submission. To estimate its chances of suc
cess we should bear in mind what this " submis
sion " must imply. It is no mere apology which
could now be accepted from S here A li Khan,
even if accompanied by an invitation to the
Yiceroy to send his Envoy up the Pass
again with promises of a respectful reception.
No prudent Administration could be content
with a hollow amende of this sort, under cover
of which we might be kept dangling between
peace and war, the dupes of a faithless prince,
who would make capital outside and inside India
of our easy-going temper. The Afghan ruler
would have to give serious and substantial gua
rantees to the British Power, including, pro
bably, the surrender of such positions, military
and political, within his territory as might seem
to him fatal to his independence, even if his new
friends, for their own convenience, counselled
compliance, which is a very doubtful contin
gency. To retreat from his attitude of defiance
may, therefore, prove almost as difficult for
S here A li as to maintain it, but if he does not
yield at once merely demonstrative measures
may only harden his resolution. We cannot
take time, it must be remembered, for our
movements without giving him also time, which
he will know how to use, while deriving a certain
profit on both sides of the mountains from the
spectacle of the power of Great Britain thus 1
compelled or induced to move with so much
caution. There are many ways, too, in which,
if it suited him, he could at any moment put
an end to the advantages supposed to lurk
in a leisurely procedure. He can order the
hill tribes to pour down upon the plains, or he
can attack Jamrood, advance against Quettah, or
descend the Khurrum Pass, choosing always the
times and circumstances which would be most
disadvantageous to us. All this is merely saying
that a policy of tentative hostility depends upon
the will of one side as much as of the other in an ,
imminent conflict ; and the fact must be taken
into account when we hear of forces advancing to
points only a day's march apart, as at Jamrood and
Ali Musjid, or of English troops cantoned for
the autumn and winter at Quettah, with Canda-
har and its garrison so near at hand. If we wish
to see how this state of semi-declaration of war
appears to outsiders, a very plain-spoken appre
ciation of it may be found in the Golos. The
St.,Petersburg journal says; "England evi
dently aims at-occupying a few positions in the
hills to frighten the Ameer into concessions, j
But as it is equally obvious that S here A li has
i long planned this campaign, he is not likely to
be coerced by mere demonstrations. The Ameer
may count upon the friendly neutrality of bo,th
Russia and Persia, as well as upon the sympa
thies and possible co-operation of the Indian
semi-independent princes. With these points
in his favour he can quietly await an attack
which must begin .fey th© foreign of formidaWej
passes. Notwithstanding the affront sustained,
the caution displayed by the English people and
politicians and their unwillingness to embark
in the venture are characteristic signs of the
times." \
These and similar observations in the Rus
sian press, more candid than flattering, illus
trate further the fact that, with the vast pub-
i licity of modern days, a demonstrative policy
loses half its advantage by being so readily seen
through. India was far more easily governed, and
Indian affairs more successfully managed, in the |
' old times of long sea voyages and infrequent
intelligence. Now the electricwire brings constant
tidings, which in their speed actually outstrip the
slower sun, and to satisfy the natural curiosity ,
of the British public almost every detail of mili- j
tary strength and strategic movements is made ;
known. These particulars are not only re- .
printed far and near upon the Continent, and |
especially in Russia, but go back to the Indian j
press, whence, no doubt, they pass, by very
simple methods indeed, to the Afghan capital.
We should not be at all surprised to learn that
in the course of the present week S here A li
Khan and his
Sirdars
Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division.
will know perfectly well
| that Lord L awrence— an ex-Viceroy of India,
' and in 1857 its fearless defender against terrible ,
odds—has openly avowed his terror at the prospect
of a third Afghan war. Beyond question they will
very shortly be familiar with the exact number
of our forces at Jamrood, the Kurrum entrance,
and Quettah ; for all these particulars have been
published with scrupulous accuracy, and if they
pass to St. Petersburg and the Indian native
Courts they probably find their way also to
Afghanistan. The result of this free ventila-
I tion of every matter formerly kept secret in
diplomacy and war is that even a semi-barbarous
ruler does not neglect to obtain the valuable in
formation thus offered him, and learns not only |
the precise details of a " demonstration," but 1
many of the ingenuous comments which are
made so confidingly upon the chances of its
failure or success. Such considerations should
be borne in mind before the risk is run of allow-
' ing India and Russia to think the British Power
slow and timid in resenting a world-wide affront.
There are, of course, great advantages in delibe
rate procedure ; and, with regard to war espe
cially, if we can obtain satisfaction and safety
without it,' no words could exaggerate the
wisdom of restraint. Nevertheless, if, through
understanding the motives of such prudence,
a cunning enemy can defeat it; if while we
gain something by delay we should lose far
more by temporising ; if the economy effected
in money, life, stores, and State efforts may
be ten or a hundred times outweighed by
the silent and widespread mischief wrought
among watchful Easterns through the spec
tacle of a Government moving so slowly and
patiently under such an insult, then this tenta-
! tive policy might by no means prove the wisest
which we could adopt. Certainly it ought to be
understood that, if nothing more be done before
winter than to enter the passes and reinforce
Quettah, these measures will not greatly impress
1 the Oriental mind. We should thereby put off i
until May next the exaction of reparation—an
interval of eight months from the date of
S here A li's repulse of our Mission—and the
language which would be held meanwhile in the
bazaars of Cabul and in the Russian camps may
be judged of by present comments. The occu-
1 pation of Candahar is, we still think, an emi-
|nently desirable step which should be taken
before the approach of winter. That place is
no colder than the posts which we shall have to
occupy In the passes if we mean to control
them; and its seizure ought not to be a difficult
task with Quettah already in our hands. • Hold
ing the capital of South-Western Afghanistan,'
1 the British forces would attract to them the
friendly elements among the population, and
this would be far more likely to bring about the
deposition of S here A li, if still defiant, than
any distant demonstration which could be fur-
About this item
- Content
Press cuttings from British and Indian Newspapers regarding the Afghan War (today known as the 2nd Afghan-Anglo War), negotiations in Cabul [Kabul], the British Government's policy with regards to the Indian Frontier, and the movements of the Russians during the war.
The cuttings have been taken from a number of newspapers including the Pall Mall Budget , The Pall Mall Gazette , The Globe , The Times , The Pioneer Mail , The Standard , The Daily News , The Daily Telegraph , The Evening Standard , The Saturday Review , The Spectator , The Morning Post and The World .
- Extent and format
- 1 volume (150 folios)
- Arrangement
The cuttings have been arranged in the scrapbook in chronological order and the pages of the book have been tied into three bundles ff 1-46, ff 47-96 and ff 97-142
- Physical characteristics
Foliation: This file has been foliated in the top right hand front corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. of each folio with a pencil number enclosed in a circle.
- Written in
- English in Latin script View the complete information for this record
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- Reference
- Mss Eur F126/24
- Title
- Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan
- Pages
- 11r:11v, 15v:16v, 25v:27v, 29v:31r, 37r:39r, 47v:49r, 57r:59r, 65r:66v, 70v:72r, 79r:80r, 83r:84r, 90v:91r, 98r:98v, 105v:107v, 109r:109v, 118v, 124r, 125v:126v, 132v:133r, 142v, 148r:148v, 149r:149v
- Author
- The Daily Telegraph
- Usage terms
- Public Domain