Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎68r] (139/312)

IRRESOLUTION ON THE INDIAN FRONTIER.
To the E ditor of the P all M all G azette.
S ir,— The first thing that strikes every one, as it struck Sir
Charles Dilke, in reviewing Central Asian affairs, is the complete
ignorance of the Government of all that has for so long a time been
going on beyond the Oxus—an ignorance which is simply due to
our weakness in not from the first insisting on having our agents in
Afghanistan, as agreed to by Shere Ali. Ignorance is always in the
end a most costly indulgence, and may even prove the destruction
of a people. Over and over again Mr. Grant Duff has warned us of
the necessity of having our agents everywhere in Asia, especially as a
protection against Russian intrigues. The more pressing error of the
Government, however, and the one with which public opinion can
more practically deal at present, is their delay in advancing on Cabul.
It cannot be put down to want of preparation. Sir Neville Cham
berlain's letter to Faiz Mohammed Khan, at the fort of Ali Musjid,
proves that the Government anticipated opposition, and were pre
pared for it. In this letter, which has been strangely overlooked, Sir
Neville wrote :■—"I expect to receive a reply not later than September 18,
so please to understand that the matter is most urgent. At the same time
it is my duty to inform you in a frank and friendly manner that if your
answer be not what I trust it will be, or if you delay to send an early reply,
I have no alternative but to make whatever arrangements may seem to
me best for carrying out the instructions I have received from my Govern
ment." This means that he would force his way; and all the telegrams
received since the 24th of September prove how thoroughly prepared the
Government of India was to force its way if necessary. There is
something wanting, therefore, to explain the abandonment of this
transparent intention to force the Kyber, and the peremptory, instan
taneous dissolution of Sir Neville Chamberlain's mission. Had the
Government, in one of the usual cold fits of timidity which always
follow hard on its warm fits of resolution and costly preparation, really
recalled the mission before it was repelled ? It looks uncommonly like
it. Of course the public only heard of its being repelled; and so the
prompt dissolution of the mission, and the reports of troops being
pushed forward to Quettah, Thull, and the Kyber Pass, looked at first
as if the Government had resolved for once to show the courage of its
words and convictions. But suddenly there came a lull in the preparations
for what seemed an immediate advance, and the ministerial organs began t
to talk of negotiations and waiting until the spring, as, indeed, the
inspired Calcutta telegram in the Times of the 23rd inst. had already
suggested ; and then, through the obscurer channel of the Overland Mail,
this remarkable letter from Sir Neville Chamberlain to the Afghan com
missioner at Ali Musjid. The explanation, therefore, that now suggests
itself is not that the Government is resolute, but that it has once again
shown its usual irresoluteness of purpose. The movement of troops really
belongs to the time when it had determined that Sir Neville should
advance to Cabul at all hazards; while the dissolution of the mission,
instead of being in consequence of, really preceded the dramatic incident
of its repulse. It will be remembered that it was about the middle of
September that the papers began to talk of a special mission, or a message
sent by M. Giers from St. Petersburg to explain away the presence of the
Russian agent at Cabul; and it was even said that the promise
had been made to recall him. If the above be the true explanation of
the news from India, Cavagnari's baffled attempt to obtain a safe-con
duct for the mission into Afghanistan was indeed a most providential
outrage on the keenest susceptibilities of Englishmen. But it is just
such irresoluteness as this on the part of the Government—which first
showed itself in recalling the fleet which it had ordered into the Darda
nelles, again, later, in accepting all the "projects" of the " Schouvaloff-
Salisbury Memorandum" after declaring its determination to stand
by the " Salisbury Circular," and finally, as it would appear, in pre
cipitately recalling a mission it had carefully prepared to assert our
rights in Afghanistan,—it is such timidity of purpose which is taking
all heart out of the Conservative party in England and of the nation
and of English-speaking people everywhere: and if Englishmen once
begin to hold down their heads before the world, it will be com
paratively a small thing that a most powerful Administration brought
itself to destruction and disgrace; for with our prestige will have
perished both our empire and our commerce, an acceptable and well-
pleasing sacrifice to the insensate emotions and impulses of the school of
" large maps," and " Perish India !" politicians.—I am Sir, your obedient
se Ti' .
Se-ptember 30.
SUMMARY OF THIS MORNING'S NEWS.
According to a telegram from Simla published by the Daily News the
Indian army is enthusiastic at the prospect of speedy employment, and the
spirit of the native troops is admirable. The despatch contradicts a statement
that the Indian Foreign Office was ignorant of the approach of the Russian
mission to Cabul. The first news of the mission was, it is stated, sent to the
Home authorities on the 7th of June, and every successive stage of its advance
was duly reported. A Paris telegram states that news has been received
from St. Petersburg that, in answer to a note from the English Cabinet,
inquiring in what way the Russian Government proposed to reconcile
General Stolietoff's mission to Cabul with its previous engagement to renounce
all political influence in Afghanistan, the Russian Government replied that that
mission, although decided upon at a time and under circumstances now no
longer existing, was merely intended as an act of courtesy to the Ameer of
Afghanistan. Last night's Politische Correspondenz publishes a statement from
Constantinople that Schir Ali Khan, the envoy of the Ameer of Afghanistan, is
instructed to claim the Sultan's intervention in order that England should not
declare war against Afghanistan, and to convince the Sultan that an alliance
with Russia is advisable for the Mussulman race. The course of events in
India continues to be closely watched by the German and Austrian press.