Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎29r] (58/312)

them and have others appointed in their stead. I
The men are bad chiefly because the system is bad.
The provinces are plundered, but not to the ad
vantage of the first plunderer. From the lowest to
the highest, each in turn ia forced to yield up his
booty to his next superior, on whom he is de
pendent, and from whom he has purchased
hia place. So things proceed upwards from
rank to rank, and we must go very high
indeed before we come to the first. cause, to
the primum mobile of the meanest village extortion.
The plunder is reaped from many quarters, but
it is to the S ultan and his favourites
that it all comes in the end. Sometimes, in
deed, the demands of the Government are press
ing, and they are met by special requisitions.
The mode of procedure is a simple one. An order
is sent off to some local Governor for the sums
needed, and he has no choice but to produce
them. His services would soon be dispensed with
if he were to be found failing in such a duty as
this. The requirements of the Palace are more
regular, and the method by which they are satis
fied is much the same. The chief difference
is that the course is a little more roundabout.
The whole machinery of government in Asia Minor
is set at work and is kept going in order to meet
the wants of the S ultan or of some one in
direct intercourse with the S ultan —a eunuch,
a female favourite, or, perhaps, some one still
lower, in direct intercourse with these. It ^ ,
is for such recipients that industrious vil- s™
lagers are overtaxed and robbed. The Christians
are not the chief sufferers. These, our Corre- |
epondent says, can mostly manage to make them
selves heard, or can find champions who will
be heard for them. The poor Mussulmans have
no advocates, and it is on them, accordingly, ;;;
that the burden descends and rests in the last
instance.
A sketch auoh aa this shows sufficiently from J
! what quarters an impulse in the direction of reform
is not likely to proceed. We shall not look with
much hope to the governing classes, who have
everything to lose by the change. The S ultan
himself, even if he were willing to move, is tied
hand and foot by social bonds. The influence of
those who are always with him has the best chance
of making itself felt. Ho may listen to remon
strances, and may make promises in reply to
them, but he will soon pass into a company
where no such trouble will be given him, and
where soft entreaties will be made to an effect
precisely the opposite of the former ones. Turkey,
it would appear, must be reformed altogether, or
it cannot be reformed at all. The task, our Cor-1
respondent says, will be diflicult, and this we can
well believe. It is gratifying, however, after all
the proof he has given ua of its difficulty,
to learn that he is still of opinion that the difficul-
ties are not insuperable. It is to the Palace he
points as the place in which a beginning must bo
made. We are shown the Augean stables, and
we get a hint, moreover, of the hero who is to un
dertake the cleansing of them. It is to the na
tional deputies that our Correspondent looks as the
most available agents of reform, but the unwilling
ness of the S ultan and his Ministers to call them
together, and so put arms into their hands, must be
overcome first,and this will not be overcome easily.
" 9^6 vW. /d/- ?^r
L HI ,
ENGLAND AND AFG HANISTAN. 1
(through beuter's agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. .)
♦SIMLA, S ept . 24.
Orders have been issued for the concentration
of troops on the Afghan frontier, with a view of
undertaking very early ulterior operations should
circumstances render military action necessary.
It is understood that Sir Neville Chamberlain's
mission has been dissolved. Gholam Hvissein
Khan, the envoy sent by the Viceroy to Cabul
with a letter from his Excellency to the Ameer,
has been recalled.
i General Sir Neville Chamberlain will resume his
commmand at Madras.
A force under General Roberts will be des
patched to the Koorum Valley, and a column of
6,000 men will assemble at Mooltan. A force of
8,000 men will bd^jtent to Quetta.
Active military preparations are being made at I
Rawul Pindee. ^
| * Delayed in transmission ,
j T he latest intelligence from India shows that
! the authorities there are making energetic pre- r
1 parations for active military operations in \
Afghanistan. We have had occasion before, and
shall have again, to characterize as it deserves the
foolish and reckless policy which has led us into i
the present difficulty, and which, if it be not
checked, will plunge us further into embar
rassment. But the most immediate subject
of interest is what are we going to do,
and how are we goihg to do it ? The tele
gram from our Special Correspondent at Simla
which we published yesterday gives an outline of
the preparations made to exact reparation for the
insult offered to the British Representative. Ac
cording to our Correspondent these preparations
are not as yet on a lafg-o scale. The garrison of
i Quettah is to be reinforced by 3,000 additional
troops, a reserve of 6,000 men is to bo assembled
' at Sukkhur, in the north of Scinde, early in
November, and a column of 4,000 men will be
brought to Thull in order to enter Afghanistan
through the Khoorum Pass. The Khoonl'm Pass
is situate near Bunnoo and is south of the Khy-
ber, being separated from the Cabul valley by a
range of mountains called the Sufaid Koh.
The superiority of this route over the traditional
entrance by the Khyber Pass is very great. The
road by the Khoorum Valley leads through an
open country inhabited by peaceful husbandmen
supposed to be friendly to England, and by it a
point only seventy miles from Cabul can easily
be reached. It strikes at right angles the main
road from Candahar and Ghuznee to Cabul. Con
sequently there is no reason why the last seventy
miles to the capital should present any great
difficulty.
According to our Correspondent no attack
on Cabul is contemplated, and our operations
will be restricted to a mere military demonstration
in support, we presume, of diplomatic action. It,
however, seems to have been overlooked by the
Government of India that the A ^ eer may decline
to be impressed by this demonstration, and by his
conduct may render more serious operations neces
sary. It certainly is difficult to believe that a column
of only 4,000 men, with long communications,
skirting a mountain range from which desultory
attacks on our convoys may with certainty be
anticipated, is likely to be looked upon
by S here A li as a very serious danger.
Unless, indeed, other columns advanced
simultaneously by other routes, and all the
communications were strongly guarded by
etappen troops, the Khoorum column would
run no slight danger of destruction. We must
suppose, therefore, that a strong column will
also be sent through the Khyber. That our
army will immediately advance by the Bolan
Pass on Candahar and Ghuznee seems improbable.
It would take some time to collect and organize
the force, and the distance from the Scinde fron
tier to Candahar is 300 miles. The distance
between Candahar and Cabul ia nearly 200 miles.
The passes between these two towns are closed
by the snow as early sometimes as
November. For the present purpose, there
fore, little can be accomplished by the
Quettah-Candahar route. It is scarcely probable
that all preparations could be made for an expedi
tionary force at Peshawur before the end of the
first week in October at the earliest, and the
season for active operations would be over
about the 7th December, thus giving about
sixty available days. The distance between Jum-
rood and Cabul is about seventeen marches.
Allowing for halting days, the Journey would, for
an army of ordinary dimensions, and not encum
bered by much baggage, occupy about three
weeks. It would therefore be possible to march
to Cabul, capture it, destroy the fortifications,
and return either to Jellalabad or British ter
ritory before the setting in of the winter.
Only a force advancing through the Khyber, how
ever, could accomplish this. The question is
whether it is better to undertake a feat of this
sort while so greatly hampered by considerations
of time, or to put off serious operations till
the spring, when everything will be ready for a
crushing blow. Unless we send a force through
the Khyber the utmost we could accomplish
before the winter would be the capture and occu
pation of Candahar. By so doing we should
to a great extent cut off the A meer from
Southern and Western Afghanistan, for by
} far the best road from ^abul to Herat