Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [49v] (101/312)
The record is made up of 1 volume (150 folios). It was created in 07 Sep 1878-19 Oct 1878. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .
Transcription
This transcription is created automatically. It may contain errors.
" The London Times is perfectly mistaken in
speaking of a Eusso-Afghan alliance, or attributing
to Russian influence the Ameer's refusal to receive
the English Embassy. The English Government
have to think themselves of their high-handed
practices, -which have made the Ameer suspicious.
England's continued intrigues have at last resulted
in making the potent Shere Ali her open enemy.
The Russian officers despatched to Shere Ali from
time to time were never commissioned to set
Afghanistan against England. Their only object
was to promote friendship and amity and develope
commerce. Among other proposals of the like
nature they mentioned the plan of a railway
between Central Asia and Afghanistan, which was
very favourably received by the Ameer. The
Ameer never had any injury to sustain nor threat
to endure from Russia ; and if Russian missions
appeared at his Court, their suite was too small to
inspire fear. But English conquest and gresd of
territory, as displayed in Beloochistan and en
forced under the most futile pretext at the cost of
the petty Princes of the region, had long set Shere
Ali thinking as to his own possible fate. Add to
this the mischievous attempts of the English to in
terfere in the domestic concerns of Afghanistan and
the numerous escort that was to have accompanied
their Embassy, and Shere Ali's conduct needs no
further explanation. This escort being far too
numerous for friendly purposes, it was naturally
concluded at Cabul that General Chamberlain's
companions were only the van of a force ordered
to occupy the Ameerate. Hence Shere Ali was
fully entitled to shut his door against a corps
which, contrary to the law of nations, was to have
invaded his country on the pretext of a pacific
mission. In any circumstances, England, acting in
her usual rough and offensive style, would soon
have discovered a plea for declaring war against
the Ameer. But whatever may befall, Russia will,
conclude no alliance with Afghanistan. Only as
England supplied Turkey with arms and ammuni
tion in the last Eastern war, so Russia will throw |
no obstacles in the way of Russian foreign traders
who may wish to sell rifles or cannons to the
Afghans. Russia will do nothing against England,
unless, indeed, she should be attacked by England,
when energetic reprisals may be expected. The
Russo-Afghan alliance is nothing but an English
fable designedly invented to serve ulterior pur-
t /
I REVIEW
SCIENCE, AND AET.
.fad -r /W' l V'
28, I878.
(" Registered for "l PnV<a
L Transmission abroad. J A 1 il - c uw '*
The tone of this letter reflects the language of
the Russian Press. A noble-minded and inde
pendent native resisting rapacious England, and
looking for sympathy to generous Russia, whose
civilizing philanthropy is fostering peace and pro
gress on his northern frontiers—such is the esti
mate Russian journals profess to be taking of the
situation.
paris, s ept . 27.
Shere Ali still attracts little attention from the
French Press. The Temps, which is, of course, an
exception to this indifference, thinks it cannot be
doubted that the Abyssinian expedition is to be
repeated in Central Asia. The English must en
deavour to place some one more trustworthy on the
throne of Cabul. But the attitude of England
towards Russia is the embarrassing side of the
question. The latter country is to blame for these
new complications. Perhaps the Emperor has
been ill-served by his Ministers, who did not
countermand in time the movements of General
Kaufmann and the setting out of General Stolietoff
for Cabul. Russian civil or military functionaries
have shown too much or too little activity. England
would accordingly do well not to go too quickly to
work.
The France talks of the decline of nations which
is gradually going on alongside the uprising of
France. It takes some credit to itself for having
predicted that the occupation of Cyprus would
entail heavy responsibilities. It finds its predic
tions already realized, and recent events in Afghan
istan show the first consequences of the formidable
rivalry preparing in Asia. France, disinterested,
can contemplate these covetous passions of other
nations with calm.
AFGHANISTAN.
T HE probable failure of the unintelligible Convention
with Turkey to effect its supposed objects would
have attracted more attention if the condition of Asia
Minor had not been superseded in interest by the affairs
of Afghanistan. The refusal of the A mber to admit Sir
N eville C hamberlain and his escort into his country is
almost equivalent to a declaration of war ; yet it is diffi
cult to believe that this occurrence can have been wholly
unexpected by the Indian Government. S here A li
has for several years refused to hold official com
munication with the Viceroy, and of late even native
Indian agents have been excluded from Cabul. A
friendly reception of the Mission would have been almost
equivalent to a concession of the demands which it would
have conveyed. The murder or forcible detention of the
English Envoy would have involved still graver complica-
v tions than those which must now be dealt with. The
^appointment of two natives of high rank as members of the
4 Mission is too much in Lord L ytton's manner to cause ex
treme surprise. His object was perhaps at the same time to
flatter the Indian nobility and to persuade the A meer that the
English Government commanded the active support of tte
indigenous population. In the result the V iceroy has
secured the attendance of two observant witnesses at the
ceremony of a formal and deliberate affront offered to his
Government; and to a certain extent he has increased the
obligation of resenting the injury. If the Indian Govern
ment had acquiesced in the insult which it has received,
there could be but one opinion as to the grossness of the
blunder which it would have committed. Lord L ttton,
unless he acted under direct orders from the S ecretary of
.S tate , was not compelled to notice at any particular time
the challenge which was offered by the A meer's reception of
the Russian Mission. S here A li well knew the feelings
which his conduct produced at Simla ; and he would have
waited, not without anxiety, for some practical expression
of resentment. The announcement some weeks ago that
Sir N eville C hamberlain was ordered to proceed to Cabnl
seemed to, put an end to uncertainty and delay. An
expectant policy, which might formerly have offered some
sadvantages, would now be considered a proof of fear or
Some of the newspaper reports of Lord L ytton's present
purposes were from the first incredible, in the common and
figurative sense that it would have been disagreeable to
believe them ; and they seem to be sufficiently contra
dicted by the movements of troops on the frontier.
