Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎84v] (172/312)

Ministers can scarcely fail to be aware that a
feeling of the deepest interest and no small anxiety-
pervades the country concerning our relations with
the Ameer of A fghanistan . I s it to be peace or
war 1 And is there to be an immediate campaign,
or are hostilities to be deferred 1 What has been
done 1 What is doing 1 What is contemplated 1
These are no trivial nor untimely questions. They
. ar e of the utmost moment; and they are natural,
opportune, and pressing. Under these circum
stances, it is impossible to pronounce as unreason
able the expectation that a Cabinet Council would
have been held at least a week ago to consider
these grave matters. But the expectation has been
j disappointed, and not until to-morrow will the !
members of the Government assemble in council in
Downing-street. The Ministers have been scattered j
over, the surface of the island, and though we no
more doubt that the P rime M inister is alive to the
gravity of the juncture than we question his right
to well-earned rural retirement, yet he has been
in contemplative seclusion at Hughenden when it
might have been supposed that there were weighty
reasons for his conferring with his colleagues.
The Cabinet commands a majority in both Houses
of the Legislature, and it has not forfeited ^
the confidence of the majority in the country, j
l If Lord B eaconsfield and his Ministry will not
support the honour and Imperial interests of the
country, we shall look in vain for any party
that will. Their opponents are pledged to clip
our wings, to narrow our interests, to circum
scribe our influence, to lower our dignity, and to
abolish that pernicious thing—our prestige. But
that is hardly a reason why the Government,
because it is trusted by the country, should
treat its just solicitude lightly. Parliament is
not sitting, and we do not seem to be enjoying
those vacation confidences from authoritative
lip's which might compensate us for the solitude of
Saint Stephen's. We are all ready to believe that
j the Ministry has at heart the welfare of the State,
' and to hope that its plans will be equal in excellence
to its intentions. But the most devoted among its
followers must surely look for some signs of action,
j or, at least, of consultation. Instead of enlighten-
ment as to the course meditated towards S here
Ali , we have a Babel of irresponsible voices,
all 'giving advice—urging, remonstrating, pro
phesying, lamenting. An earlier Cabinet Council
would have silenced a good deal of this vapid
declamation. The Ministry would have been
supposed to know its own mind ; and the country
would no longer have been in an attitude
of uncertainty. This abstention from collective
consultation on the part of the Cabinet is to be
regretted, if only by reason of the effect it
produces on the public mind. It evokes fears
which, we must observe.events of recent occurrence
have done a good deal to justify. When we pointed
out that, by the absence at Berlin of the I
P remiek and Lord S alisbury as England's Pleni- 1
potentiaries at the Congress, Cabinet Councils, >
even if held, would be practically useless, we !
were answered that the Ministers who went
to Berlin and the Ministers who stayed behind i
were so thoroughly of one mind that the danger ,
was a purely imaginary one.* The reply was diffi
cult to understand at the time ; but it must be
confessed that in due course it was e xplained. We
all supposed that Lord B eaconsfield and Lord 1
S alisbury were going to Berlin with their hands j
free, and that therefore it would be necessary for
them from time to time to confer with their
colleagues at home. It turned out that, before
they started, they and their colleagues were j
bound by the S alisbury -S ohouvalofe Memo
randum and the Anglo-Turkish Convention, and
thus that they really went to register a foregone
conclusion.
Is the position of the Cabinet with regard to
Afghanistan analogous to that we have just
described ? Did the Cabinet long ago sketch out a
policy, and was it all cut and dried some weeks
since? We can understand such a state of affairs,
only on one supposition. It is conceivable that
Ministers, resolved to have done with S here A li's
systematic unfriendliness, projected the Mission
because they knew it would be refused access
to Cabul, and determined in that event to avenge
the insult and carry out a bold line of policy.
