Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎42r] (85/312)

pear that au army, by adopting Captain Mainwaring's
route, would not only avoid the most dangerous part of
the Khoord Cabul Pass, but would be able to command and
turn it.
The above information I have on the authority of a
brother officer of the late Captain Mainwaring, who was
himself with General Nott's force, and who, from his per
sonal knowledge of the country, is fully convinced of the
military importance of the route pointed out by the
Yours faithfully,
ALEX. CALLANDER, Lieut.-Col. Bengal
Broadstairs, Sept. 25. Staff Corps.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir,—When a great emergency arises—great, perhaps,
more from the pressure of time than from its own in
herent magnitude—it becomes every Englishman who may
have special knowledge on the subject to contribute his
share to the public understanding of the question, irrespec
tive of political feeling. It appears to me that such a crisis
has arisen, and now exists, with regard to our method of
dealing with the Afghan question. This is only another
phase of the Eastern Question ; of the unavoidable and
undeniable rivalry for position between England and
Russia in th® East.
My reason for writing now is the evident unwillingness
of the Government to admit the importance of the crisis
and the consequent fear that we shall let the favourable
opportunity for beneficial action slip from our hands till it
is too late.
What is the position ? Deservedly or undeservedly, by
our own bringing about, or quite unavoidably,—I do not
stop to argue that question now, for it is not pressing and
will keep,—we have received a deliberate slap in the face
before the eyes of assembled Asia and Europe looking on-
I It is impossible to exaggerate the effect of this on the
excitable and ignorant minds of the people of Asia, both
those under our own rule in India and those who come un
der the influence of Russia, all the way from the Ural moun
tains to the Oxns, and from the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. to the North
Sea. Throughout this vast extent,wherever the news is told
of what occurred at Ali Musjid, in the Khyber, on the 21s,
of September, it will be said that England is rebuffed and
humiliatfed ; that she has submitted to insult; and in
proportion our influence, that is our power—for in Asia in
fluence is power—will go down and that of Russia be exalted.
We cannot reason this feeling away. It is to as little pur
pose to say that, knowing it to be erroneous, we can afford
to disregard it.
Those who know the East best are aware that it is a
tangible reality ; that the blow we have received ought to
be wiped out without delay if it is not to do us lasting
injury. Instead of being fully prepared for an event that
in India at all events, must have been anticipated for the
last two years, we appear to be hesitating, uncertain, and
about to adopt half measures. We read of 3,000 troops
being sent to Quettah, of the assembling of 5,000
more at Mooltan, and of a reserve at Peshawur ; of a
possible advance next spring through the Bolan Pass to
Candahar, and perhaps to Herat.
This is all trifling with the question. It is also,
in my humble judgment, proof of a miscalculation
of the military bearings of the matter, as well as
an underrating of its political importance. People
talk of advancing to Candahar, with Herat as the
objective point, and of thus occupying the southern , half
of the Ameer's kingdom, disregarding Cabul, and leaving
him to repent at leisure. It appears to me that this would
be but to confirm him in his recalcitrancy, and to throw
him more than ever, and almost of necessity, into the arms
of Russia.
A totally different course seems to mo the wiser, the
safer, and the most economical in the end. If I venture
to express an opinion upon it, it is because I have watched
every phase of this question since, as a boy, I was present
when, in December, 1838—40 years ago—our army crossed
the Sutlej for the first Afghan campaign. My father
became the historian of that campaign ; and at the end
of it—in 1840—ha pointed out the error which we
had then committed of taking a too divergent line
of advance to Cabul, and |this error we seem to be on
the point of repeating now, with far less excuse. He
pointed out then that the Goomul Pass, far south of the
Khyber, and debouching from our Indus frontier direct
upon Ghuznee, was the route which should have been
taken. Since then the Khoorum Pass has been discovered
to be a still more direct route.
We seem about to put off the matter till after the winter
—that is, till April. Who knows what turn the
Roumelian question may have taken by then, or whether
we shall be as free to act as we are now ?
