Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎51r] (104/312)

The Statist regards' an Afghan war as inevitable. The Ameer would
hardly have acted as he has done if he had not made up his mind to risk
the consequences of a hostile attitude, and his challenge cannot but be
accepted by the Indian Government, as it has in fact been accepted. The
position in which we thus find ourselves is an eloquent comment on the
Treaty of Berlin. The best justification of that instrument was, that Russia
had found by experiment the extreme limit to which British patience
v. ould allow her aggression to go, and to avoid a struggle was willing to
share the sovereignty of Asia with us j that, in short, a friendly alliance
with Russia was henceforth possible. It was on this ground that Lord
BeaconsfieM founded his defence of the treaty. Barely eight weeks have
elapsed since his boastful language was used, and already Russian inter
vention has plunged us into war in Afghanistan. The hostility of Russia
in this matter is unmistakable. Granting that she was justified, when
war seemed imminent, to prepare to strike her foe where most vulnerable,
the justification ceased with the danger. Had there existed at St. Peters-
turg any real desire to promote that friendly relationship between the two
empires which the Treaty of Berlin was supposed to have made possible, I
the Abramoff mission would never have reached Cabul, or, if it had, would
have bf en instantly recalled. One other point to remember is that the
setting out of the mission was not heard of in this country till nearly a
fortnight after the break-up of the Congress. The inference is difficult to
resist, that the Russian authorities sent on the mission as a reply to the
i laudation of the Berlin Treaty and the Anglo-Turkish Convention in
[-England. |
■' tjucGfcr"
ACCORDING to telegrams of September 26th from Calcutta, f~-
published in the Times and Telegraphy the Government of
India is not about to act so rapidly as the telegrams referred to l|
below, and in our article on " the latest accounts," would indicate.
A pause may have been ordered from England, or may be neces
sary to communicate ■with the Hill tribes, but it is understood
that the movement through the Passes will still go forward
; before the winter. Indeed, we are not quite sure that the last
telegrams are not intended for retransmission to India, to put the
f l Ameer, if possible, off his guard. Lord Lytton has, however,
already given him every possible warning, down to the numbers
of Europeans to be employed.
As we expected, Shere Ali has determined to fight, rather than
give up his independence. The necessity of a decision before the
winter seems to have hurried Lord Lytton, and on September
21st, Sir Neville Chamberlain, with an immense retinue of 1,000
persons, reached Jumrood, the entrance to the Khyber. Thence
Major Cavagnari rode forward to Ali Musjeed, the first Afghan
fort in the Khyber Pass, to demand permission to proceed. This
was refused by the Afghan officer in command, who had two days
before received special instructions, and who threatened to resort
to force. The responsibility of the Ameer was fully explained to
him, but he remained firm, exhibited his force on the hills, and
according to a Times' telegram, told Major Cavagnari that but for
personal friendship for him he would shoot him dead,—probably
a misreport of some incident in the conversation. As the Ameer's
decision was clear. Sir Neville withdrew his Mission, which was at
once broken up by order of the Viceroy, the Envoy returning to
Madras.
The British Government has, of course, under the circum
stances which its folly and panic dread of Russia have produced,
only two alternatives. It can recall Lord Lytton, and treat the
whole affair as a blunder, or it can invade Afghanistan ; and it
has decided on the latter. It was at first believed that it would
wait till the spring, and then, if the Ameer did not yield, enter
Afghanistan with an army of 40,000 men,—a reasonable plan, if
the war is once decided on. It would appear from a semi-official
sketch in the Times of Wednesday that this was the plan at home,
but it was too tardy for Lord Lytton, who, according to four
separate telegrams, has resolved to invade at once. A force
of 8,000 men will pass through the Bolan to Quettah, and
occupy Candahar ; another force of 6,000 will enter the Koorum,
with Cabul as its object; while a third, probably of 4,000 men,
will occupy the Khyber, and support the Koorum division. If
the capital can be taken before winter, the Ameer, it is expected, 1
will yield, and if not, the troops will be "ready" for the cam- '
paign in spring. We have explained elsewhere the great danger !
