Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎98r] (199/312)

JiiiitljiiN, UCi. o.
The St. Petersburg Correspondent of the Berlin
Ministerial Norddeutsche Zeitung, who reflects the
views prevailing in Governmental circles on the
Neva, says : —
" In the event of an Anglo-Russian war
in Europe, General von Kaufmann would have
occupied Merve and Herat. Russia, regarding
Afghanistan as a good buifer between England and
herself, has always kept on friendly terms with the
Ameer, but never committed the mistake of sub
sidizing an Oriental who deems it an honour to
break his word to an infidel. If Shere Ali selected
this moment for the beginning of the long-planned
1 war, he was probably actuated by the belief that
the Indian semi-independent Princes, exasperated
by the English demand of a reduction of their
troops, will mutiny in the rear of the expedi
tionary corps. Should Shere Ali be beaten and his
territory be annexed, Russia will occupy Merve and
Balkh, when the tiction of a neutral country inter
vening between the Russian and British sentinels
will cease to exist. To support the mutiny of the
Indian Princes would be contrary to the principles
of Russia, who never encourages rebellion, and, more
over, has had quite enough of the one sentimental
war in Turkey ; while should England be defeated,
Russia would require her central Asiatic troops to
prevent a Mahomedan revival in her own do-
■ minions."
The same subject is treated with less reserve in a
leader of the St. Petersburg Golos, which says :—
"England evidently aims at occupying a few
positions in the hills to frighten th® Ameer into
concessions. But as it is equally obvious that
[ Shere Ali has long planned this campaign, he is
I not likely to be coerced by more demonstrations.
| The Ameer may count upon the friendly neutrality
1 of both Russia and Persia, as well as upon the
sympathies and possible co-operation of the Indian
semi-independent Princes. With these points in
his favour, he can quietly await an attack, which
must begin by the forcing "of formidable passes.
The British Press evidently endeavours to persuad®
its readers that the Afghan war would be a mere ■
local and unimportant affair. Notwithstanding the
affront sustained, the caution displayed by people [
and politicians and their unwillinKness to embark
in the venture are a characteristic sign of tha
times."
Improving upon this, the Russian Telegraph
says :—
" Russia and England require a definite delimi-
nation of their respective spheres of influence.
An arrangement must be come to, whether in peace
or by force of arms. Russia sent an embassy to
the Ameer to inquire whether she might count
upon him in the coming crisis, and Russia, if the
Ameer deems it expedient to side with her, will
have to prottct him. Relying upon the accession
of strength he has gained by joining Russia, the
Ameer has thrown down the gauntlet to England.
Whatever may happen, Russia will never permit
the incorporation of Afghanistan by the English.
They may punish the Ameer ; but if they attempt
to do away with him, an Anglo-Russian war is sure
to ensue."
Similar language is held by more papers than
one. The elation at the embarrassment expe
rienced by England is universal.
TELEGRAPH. ©CTOBJiK 7,
ENGLAND AND CABUL.
SHERE ALI AND THE KHYBER
PASS. •
PROBABLE ADVANCE FROM
PESHAWUR.
[BY INDO-EUROPEAN TELEGRAPH.]
[from ouk special correspondent.]
SIMLA, oct 6 (10.30 p .M.)
It is understood that the native envoy was
permitted by the Ameer to leave Cabul for
Peshawur on Sept. 29.
The strong reinforcements sent by Shere Ali
to the Khyber Pass render probable an imme
diate advance in force from Peshawur.
[reuter's telegram.]
SIMLA, O ct . 4.
