Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎43r] (87/312)

1 so it is rTecessa^tOl^uljsequenrT^f^mvannT
Oabul, it should have a few weeks, or better still, a
few months of fine weather before ifc, in which the
commissariat officers can be tested in that most
difficult performance—obtaining supplies in an
enemy's country. Sir Henry Havelock insists, as
we have already insisted, upon the necessity
1 of undivided counsels. It is a matter of
history that the want of agreement between
the political and military leaders of the |
last Cabul Expedition was the primary cause !
of disaster. There are plenty of soldiers in India
with wide political experience. We have the example
of Henry Lawrence, Oubram, Nicholson, Mackeson,
and a dozen others to prove that the •oldierlike
instinct is not lost by political training.
One point regarding the proposed march through
the mountain ranges which intervene between us and J
Shere Ali's dominion requires careful consideration.
Commencing at the point where the Indus separates
our valley of Agrore from the mountains of Swat
right down to the Gomul Pass, the whole hill range
is inhabited by wild, lawless tribes, who have "
never been on friendly terms with us. Whether
subsidizing them liberally will induce them to hold
aloof from attacking or even harassing our army
] n its transit through their passes is a very ques-
i tionable matter. We must remember that whereas
the Ameer, though nominally the Sovereign of the
greater majority of these clans, has never troubled
them, we have been compelled to undertake no
less than 30 different expeditions against them.
That many of them are bitterly hostile to us is well
known, and it may safely be assumed that in a
march through their mountains we should have
ever to be prepared for attack ; -and when we i
remember that from Swat down to Vaziristan there j
are upwards of 100,000 well armed men, it behoves;!
us to be very careful not to have too many lines ofj
communication between our field of operations and
I our base. Two or three lines well held are worth !
I a dozen ope n to attack. That these tribes would j
a coalesce is a matter of impossibility. "When we
hear that steps are being taken for subsidizing
H the Khyberis, we may rest assured that, however i
much money we pay away, the robber instinct is |
too strong within them to prevent their swooping i
| down whenever occasion offers. It is wise and I
prudent not only to bribe them freely, but to I
endeavour to obtain hostages for their good i
I behaviour.
The text of the various letters addressed by Lord .
5 Lytton to the Ameer disproves completely the state-1
ments that Shere Ali's conduct was the result of ^
f- discourtesy on the part of our Government. Firm i
and dignified in their language, they are couched !
so that no offence could be taken, and yet the i
Ameer has vouchsafed no answer to them. This I
alone gives an unpleasant tone to the contretemps |
of the 21st inst.; while from Sir Neville Chamber
Iain's missive to the Commander at Ali Musjid ii I
appears that our Envoy was aware that the Ameer'i i
officials were endeavouring to induce the Khyber;
Malliks to oppose the advance of the Mission. Ii
they had succeeded in this, no display of hostility
on the part of the Afghan troops would have been ne
cessary ; for had the Afridis who dwell at the mouth
of the pass barred the approach of the Envoy,
Shere Ali could have excused himself on the
ground of his inability to control these
mountaineers. No such excuse is open to him now.
Either the Mir Akhor acted under the Ameer's
direct orders, in which case war appears inevitable,
or he wantonly exceeded his instructions—conduct
: that will require the sternest punishment from the
hands of the Cabul ruler.
1 From Allahabad comes a rumour that Brigadier-
General Biddulph, II.A., Commanding at Mooltan,
is deputed to reinforce Quettah. Mooltan is the head
quarters of the Indus steam flotilla, and is well
5 within direct rail communication with the Punjab.
It would be quite possible, therefore, to move tha
i troops destined for this column by steamer down
J to Shikarpoor in a couple of days. Th(
1 vessels are usually accompanied by flats lashed
alongside ; these could be converted into trooj
boats with perfect ease, and thus reduce the
time that would be occupied in the march of th«
force to Quettah. Here we would desire to cor-
! rect an error which crept into yesterday's article on
; this subject ; that frontier post is 175 miles from
Jacobabad, not 60.
General Roberta, it appears, is to command the
Koorum column. His post as commandant of
; the Punjab Frontier force fits him peculiarly
i for this' duty, for Thall is in the limits of his
command. Even as a corps of observa-
j tion, his position will be a difficult one. His
proximity to Khost is sure to give offence tc
^ ; the fanatical Mahomedans of that valley, and will
cause a general unpleasantness throughout the
Zadran and Muaeul country. Khost is garrisoned .
