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Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎25v] (51/312)

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The record is made up of 1 volume (150 folios). It was created in 07 Sep 1878-19 Oct 1878. It was written in English. The original is part of the British Library: India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. Records and Private Papers Documents collected in a private capacity. .

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LONDON, WEDNESDA Y i SEPTEMBER2h.
Oar special correspondent telegraphs from
{ Simla that orders have issued for the concen-
j tration of troops at the Thull entrance to the
Kurrum Valley, and also at Qnetta above the
Bolan Pass. Hopes are entertained that nego
tiations in which the Commissioner at Peshawur
is engaged, with the object of detaching the
JKhyberxees, will be successful. The Cabul Mis
sion has been broken up, and Sir Neville Cham-
1 berlain returns to Simla at once.
A telegram of yesterday's date from St.
Petersburg affirms that in the best informed
quarters there the supposition of an understand
ing existing between Russia and Afghanistan is
held to be purely imaginary. It is added, on the
same authority, that no grounds are known to
justify such imputations and conjectures.
Lord Lytton is preparing to act, in the crisis
that has arisen upon our Indian frontier, with a
spirit becoming the Government which has been
so openly insulted and defied by the Ameer
Shbre Ali . It will be seen by our telegraphic
despatch from Simla that orders have been issued
for the immediate concentration of troops at two
important points; while in the Khyber itself,
where the British Mission has been so arrogantly
stayed, negotiations are on foot which aim at
detaching the tribes of the pass from subservience
to Cabul, and rendering them friendly to our
selves. This, as our telegram states, is by no
means beyond the range of a well-founded hope,
for the Ameer had already threatened the Khy-
berees with his displeasure for their amicable ten
dencies towards the British, and these hill-people
are removed from the influence of the Russian
agent at Cabul, who has apparently persuaded
She,be Ali to affront us. It will be remembered
that before Sir Neville Chamberlain started
for Peshawur arrangements had been made with
the Khyberees for a peaceful passage through
their defiles, and, as guarantees of this, hostages
had been sent down into British territory in con
formity with the border practice. If the present
negotiation prospers the lower portion of the
Khyber at least will be thrown open to us ;
but the mountaineers will want very distinct
assurances as to our intentions, and here, as in
every other aspect of this matter, a clear, reso
lute, and well-considered policy must be acted
upon. That such a policy would be followed, as
it is, by the Viceroy was to be expected, for the
alternative of hostile behaviour on the part of
the Afghan ruler must have been canvassed at
Simla before the Mission departed. We have,
moreover, welcome proofs of it in the addi
tional intelligence communicated by our de- j
spatch. The points of concentration chosen for
the British troops have great significance to those
who study the frontier map with well-informed
eyes. A force is to be at once assembled in the
entrance of the Kurrum Pass at a spot called
Thul. This lies between Kohat and Bannu,
both British military centres, and is the gate
way of a mountain road which goes by Kurrum
fort, by the Paiwar and the Shaturgardan, directly
to Cabul. (^uetta, the other point where our
troops are to be gathered, is at the northern or
outside end of the Bolan Pass, and was already
held in force by her Majesty's arms ; but this
position, which has now become very valuable,
admits us by an easy road, if necessary, to Can-
dahar. Thence by Kalat-i-Ghilzi and Ghazni
there is an open route to Cabul; although,
indeed, to occupy Candahar would of itself give
us control of Southern and Western Afghanistan,
and possibly lead to the flight of Shbre Ali,
if he were not more quickly disposed of by the
disaffected among his nobles and people. Thus
by three different approaches the Government
of India is. already indicating its determination
to try conclusions with the Ameer ; and, while
an armed demonstration by two of the routes
to his' capital is well calculated to perplex the
military schemes of Shere Ali , the occupation
of Candahar would be, we beheve, the best step
which coul(|i be taken as a means of bringing
him to his Reuses. The inhabitants of this part
of the country are, on the whole, favourably
disposed towards us, and the passage of the
defiles would become a less imperative duty
when the Ameer had once been outflanked and
menaced by a British force holding Candahar
?,nd the Tarnek Valley.
I It is not, perhaps, without relevance to the
bonduct of Shere Ali and the frontier ques-
jtion that our Special Correspondent at Simla
jalludes to the necessity which has arisen for
strengthening the British naval squadron in the
^ Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . Between Persia and Afghanistan
S there exists indeed little love. The attacks here-
itofore made on Herat and the Seistan dispute
have left bad blood behind, and Teheran would
never be likely to sympathise much with Cabul.
But with Russia behind all these hostile in