It is generally reported that a British force is
vflTminy frnrn ^sha^nr inj.hft djrentioTi of r
aim puB^r^r
^ 1 f p8qshcin<i '■ mo l moajaoad aaq sutj
P c ri«q p3?Baqa[90 s/iVHXNawnia; 2ms H
nm ain'ep^to—grro 'grjq ctm i
-ilsno.ioqr.re^ntjojo 'eg'sinim pnn^tu—-sz aojr isar
vo^'lnT^x-n'" 1 " 01 IB 5 0n f A ®- ld ■ t3, [ ^nijnp i-iaonoo amsao -jb
Hoan A * p . iom oqz j>aog Aiax s/iaxoaoa n-n Suis i
iixm jo ^otsta rik
"00 PUB 81(000 wsqoa: : tropmn-'sr ™
st ii l{1, i? A;>s '^i 00 ^ paupaBis u auimoooq Ijpic
of lK11; siooqos n; pijssn Ijsom /
O n Saturday last the situation upon our
Indian frontier was the subject of consideration
by her Majesty's Ministers, and, since there has
been, as we h^ve before intimated, nothing
either unexpected or unprovided for in the
conjuncture, judicious persons will not look for"
any abrupt announcement. Of two courses open
to him—friendly understanding with the British,
or unfriendly treatment of them— S here A li
Khan has chosen the latter, and he has empha
sised his ill will towards us by a public affroat
admitted everywhere and almost unanimously to
be insufferable. If he did not welcome our
Mission it was obviously probable that he would
repulse it with more or less offensiveness;
and the rebuff having proved as insolent
as it could well be, the Indian forces of her
Majesty have been put in motion towards the
commanding points previously decided upon.
Such, in a few words, is the nature of what has
happened; and however long we might dwell
upon it, whether to examine the grounds of
S here A li's defiance or to estimate the import
ance of the political question which his conduct
has aroused, the imperative character of the
situation could not be more plainly ghown than
it is by the bare facts. It is one of those
instances in Imperial history where only a
single reftxd is open—at least until events dis
close fresh avenues—and that road was pointed
out in the very 'first sentences which we pub
lished upon the matter. England must at once
take possession of the posts needful for a further
advance into Afghanistan, if this becomes neces
sary, and, while showing our amicable sentiment
towards the hill people, and to the Afghans as a
nation, we must make it perfectly clear^o S here
A li that he had better have us for friends
than enemies. By the present time, no doubt, such,
a persuasion is dawning upon bis mind, if it be
not blinded by anger or deceived by treacherous
counsellors ; but the news from the frontier
certainly conveys no intimation of this change.
On the contrary, it is reported from Simla that
the Ameer is massing troops at Ali Musjid and
Gandahar, and that he has even made some kind
of menacing demonstration towards Quettah, our
advanced station beyond the Bolan Pass. The
same telegraphic message states, in terms which
might mislead, that " a British force is advancing
in the direction of Jamrood, with a view of
making an attack on Ali Musjid." It should
be borne in mind, however, that Jamrood is as
much an English fort as the Tower of London,
and that these might be, after all, mterely move-
| ments of troops to the frontier line. At the
i same time they undoubtedly bring the levies
: of the Afghan Prince and the regiments of her
1 Majesty into proximity, and our own despatch '
! from Simla clearly suggests that Jamrood is to
be strongly reinforced from Peshawur. Unless
the Ameer meant to leave the Khyber open this
movement was inevitable, and the reinforcement
of Ali Musjid is perhaps intended more to
coerce the Khyberees than to intimidate the
British commander. The operations precon
certed in view of what has happened will go
forward steadily as soon as the considerable dis
tances involved can be traversed by our troops ;
and, if S here A li is relying upon his own
Strength, and not upon secret promises from a
!greater Power, events are likely very soon to
put before him the alternative of an amende^
with serious guarantees, or a conflict.
All the information coming from St. Peters
burg confirms the belief that Russia has through
out the summer been engaged in carrying on
that unofficial war which she so successfully
waged in South-Eastern Europe. How much
of what is spoken may be mere brag, and how
much represents reality, we need pot attempt
to guess, because, looking to the past history
of Muscovite enterprises, it will be wise to ;
assumethat thero ia littlo ex^ggeratioa j
in the statements put forth. Naturally fine
phrases, and plausible explanations accompany
the bolder and more open announcements.
With these manifestations we have also become j
familiar. Each successive step onwards from
Orenburg to the Oxus was preceded or followed 1
by promises, pledges, and an ostentatious array j
of professed friendly intentions. They were 1
paraded after the capture of Tashkent; they
duly came forth when R omanopfski seized
Samarcand; they were heard again before I
K auffman and his coadjutors marched from
Khiva; and they were all falsified so soon as
duplicity had served its purpose. It is the deeds
of Russian Generals, not the words of Russian
statesmen, however exalted their rank, that we
should steadily watch and accept as' the basis of
our policy. Not a single sentence framed on Prince
k
is
" bkktlk, X/Gfltf.