sycaoq oq. jprcq ^uas naaq OA^q soosnjoi ouiuthj oqq. i
f> ars 'paanssB ajre sdoio uum^tns eq^ '^^aupanqB uaipjj ssq
pw jpjq^ ijno ijniod spjiaouwra aqj, 'dtssoS Sai^og: pun
wnouuu 9SfBj jo qno gmduM^s aq^ pcre aapjo jo axraaiqsijq
oqq. jo j ^otpa tre e^uSpunoad oa pan 'ssstujamb ui r
paApsano ssassod 'an^jiA osi^owd oq. sn SutijsanLaa 'unqf) j
Maxjj ssauqSjjj piuadmi 8 iq pan 'iaiapBoy pjuadmi eqq
[ 0 eq^ 'aSo^oQ eqa jo aapTjeg eq^ raojj spsuoraara .
paAiaoaa aABq •^uauijapjiMaq puu ijsna^sip jo aoafqo
>qn eq sb anoinni j^pidod Xq pa^uasaadajstui os uoaq
'eq ^nnoo aqij jo ^uamujaAoS eq^ jo woi^j^siaitapB ano
JSnEaaa snmai arm onsai ' htci S. tvt sassaaduno - ani 'aw ..
'htvf " ffjjr
LONDON. SATURDAY,
We learn from Simla that Nawab An honorific title; an official acting as a provincial deputy ruler in South Asia; or a significant Muslim landowner in nineteenth century India. Gholam
Hussein Khan, the Viceroy's special envoy to
Cabul, has returned to Peshawur. Lieut.-General
Crawford Chamberlain has been mentioned by
several of the Indian newspapers as the pro
bable commander-in-chief of any expeditionary
force which may be sent into Afghanistan. It is
believed in Berlin that the question will not lead
to any explanations between England and
Eussia.
i We have quoted on a previous occasion tha,
statements made by Lord Lytton and by Lord
George Hamilton , when Under Secretary oi
State for India, with respect to our frontier policy#
Both these authorities have described it as Im
perial rather than merely Indian. The lattex.
declared that it is " mainly dependent for its
" solution on the foreign policy of her Majesty's
" Government." In the face of language such as
this it is something more than idle to contend that
the frontier policy of Lord Lytton is that of Lord
Canning , Lord Nobthbeook , Lord Mayo , and
Lord Lawrence , unless it is also contended that
those statesmen adapted their measures by a pro
phetic instinct to the future policy of the the*
non-existent Government of Lord Beaconseield*
Another supposition is indeed theoretically pos
sible, but it will be disavowed with equal warmth
and promptitude by the present Peime Minister
and by his predecessor. Neither of them is
likely to admit that the foreign policy of Lord
Beaconsfieu ) is simply a continuance and de-"
velopment of that of Mr. Gladstone . If, there*
fore, our Indian frontier policy is a part of our
foreign policy, reflecting and depending upon it,
the accession of Lord Beaconseield to office
must have revolutionised it; and the attempt to
; abate alarms, or at any rate to allay un-
: easiness, by representing that Lord LyttoK
is simply continuing the policy of Lord Can-
j ning . Lord Lawrence , Lord Mayo , and Lord
i Northbrook , is to say what is contradicted not
only by obvious And notorious facts, 'but by the
unequivocal declarations of the agents of the nevf
Anglo-Indian Imperialism.
Our Indian policy as administered by Lord
Lytton is then part of our foreign policy as con*
ceived by Lord Beaconseield ; and we must
look to what has occurred in Europe for thf;
explanation of what is taking place in Asiar
Eesistance to Russia by the maintenance upon hef
I frontiers of Mohammedan Sovereigns nominally
independent, but protected by and practically
subject to us, this is Lord Beacon seield's policy
both in Europe and in Asia. The partial failure of
the European branch of the scheme has simply
quickened the zeal with which the Asian side of it
is cultivated. Whimsically parodying and per*
verting the policy of Canning , Lord Beacons*
field would recall the older world of Asia into
renewed existence to redress the balance of the newer
world of Europe. In the Anglo-Turkish Conventiou
Lord Beaconseield saw the means of undoing in
effect, and of effacing in the minds of his country
men, his defeat and surrender in the Congress at
1 Berlin. The occupation and virtual annexatioh
of Cyprus and the protectorate over Asia Minor
were the first ostensible steps in the realisation of
a project much dearer to the heart, or per
haps we ought rather to- say much more fascina
ting to the imagination of Lord Beaconseield,
than any diplomatic successes which were at all
possible to him in Europe. The statement that
our frontier policy in India is an indivisible part
of the general foreign policy of her Majesty's
Government conveys, however, but a fragment of
the truth, which it presents moreover in the form
most suitable to the House of Commons and to
public opinion in this country. Our foreign
policy under Lord Beaconseield is essentially
Asiatic in its origin and in its ultimate aims ; the
position of England in Europe is to him chiefly
important as it affects the grandeur and security
of our Eastern Empire. In small things as in
great this subordination of England to India, and
of Europe to Asia, may be traced in Lord Bea
conseield's administration, from' the vulgar and
tawdry title conferred on, or rather assumed by,
the QtrEEN to the meditated control or pro
tectorate of Asiatic Turkey. The degra-
so it is riec"ssa^^^faS^u^sequenTT^^^Sr^aTin^
Cabul, it should have a few weeks, or better still, a
few months of fine weather before it, in which the
commissariat officers can be tested in that most
difficult performance—obtaining supplies in an
enemy's country. Sir Henry Havelock insists, as
we have already insisted, upon the necessity
of undivided counsels. It is a matter of
history that the want of agreement between
the political and military leaders of the |
last Cabul Expedition was the primary cause '
of disaster. There are plenty of soldiers in India
with wide political experience. We have the example
of Henry Lawrence, Outram, Nicfiolson, Mackeson,
and a dozen others to prove that the toldierlike
instinct is not lost by political training.