which this plan involves, but may add here that the Indian 1
Government evidently expect to buy the Hillmen, and to excite
the Afghans to rebel against the Ameer, We fear that calculation '
rests upon two delusions,—first, that Shere Ali does not know :
his own business; and second, that Hillmen and Afghans
hV j uwaij ayAyJiUij hbh entrpjxrOT.«- ct —- j T - - 0 . (I
suq JU909I s^sujibq pacq Smpiooai ui ssmix
9q^ jfq pauoi^uaxn 'qo'Bj 9q; ^d90X9 '^ iom 9)'Boq9p pue praq Xq
p9u.rB9 U99q SBq qorqAV 'uopomoid 9qq. o^ 'jo a \0 U3[ 9M. ' uot ^
-09jqo ou si 9J9qx ^qu^ooB ^Snip990X9 9jb jo 95[qg]p
IpUB gaTJ99J 9ScrBJO p9UrBI^S9J STq 'J9A09JOUI *9^9qM. 'epio-q
jo 9Snoji aq^ m ^qSpM. miq 9AtS '9AT!j09g9 si < snoip9^ qSnoq^
'qoiqAV ^ougnbop siq puu '^913 si qoiqAV '^qiqia stjj -jfansimx
9q^ jo pjoq; ijsjtj su p9^9ZBg sujtbo prea pug ^qSira pijoai
p9Bi .id.ms u qoiqM. ui s9iou9Snpuoo QW 9J9q^ ^nq 'jfyxed umo siq
jtq n9A9 'p98iagoo9J kjpxeq si ^u9muJ9AO£) 9q^ ui uoi^isod 91)aq.
S IH ■p 85 ! 0 ' 6 ! S9raiq9inos smj qi qoiqAV iCj;sraij\[ 9qq o^ pooqipi ^q
: pun qqSa9jqs qsuj-oqoog jo ^u9OT9p ub pgqnqu^uoo s ^q puis
's^ogfoid qsgqe^j siqiji^snf oq squ9ranSjB pjJfoj punoj s^q 'a9ira9Jj
9qq jo J9AOipj ^njq^rej qsotu B U99q s ^q 9H •J9!}sraij\[ puiq'B^
v ST3 9qq 0!j paaBpugj S90TAJ9S joj ^nq < joq9ou'eq3 pjoq gb yoil j
The Statist regards an Afghan war as inevitable. The Ameer would
Lardly have acted as he has done if he had not made up his mind to risk
the consequences of a hostile attitude, and his challenge cannot but be :
accepted by the Indian Government, as it has in fact been accepted. The •
i position in which we thus find ourselves is an eloquent comment on the ;
Treaty of Berlin. The best justification of that instrument was, that Russia
bad lound by experiment the extreme limit to which British patience ;
vould allow her aggression to go, and to avoid a struggle was willing to |
j share the sovereignty of Asia with us; that, in short, a friendly alliance i
I with Russia was henceforth possible. It was on this ground that Lord |
Be aeons field founded his defence of the treaty. Barely eight weeks have I
tlapsed since his boastful language was used, and already Russian inter- |
vention has plunged us into war in Afghanistan. The hostility of Russia !
in this matter is unmistakable. Granting that she was justified, when ■
war seemed imminent, to prepare to strike her foe where most vulnerable, |!
the justification ceased with the danger. Had there existed at St. Peters-j
turg any real desire to promote that friendly relationship between the twojl
£ mpires which the Treaty of Berlin was supposed to have made possible,
the Abramoff mission would never have reached Cabul, or, if it had, would ]
have been instantly recalled. One other point to remember is that the ^
setting out of the mission was not heard of in this country till nearly a
■] fortnight after the break-up of the Congress. The inference is difficult to «
resist, that the Russian authorities sent on the mission as a reply to the !
laudation of the Berlin Treaty and the Anglo-Turkish Convention in
| England. '
ACCORDING to telegrams of September 26th from Calcutta,
published in the Times and Telegraph,, the Government of
India is not about to act so rapidly as the telegrams referred to
below, and in our article on "the latest accounts," would indicate.
