Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎41r] (83/312)

"V,/' fyh 2?."
INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN.
CALCUTTA, S ept . 26.
Numerous additional regiments have been warned
to prepare for service.
There are serious disturbances in the province of
Seisfcan.
The Quettah garrison will be strongly reinforced.
Troops are to be concentrated at Thall, at the en-
tr nee to the Koorum Valley.
Negotiations are in progress with the Khiberie
tribes.
The Government will await for the present the
possibility of a favourable outcome of events,
adopting an attitude of armed expectation.
PARIS, Sept. 26.
The French Press, though acknowledging the
gravity of the Afghanistan difficulty, does not as yet
devote much attention to it. The Temps sees three
courses open—an ulterior understanding with the
Ameer, the occupation and annexation of the
passes still open, and an offensive war. As to the
last contingency, the struggle would be so costly,
and England would be so embarrassed to know
what to do with Afghanistan, that it would
not be undertaken except in case of absolute
necessity. The Dibats trusts the quarrel
will be confined to the Ameer and England,
in which case the result will be the partial
or total annexation of Afghanistan, for the blunders
committed in former expeditions would be avoided.
England will probably be satisfied with a severe
chastisement of the Ameer and the occupation of
the chief passes, in which case she would have no
further cause of anxiety. The Repuhlique Frangaise
discusses the strategy of an Anglo-Russian conflict
in the East, which it regards a» ultimately inevit
able, though the present difficulty may not lead to
it. The Univers thinks England will lose her
prestige in India and run the risk of a general rising
if she does not resent the affront ; but it argues
that to force the passes would be a very hazardous
operation, and would have the appearance of a
campaign against Russia. The France does not'
apprehend an Anglo-Russian war, but regards a
localized war as inevitable. The LibertS holds
England's right to punish the Ameer unquestion
able, and does not believe Russia will intervene.
M. VamWry, iu the Allgemeine Zeitung, declares
that the conflict between England and Russia,
which he has for 14 years been laughed at for pre
dicting, is now imminent. It could have been
avoided had English statesmen not been so
obstinate and deaf to disinterested counsels. Sir
N. Obamberlain was sent too .late. M. VamMry
also suspects Russia of designs on Kashgar, which
in her hands would bo a commercial and political
blow for England. He thinks it ridiculous to
suppose that the ordering of a small force from
Kuldja to the frontier station Scharkode can be
designed merely to guard against the Chinese in
road.
LONDON, FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 27, 18781 ,,,
Our news from India this morning is of the same
general tenour as our news of yesterday. The prepa
rations for war are in full progress. Our troops are
being concentrated at several points on the Afghan
frontier ; the garrison at Quettah will be strongly
reinforced ; and numerous regiments, in addition
to those already on the move, have received orders
to hold themselves ready for service. We have no
precise information as yet as to the immediate inten
tions of the Indian Government. The belief seems to
prevail that the actual invasion of Afghanistan will
be put off until next spring. The Government, our
Correspondent sends us word, will wait for the
present the possibility of a favourable outcome of
events, and will adopt meanwhile an attitude of
armed expectation. But this is the course they |
would naturally have followed in any case. The j
question is for how long a time the expectant;
attitude is to be maintained. Shebe Ali , as. our
correspondent, Sir H. Havelook , suggests, may
have a short time allowed him within which he
may submit and make reparation for the insult he
has offered us. Or the limit of our patience may
be fixed only by the military requirements of the
case, and we may advance into Afghanistan as
soon as our forces are in readiness. Some delay there
must be. Time will bo needed for bringing up
Jay troop s in sufficient numbers, and their first
movoments wul, of course, be on Indian soil. If
Shere Ali is minded to submit, he will have an
abundant opportunity for doing so before we can
pass his frontier linb. if he does not avail himself
of this, there would seem no good reason for
extending his time of penitence any longer
than our own convenience may dictate. He
must be well aware already of what he has
to expect from us. His recent outrage was only
the last and greatest of a long series of discourte
sies. We can hardly venture to hope that he will
suddenly change at the near view of what he must
long havo had before his eyes, or that he will
turn aside at the prospect of consequences which he
has been doing his utmost to bring about. If he
does thus prove unexpectedly docile, he will
be able to make his peace before hostile operations
can begin on our part. The concentration of our
troops is a threat, and this he may venture to dis
regard. We have more faith in the efficacy of the
blow which will follow, and to delay this needlessly
would be interpreted both by him and by others
as a sign, not of moderation, but of conscious
weakness. If we are to do anything before winter,
no time must be lost ; and it is satisfactory to
know that up to this moment no time has been
lost. If Sheee ®Ali wishes to avert war, the '
interval we are, in any case, compelled to grant
him will be long enough in all reason. It would
be mere folly to wasto a single day in despatching
snore messages while our former messages remain
unanswered, or in making inquiries as to his pre
sent disposition and waiting in expectation of bul
letins announcing a favourable change. It must be
a question for our military authorities whether it
is possible to move on Aighanistan before winter.
There are abundant reasons why, if possible, it
■hould be done. Our impetuous correspondent,
'Ubloocheb ,'* thinks, indeed, that we have waited
too long already, and that an immediate advance
of our troops from Peshawur was the only fitting
reply to the gross insult put upon us at Ali
Musjid. But if the retirement of our Mission was
a mistake—and we by no means admit that it was
—it would be a graver mistake still to delay our
return in force one moment longer than we
need. As long as we postpone our attack, we
appear to be sitting down tamely under our
wrongs. In six months' time the world, no doubt,
will be undeceived; but it is a pity that the Asiatic
world, at all events, should not, if possible, be un
deceived a little sooner.
We see no room for doubt that the unfriendliness
of S hebe A xi to England has been very largely tho
work of Russian agents. The savage temper of
the Ameeb has been wrought upon and his suspi
cions roused for the purpose, apparently, of creating
an Afghan difficulty, and so distracting England
from attention to Eastern affairs elsewhere. The
design, if such it be, is not very likely to succeed.
The credulous Ameeb has far more reason to pray
to be delivered from his friends than England has ,
to be delivered from her foes. It is with no appre
hension that we need look on the prospect of a
breach with Afghanistan. Our relations with that
country have been so exceedingly troublesome that
we may rather welcome a crisis that promises to
settle them definitively. If a choice of time had
been offered us, we could scarcely have fixed on any
which would have been more favourable than the
present. A few more weeks before winter would
have been the utmost we could have wished for,
and we may perhaps find that we do not nted even
these. We have now the chance of making a final
arrangement of our North-West frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. question,
and we are not likely to let it pass. In whatever
way our quarrel with the Ameeb may be ended,
whether it be by war or by his submission without
war, the terms on which we shall insist must be
such as will leave no Afghan difficulty for the
future. We have to insure that our influence in
Afghanistan shall be supreme. We cannot leave
the country as a clear field for the arms Or the
diplomacy of Russia. There will be no two opinions
in England as to the only course open to us. Our
Afghan policy has never varied with the change of
parties at home. It is fixed, indeed, by circum
stances wholly independent of party. If we are to
hold India, we must make odr^elves safe^ with
Aighanistan. That a crisis has^arrived, and that
our action has been altered in accordance with
it during the present year, is a matter of mere ac
cident. It is no new impulse that has led us to in
terfere more closely than before with the affairs of
Afghanistan. It is the old impulse acting in a new
way! and only so acting because a new Ciuae of