Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎54v] (112/312)

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1 ENGLAND AND AfFOHANISTAN.
{ReuUr's Telegrams.)
ST. PETERSBUUGr, S ept. 28.
"With reference to the telegrams and arlicles
§ ^ ^ English papers ascribing the stop
page of the British mission to the counsel of
Russia, it is pointed out in official quarters that
•when the first news arrived here the Ministers for
War and Foreign Affairs had no more precise in-
,; formation on the subject than the public generally.
It is added that the belief expressed by these
| papers of Russian complicity in the matter miy
j | have arisen from the following considerations ;—
I I During the Eusso-Turkish war various reports
; were received to the effect that England was making
attempts to create difficulties for Russia in Central
Asia. The English mission of Sir Douglas Forsyth
to Kashgar was avowedly undertaken with this
purpose, and even in Bokhara it was alleged that
i English agents were at work; in order to counteract
the effect of these movements Russia took various
I measures, and contemplated sending several expe-
[ i ditions to reconnoitre the neighbouring territories.
However, as soon as the Berlin Congress held out
the prospect of bringing about a peaceful solution
of the question, all these measures were counter
manded. In any case, it ia added that the assump
tion that the Russian Government had any part
in the decision of Shere AH to reject the Anglo-
Indian mission is groundless. Such conjectures
are merely the outcome of the antagonism which
existed between England and Russia during the
late war.
SIMLA., S epi . 23.
General Sir Neville Chamberlain has arrived
T^ro days ago we uttered a warning that our
difficulty with S here A h might not be limited to
the opposition of an Affghan army and the under
hand assistance of Russia, and we pointed out
that signs were also to be observed of action on
the part of Persia. In commenting on the tele-
grama which were then to hand we expressed a
belief that the frontier complications which have
already developed in Seistan, and the news of an
I ; intended movement by Persia in the direction of
Herat, both pointed to the probability of Persian
interference. Other circumstances have since
p, ccme to light which tend to confirm that opinion.
It is staled in a Vienna telegram that when the
: S hah was recently in that capital he caused pro
found astonishment by his purchase of Uchatius
guns, Werndl tiflea, "and enough ammunition to
"fill the Persian arsenals several times over."
The West-end creditors of the S hah will learn
with surprise that, costly as was thin
" supposed hobby," the S hah had no dif
ficulties on the score of expense. It ia
now suggefcted, not here in Russophobist England,
as the St. Petersburg papers describe ua, but in
VienraJ that the C zar's purse supplied his Per
sian ally with the needful funds. Whether that
be so or not the fact remains that Persia has just
possessed herself of a large supply of war material,
and the knowledge of that circumstance, added to
the report of her intended demonstration againat
Herat and to the reported disturbances in Seistan,
demand the cautious observation of thia country.
We must take it for granted that England will
be bound to bring her difficulty with S here A li
t© & auccessful issue. Russia haa shown that not
withstanding all her pledges in regard to non-in
tervention in Afghanistan she had a plan of cam
paign relating to that country. It will therefore
be our first duty when S here An is brought to
his knees not simply to ^ive this country supreme
influence in Affghanistsn, but to take such
guarantees aa ahall exclude every other agent
but our own from the Cabul Court. Rassii
! must be very blind if sho does not foresea
I that result. She doubtless appreciates already
j that if the Affghan campaign be properly con-
3 ducted—we speak of the part winch diplomacy
will play—it will leave England much stronger in
I India, than it has ij^i^.rto beeis. The plains of
Indus form « wort&less line of defence. Th i (
command of th« passes through the Saleyman
Mountains is the least military advantage thai we
shall demand, but it is very unlikely that these
will be all. Russian military men can understand
es clearly as anybody else that, in viev of the
attitude just shown by Russia in Central Asia, the
English Government are not unlikely to demand
that the Hindoo Kush, instead of the Suleytnan
Mountains, shall be regarded as the rampart of the
Indian Empire. It will be better for India that
the Kawak and the Bamian Passes shall be in
the hands of English instead of Russian troops ;
and the same opinion will prevail yet more
strongly in regard to Herat, by which
those passes can be turned. Russia's past
pledges respecting Affghanistan preclude her from
interfering between England and S here A li when
once k hebe A li sues for terma. With a keen ap
preciation of considerations like these the mili-
lary governor of Turkestan is not likely to let the
present occasion go by for improving his own
position in Central Asia without availing himself
of it. If the defence of India is bettered by thia
Affghan difficulty, we may depend upon it that
Russia will make a counter move. For months
past—since the dispersion of the Tiflis army after
the peace in Asia Minor—we have had whispers
cf a Russian expedition lurking at Krasnovadok,
with the view of moving to Kizil A.rvat, which is
the first step to Merv. Now that the Affghan
Question is come before Russia with the certainty
of her diplomacy being foiled by English arms at
Cabul, it is all the more likely that Russia will
seek for some pretext to annex Merv. It will,
however, be still better for her if independently
of that movement, or simultaneously with it,
Persia ia able to lay hands upon Herat, for Merv
ia but the stepping-stone to the great Affghan
fortress.
