Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎69r] (141/312)

based. But the reasons themselves are good or
bad in virtue of their intrinsic soundness, and
must be estimated entirely apart from the fact that
it is Lord L awrence who puts them forth. If
eighteen months or two years ago a sudden change
had been effected in the policy of the Indian Go
vernment towards Afghanistan, Lord L awrence's
argument would be unanswerable. " The old
"policy," he says, "was to bear with the
" Afghans as far as we reasonably could do so, and
" to endeavour by kindness and conciliation to
" bring about friendly relations." It is not our
fault that the old policy has had to be abandoned.
We are not concerned at the present juncture to
defend all the steps taken by Lord L ytion and his
predecessors in their protracted negotiations with
the A meer , but it is manifest that the old policy
has been changed, so far as it has been changed,
not by any alteration in our friendly disposition i
towards S here A xi , but by the proof which he
himself has afforded that he rejects our friendship
and prefers the alliance of a Power whose interests,
to say the least, are not identical with ours. This
result, which in the face of recent occurrences can
hardly be gainsaid, may have been brought about
by blunders on our part. If so, the blame, when
the time comes for retrospect, must be distributed
among all those who are found to have incurred it.
But the pressing question of the moment is not to
ascertain what has brought us to the present pass,
but to determine what is to be done in the circum
stances in which we find ourselves. Lord L aw- .
rbnce asks what we are to gain by going to war
with the A meer . Very little, perhaps, even
supposing war to be determined upon. But we
must ask in rejoinder, what is the alterna
tive ? We have received an affront to which it is
impossible tamely to submit. Lord L awrence has
little doubt that if we refrain from forcing our
Mission on the A meer —which would in present
circumstances be a somewhat humiliating concession i
—he would make any apology we could reasonably
call for. Even so, however, we should still be in
a very embarrassing position. Russia, in defiance
of repeated pledges, would probably be repre
sented by an Envoy at Cabul, whose influence
may already be traced, as we learn this ?
morning from Vienna, in S here A lx's re
lations with the S ultan , while the Indian
Government would have to depend for its relations
with a proud and wayward neighbour on the agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent.
of native residents—a mode of communication
which has again and again proved unsatisfactory
and misleading. .We are ready, as we have all
along been, to come to terms with the A meer , but
we can no longer permit him to be in doubt
as to the* terms which satisfy both our honour
and our security, and it is necessary to let him
know, if we would not be discredited in the eyes of
all India, that we cannot permit him to insult us
with impunity.
No nation which respects itself will undertake a ■
war with a light heart. But if it has confidence
in the substantial justice of its cause, it will not be
deterred from defending this cause by the difficulties
which stand in its way. The successful invasion
of such a country as Afghanistan would certainly
be a difficult task, and its permanent occupation
might be even more difficult still. It is not yet
certain, however, that either will be necessary. ;
S here A tt may change his tone when he finds
that our patience is exhausted and that our for
bearance is at an end. Meanwhile, we must make him
feel that we do not mean to be trifled with. We are
still ready to respect his independence so long as he
remains on friendly terms with us and keeps clear j
of Russian intrigues. At present he seems disposed
to do neither. He rejects our advances, he enter- ;
tains a Russian Envoy, and he recommends a Rus- ^
sian alliance to the S ultan . In such Ife case Lord
L awrence's plea for the right of barbarous nations to
isolate themselves and refuse intercourse with their ,
neighbours is clearly out of court. S here A li
does not isolate himself except from ourselves. His
rejection of our proffered Mission is an act, not of
independence, but of hostility. It is a challenge
which we cannot decline ; and, as he will not listen
to us in a friendly way as we wished and intended,
we must force him to listen to us in the only way
that is open to us. We quite admit that, as Lord
L awrence says, there will be no real dishonour to
us in coming to terms with him. We will go even
further and say that that is what we wish to do.
