Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎64r] (131/312)

that the earliest possible noticeabout them was not
duly sent off to head-qnarters at St. Petersburg.
As for the repulse of the English mission, the
■whole facts were so fully given by our Cal
cutta Correspondent that not much could be
added. Hiere is no room, so far, for any secrecy
in the matter. Our very complaint is of the open
nature of the insult we have suffered. What we
do not see so obviously, and what we can only
infac. ia thfl influanfic that was at work with SHEKE
An and which induced him to refuse us a passage.
We are much mistaken if the Russian Minister of
Foreign Affairs does not know a good deal more
about this than he has thought fit to reveal. W T hen
the train has been laid and the match lighted, the
real business has been done. We may admit that
as to the details of the explosion the Russian
Ministers for War and Foreign Affairs knew no
more than the rest of their countrymen. Evidence
limited to this can hardly count for much ; and
the evidence offered by the telegram we published
yesterday goes no further. The final assurance,
that Russia had no part in the decision of S here
A li to reject the Anglo-Indian mission, we will not
venture to contradict. But before accepting it we
must pare it down a good deal and reduce it to its
real dimensions. If it had said that Russia has
had no part in exciting S here A tt to hostility
against England, we should, of course, know that
it was incorrect. If it means only that it was not
at the instigation of Russia that S here A u gave
us the latest proof of his hostility, we make no
question that it may be true. The repulse was so
ill-timed and so unwise in every way that the
A meer's foreign advisers may claim to be ac
quitted from having suggested it. It has left us
more free than we were before to act in our own
interest, and has given a direction to our Afghan
policy which may prove to be of downright service
to us. In these circumstances, we will not seek to
fix Russia with a . guilt which she herself repu
diates.
We publish this morning the reply of Russia to
an English note inquiring how General S tolje-
tojff's mission to Cabul can be reconciled with the
engagement of Russia to renounce all political
influence in Afghanistan. The conduct of Russia
in this matter is, on the face of it, not easily to be
explained. The plan of the mission, which was
formed last March,may be justified by the relations
then existing between the Russian and the English
Governments. War tears up all treaties and
cancels all promises. We must make a large allow
ance, therefore, for what is done when war seems
imminent. But, as we have already stated, it
was not until the end of July that the Russian
Mission, with its letter from the C zar , reached
S here A li . The defence offered for it is curious.
It was decided on in circumstances which no
longer exist, and it was never meant to be
anything but an act of courtesy to the A meer . If
the latter statement ia correct, there is no need for
| the former one ; while if the former one is needed
as a justification, the latter one hardly can be
correct. However, since Russia admits the engage
ment by which we hold her to be bound, and
professes her disposition to respect it, we
need not go further into the past. Her duty,
on her own showing, is now clear, and we
may fairly call upon her to put her professions into
practice. It is by the acts of her Government
that she will be judged, and not by the violent
language of her irresponsible fire-eaters.
TEE MILITARY STRENGTH OF
AFGHANISTAN.
(from ocjr correspondent.)
BEELIN, S ept . 28.
The following observations on the military
strength and geography of Afghanistan are ex
tracted from the records of the Russian Central
Staff Office at St. Petersburg :—
" Afghanistan is portioned out among many semi-inde
pendent tribes, each of which has a separate ruler and a
standing army.
" Cabul and Candaha r have a considerable regular force,
consisting of infantry, cavalry, and artillery. The greater
part of these troops xs distributed over rural garrisons, and
under the control of the local governors. The regular
Cabul force, which does not seem to have been increased
in the 30 years intervening between 1838 and 1868, is as
followsInfantry (Djasaltchi), 2,500 men ; regular
cavalry, 3,000 ; irregular cavalry, 10,000; artillery, 45
guns. Besides these there were, in times of peace, one re
giment of infantry at Candahar, one regiment at Ghuznee'
one regiment and five guns at Kale-i-Gilsai, one regiment
of infantry, one of rifles, and five guns at Kuram, and a
force of full 10,000 men, with three batteries, at Balkh•
The regular troops are maintained and reinforced by
conscription, irregulars being called in as time and cir"
cumstances require. In CabuI tHe^troops receive pay and
provisions, a practice Vhich can hardly be said to obtain
with any degree of regularity in the provinces. The in»
fantry are armed partly with matchlocks, partly with ex
cellent modern rifles, the gift of the British Government.
They also carry swords and kindjals. The Djasaltchi, or
rifles, axe armed with long solid muskets, rested on a
forked support when firing, while the cavalry boast a
large variety of weapons. The infantry are, many of
them, arrayed in cast-off English uniforms, bought up by
special agents of the Cabul Government at Peshawur and
Scinde. Some regiments wear uniforms of European cut,
made of Afghan cloth—the coats are brown, the trousers
white. The troops quartered in country towns generally
live upon the people. All the Afghan troops endeavour to
imitate the Anglo-Indian forces in their tactics, drill, and
commissariat service ; but in this respect the success of
the Cabul military is small in comparison with that of the
Herat men.
" The Herat regular force was originally organized by
1 Sultan Djan, and consists of five regiments of infantry
; of 500 men each, five detachments of cavalry, one
in each district, of 450 men each, and eight guns.