The St. Petersburg Correspondent of the Berlin
Ministerial Norddeutsche Zeitung, who reflects the
views prevailing in Governmental circles on the
Neva, says : —
" In the event of an Anglo-Russian war
in Europe, General von Kaufmann would have
occupied Merve and Herat. Russia, regarding
Afghanistan as a good buffer between England and
herself, has always kept on friendly terms with the
Ameer, but never committed the mistake of sub
sidizing an Oriental who deems it an honour to
break his word to an infidel. If Shore Ali selected
this moment for the beginning of the long-planned
war, he was probably actuated by the belief that
the Indian semi-independent Princes, exasperated
by the English demand of a reduction of their
troops, will mutiny in the rear of the expedi
tionary corps. Should Shere Ali be beaten and his
territory be annexed, Russia will occupy Merve and
Balkh, when the tiction of a neutral country inter
vening between the Russian and British sentinels
will cease to exist. To support the mutiny of the
Indian Princes would be contrary to the principles
of Russia, who never encourages rebellion, and, more
over, has had quite enough of the one sentimental
war in Turkey ; while should England be defeated,
Russia would require her central Asiatic troops to
prevent a Mahomedan revival in her own do
minions."
The same subject is treated with less reserve in a
leader of the St. Petersburg Golos, which says :—
"England evidently aims at occupying a few
positions in the hills to frighten the Ameer into
concessions. But as it is equally obvious that
Shere Ali has long planned this campaign, he is
not likely to be coerced by mere demonstrations.
The Ameer may count upon the friendly neutrality
of both Russia and Persia, as well as upon the
sympathies and possible co-operation of the Indian
semi-independent Princes. With these points in
his favour, he can quietly await an attack, which
must begin by the forcing "of formidable passes.
The British Press evidently endeavours to persuad®
its readers that the Afgi an war would be a mere
local and imimportant affair. Notwithstanding the
affront sustained, the caution displayed by people
and politicians and their unwillingness to embark
in the venture are a characteristic sign of tha
times."
Improving upon this, the Russian Telegraph!
says :—
" Russia and England require a definite deli mi-
nation of their respective spheres of influence.
An arrangement must be come to, whether in peace
or by force of arms. Russia sent an embassy to
the Ameer to inquire whether she might count
upon him in the coming crisis, and Russia, if the
Ameer deems it expedient to side with her, will
have to protect him. Relying upon the accession
of strength he has gained by joining Russia, the
Ameer has thrown down the gauntlet to England.
Whatever may happen, Russia will never permit
the incarporation of Afghanistan by the English.
I They may punish the Ameer ; but if they attempt
to do away with him, an Anglo-Russian war is sure
to ensue."
Similar language is held by more papers than
one. The elation at the embarrassment expe
rienced by England ia universal.
TELEGRAPH. OCTOEElii 7,
ENGLA ND AND CABUL.
SHERE ALI AND THE KHYBER
PASS.
PROBABLE ADVANCE FROM
PESHAWUR.
[by indo-europbaf telegraph.]
[from our special correspondent.]
SIMLA, O ct 6 (10.30 p.m.)
It is understood that the native envoy was
permitted by the Ameer to leave Cabul for
Peshawur on Sept. 29.
The strong reinforcements sent by Shere Ali
to the Khyber Pass render probable an imme- 1
diate advance in force from Peshawur.
[reuter's telegram.]
SIMLA, O ct. 4.
It is generally reported that a British force is
advancing from Peshawur in the direction of
Jamrood, with the view of making an attack on
Ali Musjid.
The Ameer of Afghanistan is massing troops
at Ali Musjid and Candahar, and threatens
Quetta.
Strong hostility exists between the Khyberie
tribes and the Ameer.
War material is being collected at Kohat.
BOMBAY, OCT. 6.
Despatches published by the Indian news
papers announce that the Khyberees have de
clared in favour of the British.
The report that it is intended to make sC dash
uppn Ali Musjid requires confirmation.
