Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎59r] (121/312)

respective contingents being forthcoming on
emergencies. And thus the whole question of
the Ameer's military strength is thrown back
again upon the individual loyalty of
the several Sirdars Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. . If the Ameer can attach
them cheap to himself—and he has never been
able to do so yet—he can reckon upon having
several armed hordes at different points of his
kingdom, obeying different authorities. But if
he takes the field on his own account, supported
only by the money and arms he has amassed
during the past nine years, he cannot count
upon more than 18,000 men, all told. This,
nevertheless, would be, from its discipline
and appointments, the most formidable force
ever put in the field by an Ameer of Cabul. The i
regular army of- Dost Mahomed, the late Ameer, 1
did not exceed 12,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry,
but twice that number was nevertheless brought
into the field when the British army invaded i
Cabul. His cavalry was of exceptional excel- j
lence, but the infantry never fairly stood up to i
fight after being once beaten. As skirmishers, I
however, they proved to be most formidable, the !
traditional feuds in which they had from child- ;
hood been engaged having brought them to j
great perfection in this branch of the
service. Moreover, each man carped with him
a trowel-like'instrument, with which in a very few
minutes he was able to dig a hole large enough
to lie in, the excavated earth being thrown up
as a defence-work in front. The jazail (with
which all the militia of the present day would
be armed) is a long-barrelled flintlock, too
heavy to be fired from the shoulder standing, i
and every soldier therefore takes with him I
either a forked rest or else has attached to the
muzzle of his gun an iron prong which serves 1
the same purpose. Of their dicipline, uniform, I
| and equipment generally the press of thirty j
years ago was never tired of jesting, and event^ i
amply justified the contempt in which the;
British army, European;fl-nd. pativo, held the;
army of Cabut
LATEST TELEGRAMS
ENGLAND AND AFGHANISTAN.
FEELING IN RUSSIA,
(theoxtgh reuter's agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. .)
simla, s ept. 29.
General Sir Neville Chamberlain has arrived
here.
st, peteesbueq, s EPT . 28.
"With reference to the telegrams and articles
published by the English papers ascribing the
stoppage of the British mission to the counsel of
Russia, it is pointed out in ofiBcial quarters that
when the first news of the event arrived here the
Ministers for War and Foreign Affairs had no
more precise information on the subject than the
public generally.
It is added that the belief expressed by these
papers of Russian complicity in the matter may
have arisen from the following considerations:
During the Eusso-Turkish war various reports
were received to the effect that England was
making attempts to create difficulties for Russia in
Central Asia.
The English mission of Sir Douglas Forsyth to
Kashgar was avowedly undertaken with this pur
pose, and even in Bokhara it was alleged that
English agents were at"work. In order to counteract
the effect of these movements Russia took various
measures, and contemplated sending several expe
ditions to reconnoitre "the neighbouring territories.
However, as soon as the Berlin Congress held out
the prospect of bringing about a peaceful solution
of the question, all these measures were counter
manded. In any case, it is added; the assumption
that the Russian Government had auy part in the
decision of Shere Ali to reject the Anglo-Indian
mission is groundless. Such conjectures are merely
the outcome of the antagonism which existed be
tween England and Russia during the late war.
LORD LTTTON AND SHERE ALI.
TO THE EDITOR OE THE DAILT NEWS.
S ir ,—I am one of a numerous body of old
Indian officials who have watched our politics with Cabul
for many years. The Ameer has been alternately cajoled
with professions of friendship, and with valuable pre
sents, which he has attributed to our weakness, or he
has received distant and discourteous treatment. Is it
astonishing that he has been unable to discover what our
real policy is ~ what our real feelings and intentions are
or that he has left us, from whom he has received such
unequal treatment, and sought a Russian alliance. To
this we have driven him - for he knows he is too small and
weak to stand alone; he must have a strong friend to
lean on, on one side or the other. Obviously we should
have secured him on our aide. Probably the most amazing
thing in all that has passed between us to obtain this end
was Lord Lytton's letter written in August last. If Lord
Lyttonis not a diplomatist, what is he? He is no law
giver, no great financier, no discemer or ruler of men.
j And hero we find him blundering, in what was
assumed to be his one strong point, as the
author of the most bullying, discourteous letter
that was ever addressed to an indepen
dent Eastern Chief from our Indian Foreign Office.