But the terms, in view of the insult we have |
received, must now be of our own choosing, not of
his ; and if he will not grant them, save under the
pressure of force, there remains no alternative
T
we be deterred from the task imposed on uf j
by the fear of difficulties, or even of pos
sible disasters. We must do our best to sur
mount the one and to avert the other ; but if we
are to submit to insult through fear of the conse
quence of resenting it, we shall be disgraced both
in our own eyes and in the eyes of all our Indian
subjects. What military measures may be neces-
tary in order to effect our object it is at present
impossible to say : that is a question which will
have to be determined by Lord L ytton and his re
sponsible military advisers. Whether an invasion
of Afghanistan in force would be either possible or
expedient in face of Ihe coming winter may be open
to doubt. J ut we have sufficient forces assem-
;j bled or about to assemble at Thai and Quettah
tAafrbcuvely to enatle us t o seize upon t he Khop- |
rum Valley and to march upon Kandahar.
These operations could be effected without
serious difficulty before the winter sets in, and they
would probably be sufficient to effect our purpose ;
^ but, if not, they would place us in a commanding
1 position for carrying out more important and de-
1 cisive measures in the spring. Such a demonstra
tion, however, if promptly made, might serve to
; convince S here A li that we are in eam-
nest, and that our enmity, if further provoked,
is likely to prove far more injurious to him than
the friendship he has so imprudently rejected.
In that case we shall have no difficulty in coming
i to terms with him, as Lord L awrence urges that
we should do, without that permanent conquest
j of all Afghanistan which Lord L awrence seems to
contemplate. But it is necessary to convince the
j A meer first, that we are not to be trifled with, and
that we will not tamely submit to insult.
It remains for us to deal with the most im
: portant of Lord L awrence's arguments, that,
namely, in which he points out the financial diffi-
i culties of the policy which events have forced upon
us. India is poor, it is urged, and is already over
weighted with taxation. Can it bear the additional
' burden of a costly and hazardous war 1 u It is
" impossible," says Lord L awrence , " to foresee
" the end of such a war. and in the meantime its
" prosecution would utterly ruin the finances of
j " India." Now, in the first place, it seems to usun- |
worthy of a great and wealthy Power like Eng
land, with an Imperial mission to discharge— |
1 and the phrase has a real meaning, though t
it has been somewhat discredited of late—to let
questions of policy wait on questions of finance.
It may prove in the end far more costly to defend
India against more formidable foes, incited to hos
tility by weakness and vacillation now, than to
chastise S here A li at once for his insolence. Be
sides, it need not be admitted that the expense of an
Afghan expedition, if it proves to be necessary, will ^
or ought to be charged exclusively on the revenues
of India. The troops who will be employed are
already maintained out of Indian resources ; but
it will rest with Parliament to determine what pro
portion of the expense of an expedition beyond the
frontiers onght to be borne by India, and what con-
I tribution ought to be made towards it out of the
Imperial Exchequer. If hostilities are determined
upon, it will be the statutable duty of the Govern
ment under the Act of 1858 formally to communi- ^
cate the fact to Parliament; so that if Parliament
meets at the usual time,the policy of the Government %
will have to be submitted to the judgment of both I
Houses very early in next year. It will then be
for Parliament to determine what course should |
be taken to meet the cost of the war, if war is un
happily forced on us. In such a case the course pur- -
sued in regard to the Persian war in 1857 will |
doubtless be held to furnish an important prece- |
dent. Lord P almerston's Government asked
the House to reimburse the Indian Treasury
for a portion of the extraordinary expenses
of that war. They had given the East India
Company a conditional promise of assistance, de
pendent for its completion, as the C hancellor
of the E xchequer was careful to explain, on the as
sent of the House. The arrangement made and ulti- £
mately sanctioned by Parliament was that the ordi- J
nary expenses of the troops should be defrayed by
the Company, but that H er M ajesty's Government i
should defray a moiety of the extraordinary
expenses. It is true that the vote was justified by i
the Government on the special ground that the ;
finances of Ifidia had been grievously disturbed in
consequence of the Mutiny ; but if India was poor
then, it is no richer now, and the fact remains that
England undertook her share of the expenses of a
war in which England was interested on behalf