But, in that case, why do we not hear of armies
being set in motion at once ? Why is there not i
an immediate advance through the Passes that con- j
duct to Candahar, to Ghizni, to Cabul? Why any j
hesitation ? Why a moment's delay ? How is it, |
if the supposition we have made be well founded,
that it is possible for those persons to obtain a
hearing who suggest that we must not undertake
military operations in the autumn, that we must
wait for spring or the melting of the snow ? How is
it that hasty action is deprecated, that we hear it
pleaded that every precaution must be taken to
ensure success, and that we cannot afford to risk a
single failure ? Every precaution should already
have been taken ; action should already have been
provided for; success, if possible at all, should
have been prepared for now. It is not S here A li
who selected the middle of September to bring his
quarrel with us to a crisis. It is not the A meer
who put winter too near to the rejection of
our Mission. It is not the Himalayan snows
that have come to confront us, but we !
that have spontaneously and deliberately gone to :
meet them. We chose the time : we chose the !
occasion ; we chose everything. There was nothing |
to prevent us from biding our time, and leaving |
S here A li to sulk through the heart of the j
inclement season. There was nothing to hinder j
us from postponing Sir N eville C hamberlain's ]
demonstration till the month of Mamh ? nothing 1
to expedite our invitation of the barbarian's
affront, nothing to hurry us in the massing of
troops, in the organisation of a formidable com
missariat, in the selection of paths and tactics. We
are assuming, for the moment, that it is too late to
do more this year than strengthen Quettah, a,nd make
terms with the hill tribes, and perhaps occupy Can
dahar. But if there be time for no more than
this, why were we not all allowed to get through
the winter without hearing S here A li's name 1
It seems utterly incredible that the action taken by
Lord L ytton should have been taken under instruc
tions issued from home, and in'conformity with
resolutions arrived at in Cabinet Councils held
some weeks back, and yet that there should now
be any thought on the part of the Cabinet of post
poning operations against S here A li till the
spring. Shall we be told that military operations
are matters for military men to decide upon ? No
doubt they are. A Cabinet that ordered military
operations in the face of the adverse opinion of
its military advisors would be guilty of a grave
crime. But a Cabinet that gratuitously invoked a
crisis at a certain moment imperatively demanding
military operations, without first learning from its
military advisers whether those operations would
be possible at that moment, would be guilty of a
blunder so gross that we would rather not describe j
it further. We decline for a moment to believe
that the Government have committed any such
blunder. We look for immediate operations against
Afghanistan, and if they are to be postponed, it
will be the duty of the Cabinet Council to-morrow,
after having considered the unexpected conditions
which may have arisen, and which may explain the
postponement, to acquaint the country with an out
line of them.
There is another point which is considerably
exercising a portion of the public, though,
we think, with much less reason. It is
! asked, who will have to pay for an Afghan
I war, if there is to be one—India or England 1 j
We can have no hesitation in answering the !
question. The bulk, if not the whole of the |
expense, ought, beyond all shadow of doubt i
or dispute, to be defrayed by the Imperial |
Exchequer ; and we do not suppose that there
will be any difference of opinion upon that
subject in the Ministry or among their followers.
There are two reasons, either of which would
be conclusive, for this course. India cannot at
present afford to pay for fresh wars, or bear any
substantial addition to its taxation. But we need
not fall back upon that plea, seeing that an Afghan
campaign, if undertaken by us, though it will be
due nominally and ostensibly to the vicinity
of Afghanistan to our Indian Empire, will really
and substantially be owing to the perfidious
proximity of another Power, and that a European
one. The Afghan question is merely the Eastern
queation bulsing out, so to 9J)e^k, in Asia. Some
^ 'quiod or.^ pUtlOJ OUI'B
oqs neijAi 'sjTut^ j < pxBoqjt;;s- l B pxetj s*a\ aqy—iniod eq
L pnno.i Suiuiof) 'tnpq p.icoqj's^s joq no miq^ asp Su'iq^a
uaeq a sqs ppioo dn os.moo aau m ouin anqM
p •rapq ijaod .iaq uo uas
3 9A ' B 'J uaT W pan 'oioqs tpjou aqi o; j3ao SaipTjair su
aoijy ssaouiij aq^ imoj spoodnx pnncu SaiinoQ " 'uoismc