In my belief Shere Ali ought still to have a locus pomi-
tentioe afforded him ; he ought to have three weeks given
him to disavow or reconsider his action, and our prepara
tions, pushed on without delay, should be fully completed
by that time. If by the 15th of October he did not retract,
apologize for the insult inflicted on us, and consent to re
ceive our representative, an advance should be made on
Cabul direct by the Khoorum, the Khyber, and the Goomul i
Passes, simultaneously with one to Candahar by the Bolan. I
If this is undertaken with sufficient force—not less than !
25,000 as against Cabul and 15,000 as against Candahar,
including the etappen troops for keeping open the long
lines of communication—and with a very strong proportion
of British infantry in each column, our forces ought to
reach Cabul by the end of the third week of November,
and Uandahar by the 10th of December. There is no extreme
cold or snow to speak of till some days later at each place
respectively. With a proper supply of sheepskin coats to our
soldiers and :to every native follower, whose number ought
to be cut down to the lowest scale, there is no reason why a
winter in Afghanistan should be formidable. Our troops
found it endurable enotigh through the two winters of 1839
and 1840. Share Ali should be given to understand distinctly
that we do not desire to displace him or to take his king
dom ; but that he has no choice but to be on the closest
and most friendly relations with us, to the exclusion of
Russia ; that we cannot afford to have a doubtful Power
at the very gates of India, any more than within our
borders, and that we do not intend to tolerate it.
Russia has no power to interfere if we act thus promptly.
If the matter is postponed till April, and especially if we
commit the glaring mistake of occupying the southern
half of Afghanistan, instead of dealing with Shere Ali in
his capital, we may have Russia interposing in an " un
official war in Cabul at the Ameer's solicitation, as she
did in Servia in 1876.
I trust we shall avoid, at the very outset of this business,
the fatal error of that year—of divided counsels and a
divide 1 have noti ona word to.unfw aa
to the line many Liberals, myself among them, took
upon the Bulgarian Question. I thought then, and I do
still, that our course at the Constantinople Conference
should have been to set ourselves first right with the out
raged moral sense of Europe by insisting upon Turkey con
ceding the International Commission which all Europe de
manded. Having obtained that concession from her we
should have been in a position to place ourselves
openly upon her side by demanding firmly and un
mistakably that she should have 12 months to
carry out her reforms. If we had taken that course,with
England, Austria, and Turkey arrayed against her, Russia
would never have crossed the Pruth, and there would have
been no war. "We lost the opportunity of thus anticipat
ing, forestalling, and checkmating Russia, because we an
nounced beforehand that we would put no coercive pressure
upon Turkey; and she consequently laughed at us. What
followed ? The continued opposition that some Liberals
made was a conscientious and not a factious one. We
felt that England could not take Turkey's part until she
i had first coerced her to do right. Hence divided counsels,
loss of the time for action, the game thrown entirely into
| Russia's hands, and the Anglo-Turkish Convention, and
a eventually this Afghan complication.
I trust we shall not commit the same mistake now. This
is not the moment for Liberals or Conservatives to indulge
in mutual recrimination as to what or who brought about
this Afghan trouble. There will be plenty of time to dis
tribute the praise and blame of what has happened here
after. This is the time to be united and to act, for benefi
cial action can only be obtained by prompt decision.
To enter Afghanistan with insufficient force is to invite
disaster ; to delay till after the spring is to run the risk
of multiplied fresh complications in Europe as well as in
Asia. We have the opportunity now of showing ourselves
swift to act and strong to punish affront, as well as, I hope,
moderate and magnanimous when our power has been vin
dicated and our just rights acknowledged. Prompt action
now, with a sufficient force, will put off the possibility of
Russian interference in Afghanistan—that is, in India—'
for the next 30 years. The advantages in favour of action
before winter instead of at the end of next April are most
weighty.
But the feasibilty of acting at once is a question that
must be decided wholly by the Indian military authorities.
