Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎102v] (208/312)

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MONDAY EVENING,
OCTOBER 7.
THE ADVANCE INTO AFGHANISTAN.
In our telegraphic columns we publish a very
startling piece of news from India, which, if con
firmed, means tbat war has already commenced be
tween British India and Afghanistan. It is an
nounced that Ali Musjid, S here A li's foremost •
outpost of any consequence in the Kbyber Pass, has
been captured by our troops. This important in
telligence is said to rest on the authority
fore be prudent to wait* for further telegrams
before accepting the statement. What gives it an
appearance of lifcelmooft i« that rumours at Simla
and elsewhere had previously mentioned the advance
of a force from Pesbawur through Jumrood into the
Khyber. We published a statement of the sort on
I Saturday, and it would therefore appear that some
tidings to that effect had reached the head-quarters
j of the Government at Simla. Should the r.ews
prove irue, it will show at all events tbat
Lord L ytton has no intention of allowing
the insult offered to his representative to go
unpunished uutil spring. The capture of Ali Mus-
jid, which is some eight or ten miles from our fron
tier, will be regarded by the people of India as a
convincing proof that England's power to exact
redress is not one whit less than in olden times. It
is possible that our too-prolonged experiment with a
p<5'ficy of "masterly inactivity," may have given
rise to a different opinion among some of the feuda
tory princes. An Asiatic is not readily made
to understand that anything but fear of the
consequences can restrain a Power from aggressive
measures against troublesome neighbours, and at
not a few semi-independent Courts in Hindostan it
has been, whispered that England did not care to
interfere with Afghanistan because she had no wish to
provoke another encounter with the fierce warriors
who annihilated her legions some forty years ago.
As we have previously pointed out, the delay of
| operations until spring might have been wrongly
j construed at Gwalior, Indore, Hyderabad, and else-
j where, as a sign of weakness in the Paramount
Power. Before all things, it was necessary to do
something which should demonstrate beyond the
i possibility of native scepticism that the arm of
England reaches as far and can strike as swiftly
and strongly as at any time since it broke the power
of the Moguls, and reduced the fierce, restless
Mahrattas to a position of law-abiding dependence.
Even, however, if this news proves true, it does
not by any means follow that the Peshawur
column will forthwith march on Cabul. By taking
possession of Ali Musjid we should compel the
A meer to keep a large proportion of his army
1 between that fort and his capital, while at
the same time he would be effectually prevented
from taking the offensive through the Khyber.
These are important objects, and the only drawback
is the excessive unhealthiness of Ali Musjid. Be
the cause what it may, the place has an evil reputa-
; tion in that respect. In 1839 a detachment of our
troops under Colonel Wade, with a numerical
strength of 2,400 men, lost more than a tenth of
the number in two months through disease. The
cause is said to have been the unwholesomeness
of the water of the Cabul river, which
flows beneath the eminence on which the fort stands.
But there must be some other available water supply
in the vicinity, one would imagine, or the A meer
could not well keep troops at a place where they
would be liable to decimation every two months.
Be this as it may, Ali Musjid will certainly be held
if it has been captured, on account of the
strategical and political advantages we derive
from its possession. But there are some in
dications that the more extended line of
advance just at present will be from Kohat
into the Khoorum Yalley, with Thull for the
immediate base of opei'ations. This route to the
capital presents certain advantages which are not
found elsewhere. The climate is comparatively mild
during winter, many of the tribes are very friendly
to our Government, and the valley is fertile and
well watered. Moreover, the inhabitants belong to
the Shia sect, and are, therefore, more or less at
enmity with the Suni dynasty of Cabul. The idea
seems to be to occupy the port of Khoorum in the
, centre of the valley as a base of operations against
Ghuznee and the capital. By adopting this
policy. Lord L ttton would sever Westera Afghan
istan from the dominions of the Ameer, a proceeding
which could not but have a most salutary effect in
restoring our prestige in India, while at the
same time our troops would be in admirable posi
tion for marching direct on Cabul the moment the
northerly passes were free from snow. There are
two of these exits from the Khoorum Valley in the
direction of Ghuznee. Of these, the Peri war Kotal
is represented as offering few difficulties, but the
j Shuturgurdan is much more formidable, and could
not be attempted without great risk until the
rigours of winter have passed away. As a matter
of right, part of the Khoorum Valley belonga to
British India. Certain of the tribes were under
the sway of the Sikhs up to the very
' moment when the " crowning mercy " of Goojerat
brought about the annexation of the Punjaub and
its outlying dependencies to our Empire. These
clans of Khoorum accordingly fell under our rule,
and they appear to have been quite content with
their fate. But some difficulties subsequently arose
about their assessment, leading to a British expedi
tion for the purpose of exacting payment of the pre
scribed revenue. As the amount was trifling, and
there seemed some likelitiood that it would
always have to be collected at the point
of the bayonet, the Indian Government decided
to quit its hold on the valley, but without band
ing it over to Afghanistan. Nevertheless, S here
A li has forced the tribes to recognise him'as their
ruler, and it is owing to bis arbitrary exactions of
tribute that they are now inclined to give a cordial
welcome to our troops.
While the Peshawur and Kohat columns are being
thus employed, strong reinforcements will be hur
ried forward to Quetta. An advance on Cabul by
that route would, however, be much more circuitous
than through the Khoorum Valley, while the difficul
ties of the road are said to be considerably greater.
But there are several strong reasons for establishing
a powerful force beyond tbe Bolan. In the first
place, our feudatory, the K han of Khelat, has a
right to look to us for protection against the A meer,
who is believed to . be. already -marching troops
a ^msbvKhelat. with^vifig to !Du aish its^rBfe foril
llowing the English to occupy Quetta. Our force
- it the latter place only amounts to 1,500 men,
md although the K han could raise a con-
liderable number of troops, his soldiers are
neither so well armed nor so effic ently drilled as the
A meer's. A rapid dash of a strong Afghan
ilsolumn on Quetta might, therefore, causo us
Serious inconvenience under present circumstances,
but Lord L ytton probably hopes to prevent f is mis-
chance by reinforcing the outpost before S here A li
has time to act. Even more important is the neces
sity of holding in strength a position which
■rives us the command of the roads from India
lo Cauda bar and from Candahar to Ghuznee.
Chose who advised the Indian Government
S |o acquire possession of Quetta were doubtless
nfluenced by strategical considerations, for there
Is scarcely a po'nt beyond the frontier which pre
sents so many and such great advantages both
for offence and defence. It now remains to be
seen whether S here A li will recognise the
jxpediency of acceding to our demands. He
s reported as having convened an assembly
)f tribal representatives ; and we liarn
hat the whole of the bar del- tribes have
. ' it once obeyed the summons. On their decision
be question of peace or war will greatly depend,
f the A meer sees reason to believe that he will re-
eive a hearty support from the Afredees, Wurzaris,
jnd their congeners, he may be expected to
■ Ight out the quarrel to the bitter end. Should
le, however, perceive any signs of wavering or bes;-
jation or disloyalty on the part of the more powerful
ilans, it is quite possible that he will disown all
jomplicity with the insult offered to Captain
3 avagnari by the commandant at AU Mu-jirl, and
■ecommence negotiations of a more earnest sort than
formerly for the restoration of amicable relations
between Afghanistan and British India.