The whole forms a total of about 5,000. Young men of
the peasant class are liable to conscription at an age when
they may almost, be regarded as children. The cavalry
being the more national force, its recruits are supplied by
the district authorities. There is a Commander-in-Chief,
subject to the personal commands of the Sovereign. The
artillery is under the direction of a special commander,
the Toptchi Bashi. The regiments are divided into
companies. Officers' titles are taken from the English
army ; the Djemal, Koronel, and Midjir answering respec
tively to the General, Colonel, and Major. The Sovereign
has a special adjutant called Adjutant Bashi, a post occu
pied in the days of Sultan Djan by a Russian ensign, Prince
Vatchnadse. Discipline is exceedingly strict. Commanders
have unlimited power, and may kill subordinates with im
punity. The soldiers live in special houses with their
families, and receive pay, food, uniforms, and arms from
the Government. The cavalry, too, get pay from the
Government, but have to find their own arms and horses.
The infantry are provided with flintlocks, modem rifles,
: the crooked Afghan sword, and kindjals from 1ft. to IJft.
j long. The uniform is of light sky-blue cotton, after th©
English pattern, with ample folds, stand-up collar, and
metal buttons. The trousers are of white cotton, very tight
and short. They wear a sort of slipper on their naked
Ifeet, black Persian hats when on duty, and red flat hats
i 'in undress. In the case of recruits these hats are yellow.
■ All the different regiments wear the same uniform. The
cavalry are distinguished by the national Afghan dress,
and armed with pikes, matchlocks, kindjals, and crooked
swords. Drill, as a rule, is intrusted to Anglo-Indian
'deserters, and carried on in accordance with English rules.
There is a great deal of regimental service going on, with a
fair degree of success in tactics and manoeuvring capacity.
The word of command is given in English.
" The small Usbek Khanates in Northern Cabulistan also
have standing armies, the strength of which some time ago
may be seen from the following list:
Infan- Oa- Artil-
try. valry. lery.
Men. Horses. Guns.
O abulistan—
Navasai .. 500 200 .. —
Lendai Sind — . 13
Dyar .. 400 .. 50 .. —
Babusi .. 500 .. 200 .. —
Infan- Oa Arbil-
try. valry. lery.
Men. Horses. Guns.
Maimene . 100 .. 1,500 .. —
Bhibbergan 1,500 .. 2,000 .. —
Aktoha .. — .. 200 .. —
B.ilkh .. 10,000 .. 2,500 .. —
Kyhu .. — .. — 10
Kundus .. — .. — ..6
All these troops are liable to take the field at the sum
mons of the Ameer of Cabul, their feudal lord and sove
reign. In addition to these regulars there is a militia—a
numerous force in a country every male inhabitant of which
is ready to take up arms at a moment's notice. As was
proved in 1839, one eighth of the entire population may be
assembled, fully equipped, and sent out with the utmost
despatch. By the side of the general levy there is a spe
cial militia, called Defteri, whose members have their
names registered in time of peace, and are in receipt of a
small salary, or a certain quantity of corn, or else enjoy
the free use of canal water. The strength and division of
' the militia is the subject of the following table :—
Horse. Infantry.
Gesaraiz—
Seidnat
Pusht Kug
Yekikholm
Desandji
Sur Djingell
Firus Kugi
Kiptchak
Taimuu
Total..
4,000
5,000
1,000
400
500
3,750
1,200
95,350
.. 3,000
300
.. 1,200
.. 800
.. 6,400
., 400
.. 10,000
61,200
Horse. Infantry.
Cabul .. .. 21,000 .. 10,000
Oandahar .. 12,000 .. 6,000
Herat .. .. 8,000 .. 10,000
Lash (Sistan) £00 5,000
Khulm .. 8,000 .. 3,090
Balkh .. .. 2,500 .. 1,000
HerPul .. 2,000 .. 2,000
Kundus .. 2,000 .. —
Aktohe .. 200 .. —
Andkui .. 1,800 .. 600
Shibbeigan .. 2,000 .. 500
Maimene .. 1,500 .. 1,000 156,550
" Almost every town and village in Afghanistan is sur
rounded by a brick wall, and may be easily converted into
a defensive position. There is also a large number of small
towers distributed over the country, for the protection of
passes, ravines, and village grounds. Some of these towers,
thanks to their advantageous situation, are formidable
enough to check the march of European troops, though
none could hold out against a regular siege.
" The most important fortress in the western parts is
Herat, enclosed within a square wall, each side 4,200ft. in
length. The wall is of brick, 35ft. high, and stands on
ground artificially raised. It is protected by a moat, and
on two sides by a glacis, constructed by the English in
1838. Six gates, defended by brick towers, lead to the city.
There is also a citadel, Tchagar Bag, in the south-eastern
corner of the city, likewise built of brick. The town is
provided with water by the Cheri Rud river. Ferra,
another fortress near the Persian frontier, is built on the
same plan as Herat, but only half the size. The walls of
this place are of a very solid sort of brick. Ferra protects
the road from southern Persia to Afghanistan.
" Northern Afghanistan is defended by the fort of