It was said that, having ascertained that the A meer's
refusal was dictated by the Russian Envoy, the V iceroy
held that the question had become rather English than
Indian, and that therefore, disclaiming all responsibility,
he only awaited orders from home. According to this
startling version of his policy. Lord L ytton would have
left it to the S ecretary of S tate to decide whether the
quarrel should be prosecuted, if at all, in Europe or
in Asia. He might himself have dealt with the Ameer
of C abul ; but a war with Russia was too great an
undertaking for the highest subordinate functionary.
If such imbecility could be justly attributed to the
V iceroy , it would be a sufficient answer to the supposed
argument that he ought to have thought earlier of the
limitations of his powers. The rebuff administered
io the Indian Government was directly offered by
a petty Asiatic potentate, whom it is the V iceroy's
business to chastise. It is literally incredible that he
should have run the risk of the untoward event which has
actually occurred without having previously received
proper authority and contingent instructions from the
S ecretary of S tate . Lord C ranbrook and Lord B eaconspield
have had time enough to determine whether the A meer or
the Emperor of R ussia was to be held responsible for the
probable exclusion of the English Mission from Afghan
territory. If a war with Russia were desirable, the real
author of the affront might with perfect justice be required
to make atonement; but, of two possible defendants, a
judicious lawyer would select the adverse litigant against
whom it was easier to obtain a verdict and to levy
damages. If the A meer can at a moderate cost be effec
tually punished, it is unnecessary to engage in a
gigantic contest with his instigator and ally. Almost all
military authorities in India and in England assert that
the conquest of Afghanistan would be certain, and not ex
traordinarily expensive. If the A meer were ostensibly
aided by Russian reinforcements, it might not be easy to
affect ignorance of hostile acts; but it is more probable
that he would be supported indirectly by Russian volun
teers and by secret supplies of money. There is, however,
no reason to suppose that there is within reach any
considerable Russian force. The Indian Government
ought, before the abortive Mission was announced, to have
made preparations for a campaign; nor is there at present
reason to believe that it has neglected an urgent duty. A
practical proof that Russia cannot secure impunity to her
dependents would serve as an effectual check on future
intrigues.
The popularity of the Government will be compromised
by the sudden disclosure of a necessary choice between an
Afghan war and dangerous humiliation; but it is not
certain that the evil could have been averted, and perhaps
it might have become more formidable with delay. Almost
any policy which could have been adopted would have in
volved serious risks. The actual result follows from the
adoption and subsequent partial abandonment of the course
which has received the cant designation of " masterly in
activity. " The phrase was first employed in English politics
many years ago by a vain and incapable Colonial Governor
in apology for his helplessness in the presence of an in
choate rebellion. The epithet may be conveniently dis
used in serious discussion; but there are political cir
cumstances in which it is well to be inactive. The
ill-will of S here A li dates from the time when the
Government of India refused to support him against rival
candidates for the throne of Afghanistan. Only those who
were minutely acquainted with the facts of the case can
judge whether it would have been prudent to favour
the competitor who ultimately proved successful. If S here
A li had been hastily acknowledged, and had afterwards been
defeated, another ruler of Cabul would have been con
verted into an enemy. Since his accession successive
Viceroys have, to the best of their ability, abstained from
interference in Afghan affairs. The dynastic question
tad scarcely been settled by the victory of S here A li
before fresh difficulties' arose in relation to the future
succession. Among several of the A meer's sons, two or
three displayed military and political capacity; and one of
them, Y akoob K han , had a principal share in placing his
father on the throne; but, like many Oriental^ princes,
S here A li in his maturer years fell under the influence
■
About this item
- Content
Press cuttings from British and Indian Newspapers regarding the Afghan War (today known as the 2nd Afghan-Anglo War), negotiations in Cabul [Kabul], the British Government's policy with regards to the Indian Frontier, and the movements of the Russians during the war.
The cuttings have been taken from a number of newspapers including the Pall Mall Budget , The Pall Mall Gazette , The Globe , The Times , The Pioneer Mail , The Standard , The Daily News , The Daily Telegraph , The Evening Standard , The Saturday Review , The Spectator , The Morning Post and The World .
- Extent and format
- 1 volume (150 folios)
- Arrangement
The cuttings have been arranged in the scrapbook in chronological order and the pages of the book have been tied into three bundles ff 1-46, ff 47-96 and ff 97-142
- Physical characteristics
Foliation: This file has been foliated in the top right hand front corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. of each folio with a pencil number enclosed in a circle.
- Written in
- English in Latin script View the complete information for this record
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- Reference
- Mss Eur F126/24
- Title
- Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan
- Pages
- 49v:51r, 94r:94v
- Author
- Saturday Review
- Usage terms
- Public Domain