Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎81r] (165/312)

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to the sahib i cullum "times." '
Salutations : Such as this humble follower of the Prophet (o n whom be praise) may
j offer to an infidel. Did you ever hear, O Sahib i Cullutn (O Lord of the Pea) what
happened to that boastful one who sold the skin of the king of the forest before he had
slain him ? Have you slain the great Sirdar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. of Cabul with the sword of your mouth
and defiled his father's grave ? Has the father of snow melted at your command,
O boastful one ? Has the Sahib i Jung* put the finger of silence on the mouth of suspense
j because you have spoken ? Have the walls of virgin fortresses fallen before the ravisher,
and have the Jan Bazt eaten dirt at the hands of infidels ? These are unclean thoughts,
O father of boasters. Know, O ye sons of dishonoured mothers, that the Sirdar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. Shere
Ali is a Sahib i Tulwar, a lord of the sword, not a son of words. Loosen the folds of
your memory and see what Akbar Khan (on whom be peace) did to the sons of the
infidel in the Coord Cabul Pass : the Suffeid Coh (Father of White Mountains) still looks
down on their crumbling bones ; and thus shall his, great nephew do again. Know that
the Prophet, the Servant of God, darkened the counsels of the unclean beasts and caused
them to supply my lord the Sirdar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. with life destroyers, such as Akbar Khan knew
not of. Has not the Evil One alsb put into your heart and into the hearts
of the writers of unclean news in this infidel land such a love of money that
they willingly tell my lord the Sirdar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. what he could not otherwise learn? How-
could he ascertain the numbers of infidels prepared for Jehanum, and the places intended
to be defiled by their presence, if it were not told him by infidel news writers, whose
I words reach his honoured ears by the mouth of the white slaves in Tashkend ? Thou
mayest ask why I do warn thee. Words of wisdom fall on thine ears as light falls on
the eyes of a blind man, who knoweth it not The Evil One hath made your hearts fat
and your livers hot; so that ye cannot understand. You believe that the sword of
your mouth is as sharp as the sword of the Holy One; but the fath er of evil has baffled you
: and by his decree your lips of uncleanness can never be closed. Even in this lancT
of darkness have we not heard that the great one of Erin hath given you over to
destruction, and declares that the harp of Tara shall shout for joy when my lord has
given the carcasses ot your infidel soldiers to the beasts that gnash with their teeth and
the foul ones that drink blood? Enough. The cymbals of the Thirteenth Imaum have
sounded. All infidels shall be destroyed, and among them your Indians shall be
; the first. S humsheer u D een.
* Sahib i Jung, the Lord of War, was a great gun in Ghuznee.
t Jan Bs?, the reckless of life.
As we announce elsewhere, a Cabinet Council has
t>een summoned for to-morrow, and the attention of
the Government will, no doubt, be chiefly directed to
the consideration of our relations with Afghanistan.
It has not been necessary for the Government of India
to wait for the decision of the Cabinet at home before
taking such immediate steps as were advisable for
bringing S here An to a sense of his imprudence.
But the insult offered by the A meer's agents to
England in the person of Sir N eville C hamber-
iAin brings matters in regard to our Indian fron
tier policy to a crisis which demands the con
sideration of the Government. We traced yester
day in brief outline the successive steps by which
this crisis has been reached. It was hoped,
indeed, up to a few days ago that it might have
been averted, and that our relations with Af
ghanistan were about to be placed on a better foot
ing by the A meer's consent to receive Sir
N eville C hamberlain at Cabul. Those hopes have
now been disappointed, and S here ali must be left
to abide by the consequences of the decision which
he has chosen to make known to us with such scant
courtesy. If we are not mistaken, the Indian
Government has already decided on the measures
to be immediately pursued, and is now engaged in
carrying them out. But a question of greater moment
awaits the decision of the Cabinet at home. Whatever
the issue of the present misunderstanding, whether
S here A li makes amends at once for his insolence,
or whether he awaits the chastisement that will
certainly overtake him, it is clear that our future
relations with Afghanistan must bo placed on a
new footing. We have no desire to annex
the country ; indeed, we should only be too
glad if we could ignore it altogether. But we
shall no longer be content to go from bad to
worse in our relations with it, as we have
been doing for the last few years. S here A li
is our neighbour, and he holds the gates of India—
a territory through which, as history shows, the tide
of invasion has always flowed down into the plains
of India. If he will be friends with us, it is well,
and we wish for nothing better. But we can permit
no more doubt on the subject. We cannot submit to
constant anxiety because he is unfriendly to us
whenever he has the chance, while he recaives the
emissaries of a rival Power. We are ready to
respect his independence so long as it is not made
a menace to our own security. It now rests with the
Cabinet to decide whether our former forbearance
should cease, and whether inactivity, masterly or
mischievous, should give place to a more decided
policy. It will not do for the tranquillity of India
to be at the mercy and caprice of a wayward
potentate like S here A li.
Ko doubt the judgmenc ot ffie ISov^nment, like ,
that of sensible men in less responsible posi
tions, will be largely determined by the course of ^
events. There are two questions, of very different ;
degrees of importance, involved in the present
Afghan difficulty. The one concerns the judgment
to be formed of the policy and the varying >
circumstances which have led through a series
of years to the existing situation ; the other
concerns the course to be pursued in the
circumstances in which we find ourselves.
It is hardly necessary to urge that the lat
ter is the pressing question of the hour.
It is also, happily, the one on which very little
difference of opinion exists to perplex us. We are
all agreed that S here A li must be punished
for his insolence, and that he must be made
to learn how much easier ic is to live on good terras
with England than on bad terms. We owe it to
India no less than to ourselves to do this, and to
do it with as little delay as may be. The other
question is one which can wait for the moment. If
the successive Governments which have controlled
our frontier relations have been inconsiderate, im
prudent, or shortsighted, we have now to bear the
consequences. But these consequences, whatever
they are, will neither be lightened nor altered by
mutual recriminations, or by any balancing of
blame between one party or Government and
another. Before we blame Lord L ytton or the
Cabinet under whoso instructions he has acted,
for an alleged change in our policy towards Af
ghanistan, we must be quite sure that the course of
events had left an alternative open to them. What
we know is that the Indian Government was so
ill served by its native agents Non-British agents affiliated with the British Government. at Cabul that it was
forced to endeavour to establish more satisfactory
relations. It was clearly not Lord L ytton 's fault
that the Peshawur Conference proved abortive. He
offered all that S here A li had asked for in 1869
and 1873, and he asked for little in rttum ; but
the Afghan Envoy professed to have no powers to
conclude a treaty,and would not even assent to the
reasonable demand that British officers should be
stationed on points of the Afghan frontier exposed
to Russia. In point of fact it is clear that S here
A li has long hesitated between England and
Russia. If we blame any one for this besides our-
selves, for pursuing a policy always hesitat
ing and at times ill-considered and shortsighted, '
it is Russia we must blame rather than S here A li
himself. Russia's pledges on the subject are ex
plicit, but how far they have been kept we may
judge from the fact, which has been made knov/n
through several channels, that so long ago as last
January S here A li wrote to the S ultan expressing
his conviction that Russia was honest and upright, ]
England faithless and deceiving, and urging the j