One point regarding the proposed march through
the mountain ranges which intervene between us and
Shere Ali's dominion requires careful consideration.
Commencing at the point where the Indus separates
our valley of Agrore from the mountains of Swat
right down to the Gomul Pass, the whole hill range
is inhabited by wild, lawless tribes, who have
never been on friendly terms with us. Whether
subsidizing them liberally will induce them to hold
aloof from attacking or even harassing our army
in its transit through their passes is a very ques
tionable matter. We must remember that whereas
the Ameer, though nominally the Sovereign of the
greater majority of these clans, has never troubled
them, we have been compelled to undertake no
less than 30 diflerent expeditions against them.
That many of them are bitterly hostile to ua is well
known, and it may safely be assumed that in a
march through their mountains we should have
ever to be prepared for attack ; -and when we j
remember that from Swat down to Vaziristan there i
are upwards of 100,000 well armed men, it behoves-;'
us to be very careful not to have too many lines ofl
| communication between our field of operations and
our base. Two or three lines well held are worth
• a dozen open to attack. That these tribes would
coalesce is a matter oF impossibility. When we
hear that steps are being taken for subsidizing
the Khyberis, we may rest assured that, however
much money we pay away, the robber instinct is
too strong within tnem to prevent their swooping
| down whenever occasion offers. It is wise and
j prudent not only to bribe them freely, but to
I endeavour to obtain hostages for their good
i behaviour.
I The text of the various letters addressed by Lord
1 Lytton to the Ameer disproves completely the state-
i ments that Shere Ali's conduct was the result of
i discourtesy on the part of our Government. Firm
| and dignified in their language, they are couched
so that no offence could be taken, and yet the,
' Ameer has vouchsafed no answer to them. This
alone gives an unpleasant tone to the contretemp,
of the 21st inst.; while from Sir Neville Chambfer
Iain's missive to the Commander at Ali Musjid ii
appears that our Envoy was aware that the Ameer'i
officials were endeavouring to induce the Khyber;
Malliks to oppose the advance of the Mission. Il
they had succeeded in this, no display of hostility
on the part of the Afghan troops would have been ne
cessary ; for had the Afridis who dwell at the mouth
of the pass barred the approach of the Envoy,
Shere Ali could have excused himself on the
ground of his inability to control these
mountaineers. No such excuse is open to him now.
Either the Mir Akhor acted under the Ameer's
direct orders, in which case war appears inevitable,
or he wantonly exceeded his instructions—conduct
; that will require the sternest punishment from the
hands of the Cabul ruler.
From Allahabad comes a rumour that Brigadier-
General Biddulph, R. A., Commanding at Mooltan,
is deputed to reinforce Quettah. Mooltan is the head-
1 quarters of the Indus steam flotilla, and is well
j within direct rail communication with the Punjab.
It would be quite possible, therefore, to move tha
troops destined for this column by steamer down
i to Shikarpoor in a couple of days. Th(
vessels are usually accompanied by fiats lashed
alongside ; these could be converted into trooj
boats with perfect ease, and thus reduce the
time that would be occupied in the march of ths
force to Quettah. Here we would desire to cor-
i rect an error which crept into yesterday's article on
this subject ; that frontier post is 175 miles from
Jacobabad, not 60.
General Roberta, it appears, is to command the
Koorum column. His post as commandant of
the Punjab Frontier force fits him pe3uliarly
for this duty, for Thall is in the limits of his
command. Even as a corps of observa-
j tion, his position will be a difficult one. His
proximity to Khost is sure to give offence tc
the fanatical Mahomedans of that valley, and will
Lse a general unpleasantness throughout th«
Zadran and Mungul country. Khost is garrisonec
by Afghan troops, so that should this column ad
vance on Ghuznee it will be threatened on its lefi
flank by the Khostwals and their equally fanatical
neighbours the Zadrans.