A pause may have been ordered from England, or may be neces
sary to communicate with the Hill tribes, but it is understood
that the movement through the Passes will still go forward
before the winter. Indeed, we are not quite sure that the last
telegrams are not intended for retransmission to India, to put the
Ameer, if possible, off his guard. Lord Lytton has, however,
already given him every possible warning, down to the numbers
of Europeans to be employed.
As we expected, Shere Ali has determined to fight, rather than
give up his independence. The necessity of a decision before the
winter seems to have hurried Lord Lytton, and on September
21st, Sir Neville Chamberlain, with an immense retinue of 1,000
persons, reached Jumrood, the entrance to the Khyber. Thence
Major Cavagnari rode forward to Ali Musjeed, the first Afghan
fort in the Khyber Pass, to demand permission to proceed. This
was refused by the Afghan officer in command, who had two days
before received special instructions, and who threatened to resort
to force. The responsibility of the Ameer was fully explained to
him, but he remained firm, exhibited his force on the hills, and
according to a Times' telegram, told Major Cavagnari that but for
personal friendship for him he would shoot him dead,—probably
a misreport of some incident in the conversation. As the Ameer's
decision was clear, Sir Neville withdrew his Mission, which was at
once broken up by order of the Viceroy, the Envoy returning to
Madras.
The British Government has, of course, under the circum
stances which its folly and panic dread of Russia have produced,
only two alternatives. It can recall Lord Lytton, and treat the
whole affair as a blunder, or it can invade Afghanistan ; and it n
has decided on the latter. It was at first believed that it would ;S
wait till the spring, and then, if the Ameer did not yield, enter - 5
Afghanistan with an army of 40,000 men,—a reasonable plan, if
the war is once decided on. It would appear from a semi-official;
sketch in the Times of Wednesday that this was the plan at home, ' S
but it was too tardy for Lord Lytton, who, according to four 5
separate telegrams, has resolved to invade at once. A force 1
of 8,000 men will pass through the Bolan to Quettah, and '
occupy Candahar ; another force of 6,000 will enter the Koorum, ' >
with Cabul as its object; while a third, probably of 4,000 men, I H
will occupy the Khyber, and support the Koorum division. If ' f
the capital can be taken before winter, the Ameer, it is expected, ' &
will yield, and if not, the troops will be "ready" for the cam- ' |
paign in spring. We have explained elsewhere the great danger '
which this plan involves, but may add here that the Indian 1 r
Government evidently expect to buy the Hillmen, and to excite ! |
the Afghans to rebel against the Ameer. We fear that calculation
rests upon two delusions,—first, that Shere Ali does not know 1
his own business; and second, that Hillmen and Afghans |
wish to be ruled by white Infidels, whom they have fought all |
thek liveg^Itl s much more probable that the British arm ies will 5
oe let tnrougn, and that desperate attacks will then be made on the
baggage-train, which must necessarily be very large.
The advocates of the Government policy say that Lord Lytton is
quite ready. In that case, he must have intended war from the
first, and has been playing a comedy, but we believe this is
only an after-thought. If he had intended war, he would
have had more Europeans near the frontier, would not have
selected such a man as Sir Neville Chamberlain for Envoy, and
would have collected provision on a very different scale. It is ; '
much more probable that he is carried away by the regular •
Anglo-Indian feeling, that a rebuff from an Asiatic must be in
stantly avenged, and that his advisers have got what we may call ji
v " Pollock on the brain." Because that skilful officer, after a second 8
- campaign, with the country in utter anarchy, conquered Afghanistan' ^
easily, and then left it, therefore it is assumed that the Afghans,
knowing they are to be finally annexed, will be defeated with
little pains. We fear this may prove an error, and that the
moment the Passes are closed with snow all Afghanistan
may hurl itself on the invaders. Shere Ali's method of
action betokens either despair or self-confidence, and he
may have allies in India of whom we know nothing. The
Russians cannot help him without declaring war, but insurgents
in India can ; and if the invading corps are checked, even for a
few days, we may have to reconquer whole provinces. The die
! however, is cast, and the best, indeed the only watchwords now'
are "Audacity" and "Reinforcements." The Anglo-Indians
will supply the first; let Lord Cranbrook, unless he is utterly
bemused by the idea that this war will be a parade, insist upon the
second.