trigues, and far too influential in Persia, we
may need to be strong in the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. for
other causes than the piracies which are re
ported there ; and it is satisfactory on all ac
counts to know that a large addition to our force
in these important waters will be at once made.
That the gross insult to British power offered
by the Ameer-has its origin in Russian machina-
tions cannot for one instant be doubted. No
thing is more certain than that Shere Ali
would never have dared to close the confines of
his kingdom against Sir Neville Chamberlain
except upon encouragement from the Musco
vite Commissioner at present resident in Cabul.
A few years ago this very Prince was gladly
receiving gifts from the British Government
and begging us to send such a Mission as that!
which has just been stopped under threat of
compulsion ; and if, later on, at the time of Sir
Lewis Pelly's conference, Shere Ali objected
! to admit a British Resident to his capital, the
reason alleged was that in that case it would
be so difficult to keep a Russian representative
away. Now we witness the Czar's agent enter-
t|iined at Cabul with every demonstration* of
abaity, and the Queen's envoy repulsed in a
manner which all India recognises as a studied
tnd notorious insult. It is quite impossible, we I
fepeat, that Shere Ali would have taken such
h course without special incentive. He may
be besotted with opium or hemp, he may be
morose and desperate at the death of his
favourite boy, Abdullah Jan ; but that which
we witness is a policy, not a passionate freak,
and the Russian agent must have promised him
enough, in the Czar's name, to supply the requi
site audacity for' the order. In fact, the semi
official organs of St. Petersburg do not .give
themselves the trouble to deny what must
be sufficiently obvious. The Nord, writing
somewhat impudently upon the feeling excited
in this country by the news from Peshawur,
admits that the Oxus expedition was despatched
" to the British address," and sa^s, " It was
very natural that Russia, threatened with a
maritime blockade, should endeavour to seek
her enemies at that point where it was be
lieved they were vulnerable, and should
make a diversion in the direction of India
to the expected attack of the Indian contin
gents transported to Europe. It is true that
the effective of these contingents was just suffi
cient peaceably to conquer Cyprus from Turkey,
and that the fire which Indian troops were des
tined to light on the shores of the Black Sea
reduced itself to a harmless squib. But the most
elementary prudence recommended to the Rus
sian Government to take this demonstration as a
serious one. When peace was made the expedi- j
tion of the Oxus became a dead letter, and will 1
only be revived as a measure of defence. Eng
land is doubtless aware of this, but the mere
eventuality of a Russian advance in the direc
tion of the Indian Empire is sufficient to terrify
her." We have as yet no news of this same
Oxus expedition, but Shere Ali probably ;
knows where it is and what it aimed at, while
we see the fruits of the Russian Mission to
Cabul, which—dead against the solemn pledges
of Prince Gortschakoff —formed part of the
total " diversion." It is beyond argument,
therefore, that the insolent behaviour of the
Afghan ruler owes its inspiration to Russia, nor
is such a fact in the least surprising to persons
well informed about Eastern affairs. But what
is the position to-day of those who told us that
there was no possible connection between the
Eastern Question and India, and that the
" sisterly voice " of Russia boded nothing save
blessing to us and the world ? They see now
—and they ought to see with shame and silence
—that the Asiatic and European conspiracies
went abreast; while as for the plea that these
Oxus and Afghan plots were answers to our
Indian contingent, it is a shameless falsehood.

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Content

Press cuttings from British and Indian Newspapers regarding the Afghan War (today known as the 2nd Afghan-Anglo War), negotiations in Cabul [Kabul], the British Government's policy with regards to the Indian Frontier, and the movements of the Russians during the war.

The cuttings have been taken from a number of newspapers including the Pall Mall Budget , The Pall Mall Gazette , The Globe , The Times , The Pioneer Mail , The Standard , The Daily News , The Daily Telegraph , The Evening Standard , The Saturday Review , The Spectator , The Morning Post and The World .

Extent and format
1 volume (150 folios)
Arrangement

The cuttings have been arranged in the scrapbook in chronological order and the pages of the book have been tied into three bundles ff 1-46, ff 47-96 and ff 97-142

Physical characteristics

Foliation: This file has been foliated in the top right hand front corner of the recto The front of a sheet of paper or leaf, often abbreviated to 'r'. of each folio with a pencil number enclosed in a circle.

Written in
English in Latin script
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Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎25v] (51/312), British Library: India Office Records and Private Papers, Mss Eur F126/24, in Qatar Digital Library <https://www.qdl.qa/archive/81055/vdc_100024093679.0x000034> [accessed 11 June 2026]

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