The preparations have been theirs ; they know the details ;
theirs must be the responsibility also. It will not speak
favourably for military organization in India if the admis
sion has to be made that action must be postponed till
spring. But to make a great and striking success is so
obviously the main consideration that postponement is
infinitely preferable to any risk of failure,
I have never held that Russia intends to invade India,
but I have said, and, with more recent knowledge gained
among themselves during 1877, 1 repeat it unhesitatingly>
that if the settlement of the question whose influence is
to predominate south of the Oxus is left open for
12 or 15 years, until Russia has two lines of railway com
plete—the one from Tiflis to Teheran, Meshed, and
Herat, and the other from Orenburg to Tashkend and Bok
hara—the Central Asian question will come upon us when
Russia has recouped the financial drain of the late war, and
her reserve system is developed in a manner which will re
quire A booklet formed of a single gathering of nested bifolia. all the resources of the British Empire to meet and
overcome.
Now we can settle the matter comparatively easily, as
between us and the Ameer alone. Then, if it come simul
taneously with the re-ripening of the South Bulgarian
j question, which the Berlin Conference has left open, it
will array half Europe and all Asia in arms. Prompti
tude of decision now, especially as to the real military
bearings of the case, will be the strictest economy of
money and life hereafter, as it will also be the truest
friendliness to Afghanistan, to Russia, and to ourselves.
I am, Sir, yours faithfully,
September 25. H. M. HAVELOOK.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir,—Will you allow one who knows well the tribes on
our North-Westem frontier of India to state briefly that if
we wish to retain our prestige in the East there must be no
' 'AMWU'IO '
jo siiBara ojapoca jo eaptsssosu sqij
^ Soipiooou {spr^io !>n9i3U8 eqi uaqiSuaa ^s oa papus ^ut sjb
iuk juiaAOs 10} p ^qdaia^uoD usaq e-veq 8 J{ joav ossqj,
aqna^d aqi pa® OAtJg 9q^ Sai^oojaa^o 'op'Bi§[8<.j paiqsq
I]iq uo s!}qnop9J §nt^09J3 st ejaauiSua josd-tooy
•93 'ijas 'aavamaa
•VIAHgg
•8a9J40j; 9q^ ^q p3Ai909J it^qBanoABj
q jjias . suoi^nxBpap 9£oq^ ^"sq^ 9doq b S9ss9idx9 uqsBj
pear that an army, by adopting Captain Mainwaring's
route, would not only avoid the most dangerous part of
the Khoord Cabul Pass, but would be able to command and
turn it.
The above information I have on the authority of a
brother officer of the late Captain Mainwaring, who was
himself with General Nott's force, and who, from his per
sonal knowledge of the country, is fully convinced of the
military importance of the route pointed out by the
Afghan. Yours faithfully,
ALEX. CALL AN DER, Lieut.-Col. Bengal
Broadstairs, Sept. 25. Staff Corps.
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir,—When a great emergency arises—great, perhaps,
more from the pressure of time than from its own in
herent magnitude—it becomes every Englishman who may
have special knowledge on the subject to contribute his
, share to the public understanding of the question, irrespec
tive of political feeling. It appears to me that such a crisis
has arisen, and now exists, with regard to our method of
dealing with the Afghan question. This is only another
phase of the Eastern Question ; of the unavoidable and
undeniable rivalry for position between England and
Russia in the East.
My reason for writing now is the evident unwillingness
of the Government to admit the importance of the crisis
and the consequent fear that we shall let the favourable
opportunity for beneficial action slip from our hands till it
is too late.
What is the position ? Deservedly or undeservedly, by
our own bringing about, or quite unavoidably,—I do not
stop to argue that question now, for it is not pressing and
will keep,—we have received a deliberate slap in the face
before the eyes of assembled Asia and Europe looking on-
It is impossible to exaggerate the effect of this on the
excitable and ignorant minds of the people of Asia, both
those under our own rule in India and those who come un
der the influence ef Russia, allthe way from the Ural moun
tains to the Oxus, and from the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. to the North
Sea. Throughout this vast extent, wherever the news is told
of what occurred at Ali Musjid, in the Khyber, on the 218,
of September, it will be said that England is rebuffed and
humiliatted ; that she has submitted to insult; and in
proportion our influence, that is our power—for in Asia in
fluence is power—will go down and that of Russia be exalted.
"We cannot reason this feeling away. It is to as little pur
pose to say that, knowing it to be erroneous, we can afford
to disregard it.