But there ia an obvious difficulty in the
way of Russia giving Persia any encourage
ment to take Herat from Affghanistau. The
Persians and the Affghana hate each other
with sectarian rancour, and the feud between
Persia and Affghanistan ia of too old a stand
ing to be lightly passed over. If, therefore,
a Persian advance be made upon Herat it will be
a sign that Russia acknowledges herself to be
foiled at Cabul. S here A li would make no terms
:with a neighbour whose partner was attempting i
to annex the capital of Western Affghanistan.
Should Russia discover a change in S here A li's
mcod, or assure herself that England will in future
j prevent the adoption of any serious intrigue at the
Affghan capital, we may expect to hear of her
making an effort to increase her own influence in
ether directions. Whether this movement will
le restricted to the capture of Merv, or whether
it will include an expedition against Herat,
secretly supported by Russia, will largely depend
upon the action of the English Government.
Signs are not wanting that these contingencies ;
have been duly considered by the English Govern- ^
wient. It has been publicly announced that we
may have to increase our fleet in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , j
and a demonstration in that quarter may cause tha
I S hah to pause before he departs from an attitude
of strict neutrality. As to Merv, it is already ;
known to Russia that any occupation of tha 1 -,
place by her armies would years ago have mat i
with a counter movement from England. In the
altered condition of affairs which has now been
Ircught about the necessity for that action on our
I art becomes all the greater. If, say two or three
yeara ago, a Russian advance upon Merv, as the
1 first step towards taking Herat, would have called
forth the active opposition of this country, that '
proceeding on our part will now be all the more
neceesaiy in view of our altered relations with
Affghanistan. Merv and Herat turn the Hindoo
Kush in the west, just as the Chitral turns those
mountains in the east. Our Affghan complici- ;
tij^
siqissodtof SBM !jtiq"'Bi>naniT{8iiq^S9 oi^jado esoq^
jo con^iinpnco-aott aq;} jo easmao equ 90 bi ^ pxre o)
ueq!> ssejasn eq pjtKm 'msq; rojojud ptre tqioit
eonpoad 0$ ni jawod eq^ bbm oiaqij tjaqj i
^oqso^ qfnoiio ssaoons qijm—ijasraom aqij jtoj ssaoong ssaf 1
10 ejcra qsiM najpsiijaptm ttaaq p«q stio|i r iqnoadg ('isaq
•eJtenSci'Bf ano m vjado panniijsaj tjs ijoa puq
8^4 siqi) jo—qoBoidaiaq^ies !)8oaijB!|q3jca aao
—ijeaSsj nu pao^q Saiqijaaios
4* V
T.NGLAXi) AND AFFCHANISTAK.
{Beuter's Teleqrams.)
st. petbrsbuka, sept. 28.
"With reference to the telegrams and articles
published by the English papers ascribing the stop
page of the British mission to the counsel of
Kussia, it is pointed out in official quarters that
^hen the first news arrived here the Ministers for
War and Foreign Affairs had no more precise in-
| formation on the subject than the public generally.
It is added that the belief expressed by thesa
i papers of Russian complicity in the matter may
i have arisen from the following considerations :—
I During the Eusso-Turkish war various reports
•were received to the effect that England was making
attempts to create (difficulties for Russia in Central
Asia. The English mission of Sir Douglas Forsyth
to Kashgar was avowedly undertaken with this
purpose, and even in Bokhara it was alleged that
j English agents were at work; in order to counteract
the effect of these movements Russia took various
measures, and contemplated sending several expe-
: ditions to reconnoitre the neighbouring territories.
However, as soon as the Berlin Congress held out
the prospect of bringing about a peaceful solution
i of the question, all these measures were counter
manded. In any case, it is added that the assump-
i tion that the Russian Government had any part
in the decision of Shere Ali to reject the Anglo-
Indian mission is groundleas. Such conjectures
are merely the outcome of the antagonism which,
existed between England and Russia during the
late war.
simla., sept. 23.
General Sir Neville Chamberlain has arrived
here.
Two days ago we uttered a warning that our
difficulty with S here A li might not be limited to
ihe opposition of an Affghan army and the under
hand assistance of Russia, and we pointed out
that signs were also to be observed of action on
the part of Persia. In commenting on the tele
grams which were then to hand we expressed a
belief that the frontier complications which have
already developed in Seistan, and the news of an
j intended movement by Persia in the direction of
Herat, both pointed to the probability of Persian
interference. Other circumstances have sines
ccme to light which tend to confirm that opinion.
It is stated in a Vienna telegram that when the
S hah was recently in that capital he caused pro
found astonishment by his purchase of Uchatius
guns, Werndl rifles, "and enough ammunition to
"fill the Persian arsenals several times over."
