Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎58r] (119/312)

active measures that were necessary to secure ,
British, prestige in Afghanistan.
The composition of the staff of the Kohat I
column was finally settled yesterday. Biddulph |
commands the Quetta reinforcements, and'
Stewart the reserve at Sukkur.
No commander-in-chief has yet been nomi
nated, though rumour naturally appoints Cham
berlain, who arrived here yesterday.
[BY DAILY TELEGRAPH SPECIAL WIRE.]
[PROM CUB OWN COEEESPONDBNT.J
VIENNA, S ept. 29.
Referring to the Anglo-Afghan difficulty, to-j
day's Fremderiblatt writes as follows: " The
Russian Government will, of course, wash its
hands in innocence of the whole affair, and will
throw the entire blame upon Shere Ali. After
all, the Colossus of the North is at liberty to use
the native princes as the skirmishers of its
aggressive policy. The event itself is nothing
else but the triumph of Russian diplo
macy over that of England. No thinking
man will admit that Russia contemplates the in
vasion of India. Russia's object is twofold—
firstly, to plunge England into serious compli
cations, which she will succeed in doing; and,
secondly, to leave only one road for Central
Asiatic Indo trade through the Bamian Pass,
north of Cabul. Millions which hitherto found
their way to India by the Turkestan valleys
would thus go to Russia. This result, peacefully
obtained, would certainly be preferable for
Russia to the most popular of wars. But that
the accomplishment of this double aim may very
well lead to war is a fact we do not feel inclined
to deny."
[renter's telegrams.]
SIMLA, SEPT. 29.
General Sir Neville Chamberlain has arrived
here.
ST. PETERSBURG, S ept . 28.
With reference to the telegrams and articles
published by the English papers, ascribing the
stoppage of the British Mission to the counsel
of Russia, it is pointed out in official quarters
that when the first news of the event arrived
here the Ministers for War and Foreign Affairs
had no more precise information on the subject
than the public generally.
It is added that the belief expressed by these
papers-of Russian complicity in the matter may
have arisen from the following considerations.
During the Russo-Turldsh war various reports
were received to the effect that England was
making attempts to create difficulties for Russia
in Central Asia.
The English mission of Sir Douglas Forsyth
to Kashgar was avowedly undertaken with this
purpose, and even in Bokhara it was alleged that
English agents were at work. In order to coun
teract the effect of these movements, Russia took
various measures, and contemplated sending
several expeditions to reconnoitre the neigh
bouring territories. However, as soon as the
Berlin Congress held out the prospect of bring
ing about a peaceful solution of the question, all
these measures were countermanded.
In any case, it is added, the assumption that
the Russian Government had any pari in the
decision of Shere Ali to reject the Anglo-Indian
Mission is groundless. Such conjectures are
merely the outcome of the antagonism which
existed between England and Russia during the
klate war- " ■ •
THE.FRON TIER HIL L TRIBES.
/ SHEEE ALI 'S ARMY.
Among the latest items of news from India
in connection with Anglo-Afghan affairs is the
announcement that the Viceroy purposes en
tering into closer relations with the frontier
hill tribes. We use the word " closer " instead
i of " more' friendly," which our telegrams and
other writers have preferred, for two reasons.
The first is that "friendship," in the sense we
understand it, with such tribes is impos
sible. An Afridi may be tamed, made a
pet of, pampered, and led about up-
muzzled by a riband, but his own master
would be strangely incautious if he went for a
stroll with him into a solitary spot. Amongst 1
themselves they recognise no life as safe from
each other, and the most intimate " friends"
never think of going a day's journey together, or
visiting each other's villages, without carrying
about with them every offensive and defensive
weapon they possess. If, then, the Afridis—
we select that tribe at random, and not for any j
exceptional ferocity of character—cannot de- j
velope more human kindness towards men of
their own blood and religion, poor men '
moreover, how can we possibly expect r
them to feel amiably towards well-to-do
infidels ? That he is well-to-do is of itself suffi
cient reason for a stranger's death, and when to
this is added that he is an infidel, a dog whose
destruction will be scored to the murderer's
credit in the next world, the death becomes a
pious act. Worldly prudence commends, while
religious duty dictates, the treacherous deed, and
under the circumstances it seems to us a licence
of metaphor not permissible in prose to speak of
making " friends" of the hill tribes. The
second reason is that when a person is swearing
eternal friendship at the same moment with two
persons who are deadly enemies to each other,
there are some grounds for suspecting his sin- i
cerity. Yet this is what the hill tribes are doing.
In the Bannu district, for instance, the
Waziris, one of the first tribes that a
j British force advancing into Cabul will
i encounter, have for the last year been
carrying on an amiable intercourse with the
Ameer of Cabul. At intervals they are invited
to visit his capital, and Shere Ali Khan makes
them presents " as a token of his esteem and re-
I gard " for them. At intervals also they are in
vited to visit British officials when on tour in
their neighbourhood, and they never leave the
camp of the Sahib empty handed. The Waziri
thinks this is delightful, and, if he had his way,
would never disturb the status quo. With both
hands he receives, and to either donor he vows
an interminable amity. But this mood cannot,
with any reason, be called " friendship." When
all is peace, and the only conflict is of compli
ments and bribes, the hill man takes life gaily
enough; but should the Cabul Ameer and the
British Sahib suddenly draw their swords
upon one another, the Waziri, midway, will
find himself awkwardly placed. A rabbit in
a bank with a hole on either side, and looking
out upon genial pastures both to right and left,
is a comfortable beast enough, but how the
position alters when a ferret is coming in at one
hole, and a terrier stands on guard at the
| other 1 And to-day the country side is " up,"
i and the wild things of the banks and brakes,
! the hill men of the border marshes, must elect,
and that quickly, on which side their safety lies.
On the east are spread out the open plains of
British India; on the west are the dark and
tortuous" defiles of Cabul. The landscape in
either case reflects the policy, and the hill men
have to choose between the two—between
| honest service in British pay, or the
i shifty protection of a treacherous Afghan.
It is impossible to say which they will choose.
They are independent tribes, and their choice is
so far absolutely free/ But either side can
bring influences to bear, the potent influence of
money, and the side that bribes highest will-,
obtain the first promise of alliance. Now, the i
promises of an Afridi are treated by himself as !
mere badinage, the joke of a negotiation, so it
is probable that the Ameer, and it is certain |
that the Viceroy, will require . host,ages .as a
material guarantee for receiving his money's
worth. And here the British will have a dis
tinct advantage, for the system of hostages is
as old as our frontier history, and the tribes
have long ago learnt how the Sahib keeps faith
with the detenus. In Cabul, however, the
hostage is a life prisoner, and used for ever
after as an instrument for unfair ex
tension of the original pledge as occasion
requires. The argument of solid advantage
therefore lies with the Viceroy. He can pay better
than the Ameer, and his character stands higher.
Come what may, the pay will be more liberal
and more punctual, and the hostages will
be safely sent back to him at the very hour
promised.
Here again the British alliance is more
attractive than the Afghan. The former
will ask only for an amiable neutrality; the
latter for active hostility. Now the hill
men have perennial wars of their own to at
tend to, much more important to them than
a casual disagreement between Cabul and India,
and, except with a certainty of very great and
immediate advantage, they would not play into
the hands of their private enemies by fighting
on their own account against a powerful
stranger. If, for instance, the Mahsud Kheyl
Waziris were to oppose General Roberts when
marching from Thul, the Darwesh Kheyl
Waziris would chuckle immensely, and carefully
refrain from attacking the British. Indeed, they
might even help the British to thin , the ranks
of their hereditary foes; and then, when General |