Shades of Elliott and Edmonstone! it is enough to make
them turn in their graves. They were strong, and withal
were courteous. Nothing seems to have remained of their
j teaching. This wonderful letter is calculated to give
i offence in every line. Was this its object ? Was it written
j in the belief that it was a courteous, gentlemanlike letter
1 or was it purposely written to give offence and bring on a
war to gratify the personal vanity of a weak Viceroy or
the ambition of his advisers Y and are we to be com
mitted to a most serious war, to lose many men and much
treasure, and rouse all India and Europe too into a state
of watchfulness and expectancy to gratify such a vanitv as
this ?
The first move has been a false one, a blunder—it was
that letter. The second was no better ; the advance of
the mission without knowledge as to its reception ; and
then the snub, which must be atoned for or avenged—
and this cannot be done for six months—so the move was
not only false in substance, but was ill-timed. Lit us
hope there is wisdom somewhere, that we still can find the
iron hand in the silken glove, and by these means skilfully
manage our Eastern neighbours, rather than by this
rough diplomacy.—I have the honour to be your obedient
servant, " MANNERS AfATTTC THE MAN."
Travellers' Club, Sept. 29.
T he A fghan P asses .—(To the Editor of the
AW)-Sir,-As one who served under the late
Sir William Nott from Candahar^irt Ghuznee and Cabul
to the Sutlej, may I be allowed to state publicly that he
had particular regard, on all occasions where practicable
m detaching skirmishing parties on either side of ali
passes and ravines ? whereas in the interesting extract
under the above headinsr m your issue of yesterday's date
I read: " By neglecting this precaution Generul Nott suf
fered somewhat from the shots of his watchful enemy "
The splendid old general was too practical a soldier to fail
m the slightest degree in this most important duty a fact
which can be proved by men and officers who had the
honour to obey his orders, and, as one of the latter, I am
Sir,your obedient servant, W. R. B.—Brighton, Sept. 25.
m
THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS CE
IAEGHAN QUESTION.
THE
TO THE EDITDB OE THE DAILT NEWS.
S ir ,—Although we may not abandon all hope
■bhat war with Afghanistan may be averted, yet
we cannot close our eyes to the fact that it has
been announced from India, on what appears to
be very high authority, that such a war is in
evitable. Military preparations on a large scale
have been already commenced, and as these pre
parations, from the very moment they are under
taken, must involve expenditure, I think the time
has come when the question should be fully and
fairly met: If there is an Afghan war, ought
tbe cost to be borne by England or
by India ? The answer which will be given
to this question is of importance to England,
and may involve issues of the gravest moment to
India. It has in certain quarters been represented
that an Afghan war will be a contest of trifling
importance, likely to involve little more outlay
than one of those small frontier wars which have
been of such frequent occurrence in India. I
think, however, it will be'&dmitted that on such a
subject it is impossible to quote a higher autho
rity than Lord Lawrence. He possesses an almost
uh rivalled experience of Indian affairs, and no one
has been less prone than he to ^ive expression to
exaggerated fears. In a letter which appeared in
the Times on the lOth of January last on our
frontier policy in India a letter which events
tha? are now happening show was distinguished
by the most remarkable sagacity. Lord Lawrence
said: "The former war in Afghanistan is
calculated to have cost us thirteen mil
lions sterling, and though the number of
troops employed was considerable, the proportion
of English soldiers was always deemed insnflicient.
Bearina - in mind the disasters of that war, wo
may certainly consider that the f^rce allotted for
another expedition, especially the European por
tion of it, would largely exceed that en .raged in
the first war. The late Lord Sandhurst calcu-