ig aonis J9Aa uopaoi a ao q aAuq j—*saqSnu '•Tf
•at uaaq sXgAra sbu aqs su an;
a aift (jnoqu m sbm aqg—iuompoo aq^ jo aum aqi'i
ui W ^siq^q Xmnpjo jaq; m ©RSTtQ 11™% ©qi sv\\
fs ■• 10 ^ AV soiIV ssaouiij aq* jo ga t ppt3d aq^ io astou at
paBaq I JpTu^s sbav Moxq aq^ euojaq act
_ •hoats sbm. jspjo aqq. ^tvq f o\t—; aou a
CI ^uj L J^- jL -
Ministers can scarcely fail to be aware that a
feeling of the deepest interest and no small anxiety
pervades the country concerning our relations with
the Ameer of A fghanistan . I s it to be peace or
war % And is there to be an immediate campaign,
or are hostilities to be deferred ? What has been
done % What is doing ? What is contemplated 1
These are no trivial nor untimely questions. They
- are of the utmost moment; and they are natural,
opportune, and pressing. Under these circum
stances, it is impossible to pronounce as unreason
able the expectation that a Cabinet Council would
have been held at least a week ago to consider
these grave matters. But the expectation has been
, disappointed, and not until to-morrow will the
members of the Government assemble in council in
Downing-street. The Ministers have been scattered j
over the surface of the island, and though we no
more doubt that the P rbme M inister is alive to the
gravity of the juncture than we question his right
to well-earned rural retirement, yet he has been
in contemplative seclusion at Hughenden when it
might have been supposed that there were weighty
reasons for his conferring with his colleagues.
The Cabinet commands a majority in both Houses
of the Legislature, and it has not forfeited
the confidence of the majority in the country,
j If Lord B eaconsfield and his Ministry will not
support the honour and Imperial interests of the
country, we shall look in vain for any party
that will. Their opponents are pledged to clip
our wings, to narrow our interests, to circum
scribe our influence, to lower our dignity, and to
abolish that pernicious thing—our prestige. But
that is hardly a reason why the Government,
because it is trusted by the country, should
treat its just solicitude lightly. Parliament is
not sitting, and we do not seem to be enjoying
those vacation confidences from authoritative
lips which might compensate us for the solitude of
Saint Stephen's. We are all ready to believe that
1 the Ministry has at heart the welfare of the State,
' and to hope that its plans will be equal in excellence
to its intentions. But the most devoted among its
followers must surely look for some signs of action,
j or, at least, of consultation. Instead of enlighten
ment as to the course meditated towards S hebe
A li , we have a Babel of irresponsible voices,
all 'giving advice—urging, remonstrating, pro
phesying, lamenting. An earlier Cabinet Council
would have silenced a good deal of this vapid
declamation. The Ministry would have been
supposed to know its own mind ; and the country
would no longer have been in an attitude
of uncertainty. This abstention from collective
consultation on the part of the Cabinet is to be
regretted, if only by reason of the effect it
produces on the public mind. It evokes fears
which, we must observe, events of recent occurrence
have done a good deal to justify. When we pointed
out that, by the absence at Berlin of the
P remie k and Lord S alisbury as England's Pleni
potentiaries at the Congress, Cabinet Councils,
even if held, would be practically useless, we
were answered that the Ministers who went
to Berlin and the Ministers who stayed behind
were so thoroughly of one mind that the danger
was a purely imaginary one.* The reply was diffi
cult to understand at the time ; but it must be
confessed that in due course it was explaine d. We
all supposed that Lord B eaconsfield and Lord
S alisbury were going to Berlin with their hands
free, and that therefore it would be necessary for
them from time to time to confer with their
colleagues at home. It turned out that, before
they started, they and their colleagues were
bound by the S alisbury -S ohouvaloff Memo
randum and the Anglo-Turkish Convention, and
thus that they really went to register a foregone
conclusion.
Is the position of the Cabinet with regard to
Afghanistan analogous to that we have just
described 1 Did the Cabinet long ago sketch out a
policy, and was it all cut and dried some weeks
since ? We can understand such a state of affairs,
only on one supposition. It is conceivable that
Ministers, resolved to have done with S here A li's
systematic unfriendliness, projected the Mission
because they knew it would be refused access
to Cabul, and determined in that event to avenge
the insult and carry out a bold line of policy.