Those who know the East best are aware that it is a
tangible reality ; that the blow we have received ought to
be wiped out without delay if it is not to do us lasting
injury. Instead of being fully prepared for an event that
in India at all events, must have been anticipated for the
last two years, we appear to be hesitating, uncertain, and
about to adopt half measures. We read of 3,000 troops
being sent to Quettah, of the assembling of 6,000
more at Mooltan, and of a reserve at Peshawur ; of a
possible advance next spring through the Bolan Pass to
Candahar, and perhaps to Herat.
This is all trifling with the question. It is also,
in my humble judgment, proof of a miscalculation
of the military bearings of the matter, as well as
an underrating of its political importance. People
talk of advancing to Candahar, with Herat as the
objective point, and of thus occupying the southern , half
of the Ameer's kingdom, disregarding Cabul, and leaving
him to repent at leisure. It appears to me that this would
be but to confirm him in his recalcitrancy, and to throw
him more than ever, and almost of necessity, into the arms
of Russia.
A totally different course seems to me the wiser, the
safer, and the most economical in the end. If I venture
to express an opinion upon it, it is because I have watched
every phase of this question since, as a boy, I was present
when, in December, 1838—40 years ago—our army crossed
the Sutlej for the first Afghan campaign. My father
became the historian of that campaign ; and at the end
of it—in 1840—ha pointed out the error which we
had then committed of taking a too divergent line
of advance to Cabul, and |this error we seem to be on
the point of repeating now, with far less excuse. He
pointed out then that the Goomul Pass, far south of the
Khyber, and debouching from onr Indus frontier direct
upon Ghuznee, was the route which should have been
taken. Since then the Khoorum Pass has been discovered
to be a still more direct route.
We seem about to put off the matter till after the winter
—that is, till April. Who knows what turn the
Roumelian question may have taken by then, or whether
we shall be as free to act as we are now ?
In my belief Shere Ali ought still to have a locus pomi-
tentice afforded him ; he ought to have three weeks given
him to disavow or reconsider bis action, and our prepara
tions, pushed on without delay, should be fully completed
by that time. If by the 15th of October he did not retract,
apologize for the insult inflicted on us, and consent to re
ceive our representative, an advance should be made on
Cabul direct by the Khoorum, the Khyber, and the Goomul
Passes, simultaneously with one to Candahar by the Bolan.
If this is undertaken with sufficient force—not less than
25,000 as against Cabul and 15,000 as against Candahar,
including the etappen troops for keeping open the long
lines of communication—and with a very strong proportion
of British infantry in each column, our forces ought to
reach Cabul by the end of the third week of November,
and Oandahar by the 10th of December. There is no extreme
cold or snow to speak of till some days later at each place
respectively. With a proper supply of sheepskin coats to our
soldiers and to every native follower, whose number ought
to be cut down to the lowest scale, there is no reason why a
winter in Afghanistan should be formidable. Our troops
found it endurable enough through the two winters of 1839
and 1840. Suere Ali should be given to understand distinctly
that we do not desire to displace him or to take his king
dom ; but that he has no choice but to be on the closest
and most friendly relations with us, to the exclusion of
Russia ; that we cannot afford to have a doubtful Power
at the very gates of India, any more than within our
borders, and that we do not intend to tolerate it.
Russia has no power to interfere if we act thus promptly.
If the matter is postponed till April, and especially if we
commit the glaring mistake of occupying the southern
half of Afghanistan, instead of dealing with Shere Ali in
his capital, we may have Russia interposing in an " un
official " war in Cabul at the Ameer's solicitation, as she
did in Servia in 1876.
I trust we shall avoid, at the very outset of this business,
the fatal error of that year—of divided counsels and a
dipidad natiaa a i; t have not o ne word to.uns^y as
to the lino many Liberals, myself among them, took
upon the Bulgarian Question. I thought then, and I do
still, that our course at the Constantinople Conference
should have been to set ourselves first right with the out
raged moral sense of Europe by insisting upon Turkey con
ceding the International Commission which all Europe de
manded. Having obtained that concession from her we
should have been in a position to place ourselves
openly upon her side by demanding firmly and un
mistakably that she should have 12 months to
carry out her reforms. If we had taken that course,with
England, Austria, and Turkey arrayed against her, Russia
would never have crossed the Pruth, and there would have
been no war. We lost the opportunity of thus anticipat
ing, forestalling, and checkmating Russia, because we an
nounced beforehand that we would put no coercive pressure
upon Turkey; and she consequently laughed at us. What
followed ? The continued opposition that some Liberals
made was a conscientious and not a factious one. We
felt that England could not take Turkey's part until she
had first coerced her to do right. Hence divided counsels,
loss of the time for action, the game thrown entirely into
Russia's hands, and the Anglo-Turkish Convention, and
eventually this Afghan complication.