The Momunds are marching to join the
Cabulees.
Gre^t enthusiasm prevails in the ranks of the
Indian Army at the prospect of military opera
tions.
O n Saturday last the situation upon our
Indian frontier was the subject of consideration
by her Majesty's Ministers, and, since there has
been, as wes hqve before intimated, nothing
either unexpected or unprovided for in the
conjuncture, judicious persons will not look for
any abrupt announcement. Of two courses open
to him—friendly understanding with the British,
or unfriendly treatment of them— S here A li
Khan has chosen the latter, and he has empha
sised his ill will towards us by a public affroat
admitted everywhere and almost unanimously to
bo insufferable. If he did not welcome our
Mission it was obviously probable that he would
repulse it with more or less offensiyeness;
and the rebuff having proved as insolent
as it could well be, the Indian forces of her
Majesty have been put in motion towards the
commanding points previously decided upon.
Such, in a few words, is the nature of what has
happened; and however long we might dwell
upon it, whether to examine the grounds of
j S here A li's defiance or to estimate the import
ance of the political question which his conduct
has aroused, the imperative character of the
situation could not be more plainly ^hown than
;it is by the bare facts. It is one of those
instances in Imperial history where only a
single road is open—at least until events dis
close fresh avenues—and that road was pointed
out in the very 'first sentences which we pub
lished upon the matter. England must at once
ta^e possession of the posts needful for a further
advance into Afghanistan, if this becomes neces
sary, and, while showing our amicable sentiment
towards the hill people, and to the Afghans as a
nation, we must make it perfectly clear^to S here
A li that be had better have us for friends
than enemies. By the present time, no doubt, such
a persuasion is dawning upon his mind, if it be
: not blinded by anger or deceived by treacherous
counsellors ; but the news from the frontier
certainly conveys no intimation of this change.
On the contrary, it is reported from Simla that
the Ameer is massing troops at Ali Musjid and
Candahar, and that he has even made some kind
of menacing demonstration towards Quettah, our
advanced station beyond the Bolan Pass. The
same telegraphic message states, in terms which
might mislead, that " a British force is advancing
in the direction of Jamrood, with a view of
making an attack on Ali Musjid." It should:
be borne in mind, however, that Jamrood is as
much an English fort as the Tower of London,
and that these might be, after all, mterely move
ments of troops to the frontier line. At the
same time they undoubtedly bring the levies
j of the Afghan Prince and the regiments of her
1 Majesty into proximity, and our own despatch '
! from Simla clearly suggests that Jamrood is to
be strongly reinforced from Peshawur. Unless ■
the Ameer meant to leave the Khyber open this
movement was inevitable, and the reinforcement
of Ali Musjid is perhaps intended more to
coerce the Khyberees than to intimidate the
British commander. The operations precon
certed in view of what has happened will go
forward steadily as soon as the considerable dis
tances involved can be traversed by our troops ;
and, if S here A li is relying upon his own
strength, and not upon secret promises from a
greater Power, events are likely very soon to
put before him the alternative of an amende,
with serious guarantees, or a conflict.
All the information coming from St. Peters
burg confirms the belief that Russia has through-
out the summer been engaged in carrying on
that unofficial war which she so successfully
waged in South-Eastern Europe, How much
of what is spoken may be mere brag, and how
much represents reality, we need pot attempt
to guess, because, looking to the past history
of Muscovite enterprises, it will be wise to ;
assumo that ttero _ cxa gge rationJ
in the statements put forth. Naturally fine
phrases, and plausible explanations accompany
the bolder and more open announcements.
With these manifestations we have also become ;
familiar. Each successive step onwards from
Orenburg to the Oxus was preceded or followed !
by promises, pledges, and an ostentatious array j
of professed friendly intentions. They were '
paraded after the capture of Tashkent; they
duly came forth when R omanopfski seized
Samarcand; they were heard again before I
K auffman and bis coadjutors marched from
Khiva; and they were all falsified so soon as
duplicity had served its purpose. It is the deeds
of Russian Generals, not the words of Russian
statesmen, however exalted their rank, that We
should steadily watch and accept as' the basis of
our policy. Not a single sentence framed on Prince
M