Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎31r] (62/312)

1 some of these epistolary incentives; the subsidy
1 ho might count upon receiving fronj his ally,
openly or privately, is also set forth ; and even
at the remote date when the papers to which
we refer came to the knowledge of the Indian
Government it is certain that Russian money
was largely current already in the bazaars of
Cabul and Jellalabad. It may of course have
I come legitimately in the way of trade from the
I Orenburg caravans—perhaps it did; and the awk
ward revelations which have been transmitted to
Simla by some of these semi-official communica
tions may be indignantly disowned at St. Peters
burg—perhaps they will. But it would be
interesting to bring them to the notice of Prince
i Gortsciiakoff , and to learn whether certain
other experiments which are said to have been
made by Russian agents on the cupidity or
! ambition of some of our great feudatory
1 Princes in India were equally unauthorised
j by Russia and disconnected with her Asiatic j
policy. Muscovite statesmanship is accustomed I
to disown abruptly any detected enterprise 1
of the kind, and probably the explanations
we should receive would leave little to be
desired in this way. With prominent com
manders like General Kaupfmann and re
gularly appointed diplomatic envoys like General
Abramoff , however, another course has usually
been adopted. When Khiva was practically
annexed in violation of the solemn promise from
the Czar conveyed to Lord Granville by;
Count Schouvalofp , the apology offered was
that the force of circumstances had proved too
strong for the Emperor and his servants. The
\fait accompli was pointed to with a diplomatic
j shrug in reply to all our remonstrances, and Mr.
t Gladstone's Cabinet rested content with it. i
Yet no military necessity, as far as Central Asia 1
1 w^ concerned, operated to cause the expeditions i
to the Oxus, while the mission of a Russian I
envoy to Cabul was a glaring breach of faith and
pledge, which—as Muscovite organs confess—was \
devised as a hostile counter-stroke, and has had j
the mischjevous results expected from the step. J
It cannot but appear, therefore, absolutely in
cumbent to demand the withdrawal of the Czar's
agent at Cabul without delay. Nothing less than
this, in our judgment, could meet the necessity
of the case, if amicable relations are to be pre
served between England and Russia, for nothing
less can establish a conviction that what has
happened was designed under different circum- j
stances and against a contingency which has j
never arisen. Russia has no sort of business,
political, commercial, or military, in a frontier
Indian State which must remain either inde
pendent or else become feudatory to he? Majesty;
and, with whatever diplomatic politeness the
demand may be accompanied, nothing short of
prompt compliance with jt can remove the
universal suspicion that the Afghan Ruler has
been but a puppet in the hands of that Power
which perpetually moves towards India by
Constantinople, and towards Constantinople by
India.
In presence of the Imperial crisis thus arising
it is satisfactory to see that the reckless agitation
which gave Russia so much advantage in the re
cent war hasnot again reared itsunpatrioticfront.
No voices of the least authority have so far denied
that our course in this matter is simple and plain,
and that for the honour and safety of the Empire
we must make the reparation for the rebuff
We have received as public and signal as the
outrageous affront itself. An ignorant utter
ance here and there talks indeed of " altered
policy" and " disastrous possibilities but when
events change policies must be accommodated to
meet them, and Lord Lawrence himself would
not now maintain an attitude of " masterly inac
tivity " with a Russian agent domiciled in Cabul,
and such intrigues as we have alluded to brought
to the knowledge of the Indian Government. In
this and that pro-Russian quarter it is feebly pre
tended that our Mission was too strong in escort,
and that Shere Ali might be excused, perchance,
for objecting to the retinue of a thousand armed
men who accompanied Sir Neville Chamber
lain . But these glib advocates would do well
to take notice of the announcement made by
our Special Correspondent at Simla to the effect
that two preparatory letters had been sent to the
j Ameer by Lord Lytton , at intervals, one after
! the other, explaining the friendly significance of
| the Mission, and that to neither of these was
any answer vouchsafed by the arrogant Afghan.
[ Moreover, the Khyber Pass is not a road which
j a British Mission could be expected to enter
■ without a sufficient body-guard ; nor did Shere
Ali himself come down to ^Lahore to meet
Lord Mayo without a becoming attendance.
The character, however, of what has happened
is only too obvious, and its rectificotion must be
decisive and prompt. The Ruler of Cabul may,
perhaps, endeavour to temporise and extenuate,
but this ought not to stand in the way of clear
insistance and resolute action on our part. The
defiance has been ventured upon in the eyes and
ears of all India, and all India will watch and
j criticise the nature of our reply. No time should
j be lost, and we believe that no time is being lost,
| in demonstrating our perfect readiness to cope ^
with the novel and Binister phenomenon of a
Russian Prince Milan at Cabul. Still such a
phenomenon must not endure too long, and
when we have dealt summarily with it, the yet ,
greater peril behind it must be removed—by
agreement or in some other way—far out of
reach of another experiment upon our frontier- j
peace and authority.
THE INDIAN CRISIS.
THE LETTERS FROM THE
VICEROY TO SHERE ALI.
SIB N. CHAMBERLAIN'S NOTE.
THE SITUATION ON THE FRONTIEB.
VIEWS OF THE BDSSIAN PRESS.
(B y E astern T elegraph.)
(peom our special correspondent.)
BOMBAY, W ednesday.
There is considerable excitement here, as it is
thought probable that if an invasion of Afghanistan
is undertaken, a division will be sent up from Kur-
rachee, by the Indus, to join the forces which will i
operate by the Bholan Pass.
According to the orders at present issued the
situation may be summed up as follows: —
One column of eight thousand men has assembled
at Mooltan to march across to Quetta and
hold the Bholan Pass; six thousand men are
assembling in the Koolum Valley in order to seize
the Kohat Pass and facilitate the entrance of a
third column, which is now forming, into the more
formidable Khyber Pass. When all the three
passes have been seized in order to produce an
effect on the Ameer, an insurrection among the
Afghan tribes, many of whom have long been in a
state of discontent verging upon hostility to the
central Government, is considered probable.
It is believed to be quite possible that Persia,
acting under the advice of Russia, will take advan
tage of the confusion, which will ensue upon our
advance, to make a fresh attempt to capture Herat.
Orders have been at once issued to draw other
bodies of troops, besides those mentioned above,
towards the frontier, with a view of very early
ulterior operations should the course of affairs
render it necessary.
It will be remembered that a most courteous and
friendly letter, written in 1876 by the Viceroy to
the Ameer with a view of discussing and improving
the relations between the British Government and
Afghanistan, has up to this day remained totally
unanswered.
Since that time no communication whatever has
been held with Shere Ali until, on the 14th of
August, the following letter was sent by the Viceroy
from Simla :—
" The authentic intelligence which I have lately
received as to the course of recent events at Cabul
and in the countries bordering on Afghanistan, has
rendered it necessary that I should communicate
fully and without reserve with your Highness upon
matters of importance, which concern the interests
of India and Afghanistan.