As we have before pointed out, it will be the
height of folly to advance in small bodiea
It is impossible to say what opposition maj
be offered to each individual column. Inter
communication is impossible ; each one musl
depend on itself entirely ; and we must remember
that juzails and tulwars are not the only arms the
j Afghans possess. The batteries of guns presented to
the Ameer in 1868, and the 18,000 stand of rifles in
that year and on subsequent occasions, will
all tend to increase the difficulties of forcing the
sses. We are not anxious to exaggerate the
work before us, but it must be clearly understood
that there are elements in the case which did not
exist in 1842, and every precaution should be taken
to prevent mistakes. Ir active operations are post
poned until the spring, as will probably prove to
be the case, everything should be ready for an
advance directly the season permits.
'Ktuf " ftjJ'r
LONDON, SATURDAY, SEPT. 28.
We learn from Simla that Hawab Gholam
Hussem Khan, the Viceroy's special envoy to
Cabul, has returned to Peshawur, Lieut.-General
Crawford Chamberlain has been mentioned by
several of the Indian newspapers as the pro
bable commander-in-chief of any expeditionary
forde which may be sent into Afghanistan. It is
believed in Berlin that the question will not lead
to any explanations between England and
Russia.
i We have quoted on a previous occasion th&
! statements made by Lord L ytton and by Lord
G eorge H amilton , when Under Secretary oi
State for India, with respect to our frontier policy.
Both these authorities have described it as Im
perial rather than merely Indian. The lattei
declared that it is " mainly dependent for its
" solution on the foreign policy of her M ajesty' s
"Government." In the face of language such as
this it is something more than idle to contend that
the frontier policy of Lord L ytton is that of Lord
C anning , Lord N oethbrook , Lord M ayo , and
Lord L awrence , unless it is also contended that
those statesmen adapted their measures by a pro
phetic instinct to the future policy of the the®
non-existent Government of Lord B eaconsiteliv
Another supposition is indeed theoretically pos«
sible, but it will be disavowed with equal warmth
and promptitude by the present P rime M inister
and by his predecessor. Neither of them is
likely to admit that the foreign policy of Lord
B eaconsfie I i D is simply a continuance and de-"
velopment of that of Mr. G ladstone . If, there-'
fore, our Indian frontier policy is a part of our
foreign policy, reflecting and depending upon it,
the accession of Lord B eaconsfield to office
must have revolutionised it; and the attempt to
1 abate alarms, or at any rate to allay un-
: easiness, by representing that Lord lyttos
is simply continuing the policy of Lord C an-
| ning . Lord L awrence , Lord M ayo , and Lord
1 N orthbrook , is to say what is contradicted not
only by obvious and notorious facts, "but by th(
unequivocal declarations of the agents of the nevf
Anglo-Indian Imperialism.
Our Indian policy as administered by Lord
L ytton is then part of our foreign policy as con*
ceived by Lord B eaconsfield ; and we must
look to what has occurred in Europe for thf;
explanation of what is taking place in Asia*
Resistance to Russia by the maintenance upon hef
| frontiers of Mohammedan Sovereigns nominally
independent, but protected by and practically
subject to us, this is Lord B eaconseield's policy
both in Europe and in Asia. The partial failure of
the European branch of the scheme has simply
quickened the zeal with which the Asian side of it
is cultivated. Whimsically parodying and per*
verting the policy of C anning , Lord B eacons-*
field would recall the older world of Asia into
renewed existence to redress the balance of the newer
world of Europe. In the Anglo-Turkish Conventiou
Lord B eaconsfield saw the means of undoing in
effect, and of effacing in the minds of his country
men, his defeat and surrender in the Congress at
Berlin. The occupation and virtual annexatioh
of Cyprus and the protectorate over Asia Minor
were the first ostensible steps in the realisation of
a project much dearer to the heart, or per
haps we ought rather to- say much more fascina
ting to the imagination of Lord B eaconsfield,
than any diplomatic successes which were at all
possible to him in Europe. The statement that
our frontier policy in India is an iadivisible part
of the general foreign policy of her M ajesty' s
Government conveys, however, but a fragment of
the truth, which it presents moreover in the form
most suitable to the House of Commons and to
public opinion in this country. Our foreign
policy under Lord B eaconsfield is essentially
Asiatic in its origin and in its ultimate aims ; tha
position of England in Europe is to him chiefly
important as it affects the grandeur and security
of our Eastern Empire. In small things as iu
great this subordination of England to India, and
of Europe to Asia, may be traced in Lord B ea-
consfield's administration, from" the vulgar and
tawdry title conferred on, or rather assumed by,
the Qt /een to the meditated control or pro
tectorate of Asiatic Turkey. The degra-