But, in that case, why do we not hear of armies
being set in motion at once 1 Why is there not :
an immediate advance through the Passes that con- j
duct to Can dahar, to Ghizni, to Cabnl ? Why any [
hesitation 1 Why a moment's delay 1 How is it,
if the supposition we have made be well founded,
that it is possible for those persons to obtain a
hearing who suggest that we must not undertake
military operations in the autumn, that we must
wait for spring or the melting of the snow 1 How is
it that hasty action is deprecated, that we hear it
pleaded that every precaution must be taken to
ensure success, and that we cannot afford to risk a
. single failure 1 Every precaution should already
have been taken ; action should already have been
provided for; success, if possible at all, should
have been prepared for now. It is not S here A m
who selected the middle of September to bring his
quarrel with us to a crisis. It is not the A meer
who put winter too near to the rejection of
our Mission. It is not the Himalayan snows
that have come , to confront us, but we
that have spontaneously and deliberately gone to
meet them. We chose the time ; we chose the
occasion ; we chose everything. There was nothing
to prevent us from biding our time, and leaving |
S here A li to sulk through the heart of the
inclement season. There was nothing to hinder
us from postponing Sir N eville C hamberlain's
demonstration till the month of March • nothing
to expedite our invitation of the barbarian's
afiront, nothing to hurry us in the massing of
troops, in the organisation of a formidable com
missariat, in the selection of paths and tactics. We
are assuming, for the moment, that it is too late to
do more this year than strengthen Quettah, and make
terms with the hill tribes, and perhaps occupy Can-
dahar. But if there be time for no more than
this, why were we not all allowed to get through
the winter without hearing S here A li 's name?
It seems utterly incredible that the action taken by
Lord L ytton should have been taken under instruc
tions issued from home, and in' conformity with
resolutions arrived at in Cabinet Councils held
some weeks back, and yet that there should now
be any thought on the part of the Cabinet of post
poning operations against S here A li till the
spring. Shall we be told that military operations
are matters for military men to decide upon 1 No
doubt they are. A Cabinet that ordered military
operations in the face of the adverse opinion of
its military advisors would be guilty of a grave
crime. But a Cabinet that gratuitously invoked a
crisis at a certain moment imperatively demanding
military operations, without first learning from its
military advisers whether those operations would
be possible at that moment, would be guilty of a
blunder so gross that we would rather not describe
it further. We decline for a moment to believe
that the Government have committed any such
blunder. We look for immediate operations against
Afghanistan, and if they are to be postponed, it
will be the duty of the Cabinet Council to-morrow,
after having considered the unexpected conditions
which may have arisen, and which may explain the
postponement, to acquaint the country with an out
line of them.
There is another point which is considerably
exercising a portion of the public, though,
we think, with much less reason. It is
asked, who will have to pay for an Afghan
war, if there is to be one—India or England ?
We can have no hesitation in answering the
question. The bulk, if not the whole of the
expense, ought, beyond all shadow of doubt
or dispute, to be defrayed by the Imperial
Exchequer ; and we do not suppose that there
will be any difference of opinion upon that
subject in the Ministry or among their followers.
There are two reasons, either of which would
be conclusive, for this course. India cannot at
present afford to pay for fresh wars, or bear any
substantial addition to its taxation. But we need
not fall back upon that plea, seeing that an Afghan
campaign, if undertaken by us, though it will be
due nominally and ostensibly to the vicinity
of Afghanistan to our Indian Empire, will really
and substantially be owing to the perfidious
proximity of another Power, and that a European
one. The Afghan question is merely the Eastern
question bulging out, so to speak, in Asia. Some
persons thought they had stopped it up, but
now, as they see, it leaks elsewhere. We
do not pretend to be surprised at the circum
stance. Perhaps the Government are just
as little surprised. But then they must show, by
prompt and vigorous action, that they were pre
pared for. what has occurred. What is wanted
now in India is something of the spirit of the
Founder of our Empire in the East, of the spirit
which drove C live to make his sudden attack on
Arcot. We are sure there are men in India
imbued with it, and who would quickly carry a
campaign against Cabul to a successful issue, if they
| are not paralysed by more vacillating minds. And
there is, as our Simla despatch in another part of
our impression to-day testifies, still some ground for
the hope that, by a vigorous and immediate demon
stration of our strength, the end we have in view
may possibly be attained without a campaign and
without a declaration of war.