I trust we shall not commit the same mistake now. This
is not the moment for Liberals or Conservatives to indulge
in mutual recrimination as to what or who brought about
this Afghan trouble. There will be plenty of time to dis
tribute the praise and blame of what has happened here
after. This is the time to be united and to act, for benefi
cial action can only be obtained by prompt decision.
To enter Afghanistan with insufficient force is to invite
disaster ; to delay till after the spring is to run the risk
of multiplied fresh complications in Europe as well as in
Asia. We have the opportunity now of showing ourselves
swift to act and strong to punish affront, as well as, I hope,
moderate and magnanimous when our power has been vin
dicated and our just rights acknowledged. Prompt action
now, with a sufficient force, will put off the possibility of
Russian interference in Afghanistan—that is, in India—
for the next 30 years. The advantages in favour of action
before winter instead of at the end of next April are most
weighty.
But the feasibilty of acting at once is a question that
must be decided wholly by the Indian military authorities.
The preparations have been theirs ; they know the details ;
theirs must be the responsibility also. It will not speak
favourably for military organization in India if the admis
sion has to be made that action must be postponed till
spring. But to make a great and striking success is so
obviously the main consideration that postponement is
infinitely preferable to any risk of failure.
I have never held that Russia intends to invade India,
but I have said, and, with more recent knowledge gained
among themselves during 1877,1 repeat it unhesitatingly}
that if the settlement of the question whose influence is
to predominate south of the Oxus is left open for
12 or 15 years, until Russia has two lines of railway com-
plete—the one from Tiflis to Teheran, Meshed, and
Herat, and the other from Orenburg to Tashkend and Bok
hara—the Central Asian question will come upon us when
Russia has recouped the financial drain of the late war, and
her reserve system is developed in a manner which will re
quire A booklet formed of a single gathering of nested bifolia. all the resources of the British Empire to meet and
overcome.
Now we can settle the matter comparatively easily, as
between uh and the Ameer alone. Then, if it come simul
taneously with the re-ripening of the South Bulgarian
question, which the Berlin Conference has left open, it
will array half Europe and all Asia in arms. Prompti
tude of decision now, especially as to the real military
bearings of the case, will be the strictest economy of
money and life hereafter, as it will also be the truest
friendliness to Afghanistan, to Russia, and to ourselves.
X am, Sir, yours faithfully,
September 25. H. M. HAVELOOK,
TO THE EDITOR OF THE TIMES.
Sir,—Will you allow one who knows well the tribes on
our North-Western frontier of India to state briefly that if
we wish to retain our prestige in the East there must be no
dilly-dallying in resenting so gross an insult as has been
offered to England by this Afghan barbarian ?
At Peshawur, a few miles only from Fort Jumrood
which commands the entrance to the Khyber Pass, is a fine
force of some 7,000, of all arms, in the highest state of effi
ciency. I have no hesitation in saying the only response to
the insolent refusal to allow our Mission to pass through
the Khyber was to have called up this force, and for Sir
Neville Chamberlain to have then and there accepted the
challenge, and to have forced his way through.
The tale Mufti Shah and Mir Akhqr would have carried
to Shere Ali would have brought him very speedily to his
senses. Our name would have stood high in every In
dian bazaar, and diplomacy could then have done the
rest.
Retirement in the eyes of those frontier warriors was, I
fear, a mistake ; whereas taking up a position beyond the
Khyber, while supports would have speedily held the Pass,
would have been sufficient till the Viceroy could satisfy
himself Shere Ali was responsible for the insult offered.
Yours obediently,
September 25. BELOOCHEB.