The West-end creditors of the S hah will learn
with surprise that, costly as was this
" supposed hobby," the S hah had no dif
ficulties on the score of expense. It is
now snggefcted, not here in Russophobist England,
as the St. Petersburg papers describe us, but in
VienraJ that ihe C zar's purse supplied his Per
sian ally with the needful funds. Whether that
be so or not the fact remains that Persia has just
possessed herself of a large supply of war material,
and the knowledge of that circumstance, added to
Ihe report of her intended demonstration against
Herat and to the reported disturbances in Seistan,
demand the cautious observation of this country.
We must take it for granted that England will
be bound to bring her difficulty with S herb A li
t© a auccessful issue. Russia has shown that not
withstanding all her pledges in regard to non-in
tervention in Affghanistan she had a plan of cam
paign relating to that country. It will therefore
be our first duty when S herb A li is brought to
hig Imees not simply to ^ive this country supreme
influence in Affghanistun, but to take such
guarantees as shall exclude every other agent
but our own from the Csbul Court. Russia
must be very blind if she does not foresee
that result. She doubtless appreciates already
that if the AfiVhan campaign be properly con
ducted—we speak of the pact wiiich diplomacy
will play—it will leave England much stronger in
India thas it has JbilMrto beee- The plains of
\Indus form a wott&tess line of dafence." Thi
command of th« passes through the Suloyman
Mountains is the least military advantage that wa
shall demand, but it is very unlikely that these
will be all. Russian military men can understand
8S clearly as anybody else that, in viev of the
attitude just shown by Russia in Central Asia, the
English Government are not unlikely to demand
that the Hindoo Kush, instead of the Suleyman
Mountains, shall be regarded as the rampart of the
Indian Empire. It will be better for India that
the Kawak and the Bamian Passes shall be in
the hands of English instead of Russian troops ;
and the same opinion will prevail yet more
strongly in regard to Herat, by which
thoEe passes can be turned. Russia's past
pledges respecting Affghaniatan preclude her from
interfering between England and S here A li when
once ^ heee A li sues for terms. With a keen ap
preciation of considerations like these the mili-
tary governor of Turkestan is not likely to let the
present occasion go by for improving his own
position in Central Asia without availing himself
of it. If the defence of India is bettered by this
Affghan difficulty, we may depend upon it that
Russia will make a counter move. For months
past—since the dispersion of the Tiflis army after
the peace in Asia Minor—we have had whispers
of a Russian expedition lurking at Krasnovadok,
with the view of moving to Kizil Arvat, which is
the first step to Merv. Now that the Affghan
Question is come before Russia with the certainty
of her diplomacy being foiled by English arms at
Cabul, it is all the more likely that Russia will
seek for some pretext to annex Merv. It will,
however, be still better for her if independently
of that movement, or simultaneously with it,
Persia is able to lay hands upon Herat, for Merv
is but the stepping-atone to the great Affghan
fortress.
But there is an obvious difficulty in the
way of Russia giving Persia any encourage
ment to take Herat from Affghanistau. The
Persians and the Affghans hate each other
with sectarian rancour, and the feud between
Persia and Affghanistan is of too old a stand
ing to be lightly passed over. If, therefore,
a Persian advance be made upon Herat it will be
a sign that Russia acknowledges herself to be
foiled at Cabul. S herb A li would make no terms
with a neighbour whose partner was attempting
fo annex the capital of Western Affghanistan.
Should Russia discover a change in S herb A li's
mood, or assure herself that England will in future
I prevent the adoption of any serious intrigue at the
Affghan capital, we may expect to hear of her
making an effort to increase her own influence in
other directions. Whether this movement will
te restricted to the capture of Merv, or whether
it will include an expedition against Herat,
secretly supported by Russia, will largely depend
upon the action of the English Government.
Signs are not wanting that these contingenciei
have been duly considered by the English Govern
ment. It has been publicly announced tha,t we
may have to increase our fleet in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. ,
and a demonstration in that quarter may cause the
I S hah to pause before he departs from an attitude
of strict neutrality. As to Merv, it is already
known to Russia that any occupation of tha 1 ;
place by her armies would years ago have mat i
with a counter movement from England. In the
altered condition of affairs which has now been
Ircught about the necessity for that action on our
I art becomes all the greater. If, say two or three
years ago, a Russian advance upon Merv, as the
1 first step towards taking Herat, would have called
forth the active opposition of this country, that
proceeding on our part will now be all the more
necessaiy in view of our altered relations with
Affghanistan. Merv and Herat turn the Hindoo
Kush in the west, just as the Chitral turns those
mountains in the east. Qui Affghan complici-
tiors will render it exceedingly desirable to keep
a cloter watch than ever Upon the movements of
Russia and her allies in those regions. One little
circumstance which has just come to light invests
the Chitral with an additional interest at the pre
sent moment. The most recent map of the
Turkestan Topographical Department shows that
ihe Russian frontier is not four hundred miles
from our dependency of Cashmere, but only a
'hundred and fifty miles. Those who remamber
the alterations in the Russian official map after the
A trek country wfs annexed up to the Gurgan,
and when the north-western boundary of Affgha-
nistan was under settlement, will recognise the
significance of the information which is to be
gathered from a careful study of large maps, and
(specially Russian maps.