Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎22v] (45/312)

countrymen, and the alarm raised in the minds of tlie
English Government by Russia's intrigues in Persia.
In those days Ferozepore was the extreme limit of
our power in the north-west, and there on the 29th
of November, 1838, the Governor General held his
! hrsfc meeting with Kunjeet Singh, the Lion of
Lahore. During several days these visits of cere
mony continued, and round the banks of the Sutlej
there assembled as gallant a display of British
troops and Sikh soldiers as has ever been seen, for
it was the Army of the Indus. But before this
the siege of Herat had been raised, and the
intrepidity of Eldred Pottinger, to whom
this country has not realised its great
debt, had repulsed that last assault against its
walls on the 24th of June. It was resolved ac
cordingly to reduce the proportions of the army
assembled at Ferozepore, and not to send the whole
force across the Indus. The Bengal contingent,
when reduced, numbered some nine thousand
men, and there was a special corps, under
Shuja-ul-Mulk, of six thousand more. It was
this force which left Ferozepore and advanced
on Candahar, through Bhawnlpore and Khelat.
Shuja-ul-Mulk and his English allies were
to strike against Dost Mahomed through the
Eholan Pass and Quettah; Runjeet Singh and
his Sikhs from Peshawur and the Khyber. But in
order to reach Khelat we had to pass through the
territory of the Ameers of Scinde, and between
them and Runjeet Singh, as well as with
Shuja-ul-Mulk, there were various questions in dis
pute, notably the Shikarporo dimculty. These
were settled for the time in that unavoidably
arbitrary manner which must be followed when
matters have progressed so far as for a large army to
have received instructions to advance. The " army
of the Indus " had received such orders. It was to
march on the Bholan, and to obey it had to pass
through the territory of the Ameers of Scinde.
Englishmen of the present generation are fortunate
in not being compelled to resort to the same
expedients to reach Cabul that their fathers were
j v, hen I ottinger and Bumes were our representatives
j at JHyderabad (Scinde) and Khyrpore. The task of
striking at Cabul from Peshawur and the
Khyber had to be confided to Sikhs, whose
sympathies with the cause soon became equivocal;
and to reach Khelat and Candahar we had to adopt
a line of action that was distasteful to some of our
best officers. There was another English army in
the field also, that of Sir John Keane, from Bom
bay, whence it had reached the mouths of the
Indus by sea.
This triple army—the Bengal column, under
Sir Willoughby Cotton; the Bombay column,
under Sir John Keane; and the contingent under
Shuja-ul-Mulk—made its way through Scinde
upon the Bholan. On the 4th of April it ren
dezvoused at Quettah, having traversed the Bholan
in safety, and without difficulty. On the 6th
Sir John Keane arrived and assumed the com-
j mand of the whole army, and on the 9th and
| 10th it was traversing the Kojuck Pass on the road ;
: to Candahar. On the 25th of April we appeared
before the walls of that city, the principal place in
southern Afghanistan, which opened its gates without
any resistance, and Shuja-ul-Mulk was received with
acclamation by a small section of the Sudosye
faction, or rather so it appeared at first. But, in
truth, it was not so. Whatever sentiment of
loyalty the family of Ahmed Khan had once
attracted to itself had long since disappeared,
and Shah Shuja returned almost as a stranger to
the land of his ancestors. On the 8th of May it
was resolved that the formal ceremonial of
installing the Sudosye as ruler should take place,
and a grand review was announced to be held in the
plains outside the city. But whether this foreign dis
play was the means of alienating Afghan sympathy,
or some other cause was at work to mar the har- 1
mony of the occasion, there is no doubt that the
momentary ebullition of loyalty shown by some of
the Afghans had given place to an apathy that was
clearly evidenced by the fact that not a hundred
Afghans attended the grandceremonialwhichmarked
the return of the Durani Monarch. Dost Mahomed
had entrusted the defence of Candahar to his
brother, Kohundil Khan, but on the approach of
the invading army Kohundil and several of his
brothers fled, nor paused until they found
safety within the Persian frontier. But Dost
Mahomed, the ablest and the most famed of the
Barucksye brotherhood, still ruled in Cabul and
Ghizni and fill the northern country. Whilst our
army lingered at Candahar a brigade was despatched
under Colonel Sale to occupy Girishk, on the road
to Herat, in case Kohundil Khan should endeavour
to rally his disheartened followers. Yet the delay
at Candahar was not wholly unemployed. Pre
parations were made for a forward movement,
and negotiations were opened up with the Ghiljie
clans. In the former some progress was made, in
the latter scarcely any.
During the two months' stay at Candahar
a certain amount of supplies had been collected,
and on the 27th of June the British army
resumed its forward movement, this time
through the Ghiljie country, upon Ghizni. Sir
John lieane appeared before the walls of that cele
brated fortress on the 2l8t of July, and there he
found Hyder Gholam, Dost Mahomed's son, in
command, with Af/ul Khan in the vicmity in
charge of a corps of cavalry. Since the days of
Mahmoud of Ghizni and Mahomed of Giior this
city fortress has been famed among the Afghans. ;
As Kaye puts it, its strength was their boast, and ,
Dost Mahomed anticipated that the force of the in
vasion would be broken before its impregnable walls.
On the other hand, strange to say, our Commander
was disposed to consider that the reputation of
Ghizni was undeserved, and he had accordingly
advanced against it with only his field guns, and
without any regular train. But a glance at the
walls of Ghizni showed our Commander that it did
not beiie its reputation, and that it was a place of
| great strength, both by nature and by art. Yet
; was an English army to be turned a.side in its
j march, even by the formidable ramparts of this
i stronghold, and its resolute garrison under the
King's son ? The English General resolved that ifc
should not, and, in the absence of his battering
train, formed his plans for its capture by assault.
To our ally, Shah Shnja, it was incomprehensible
how we intended to break into the iron-girt fortress.
While the Afghan prince was troubled with the im
possibility of breaching the walls. Sir John Keane
and his engineers were busy seeking which gate should
be blown in. A nephew of Dost Mahomed, Abdul
Rashid Khan, had deserted the Barucksye cause, and
it was from him that our General learnt that ail the
gates had been walled up with the exception of the
Cabul Gate. The Cabul Gate was the one weak ,
point in the armour of Ghizui, and it was decided
to eti'ect an entrance at that portion of the fortifica
tion. Early in the morning of the 23d of July,
1839, the storming party and its supports, con
sisting of the four English regiments, viz., the 2d, ,
13th, and 17th of the Line, and the Company's!
European Regiment, followed the Engineers and
| Sappers who had gone ahead to explode the mine
placed at the foot of the Cabul Gate. The night
was stormy, and the early dawn was dark and
dreary, weather pre-eminently suited for such a
deed as that which lay before Colonels Dennie and ;
Sale. And in the middle of the night Sir John i
Kean© made a demonstratioA with all his field-
pieces against the western and southern sides
of the fortress. To the north, where the
English Sappers, under Captain Thomson, were busy
j with the real work of the night, all was quiet. After
some hours' cannonade, during which the Afghan
garrison was worried by successive alarms in other
quarters of the city. Sir John Keane's attack died
fitfully away, and all was, for a brief space, tranquil
and serene. But it was only for a brief space.
Captain Thomson had done his work well and
thoroughly. The powder bags had been placed
under the Cabul Gate, and Durand " scraping the
powder with his finger nails," lired the powder
which had failed to ignite on the first application of
the port-fire. With a terrific roar up went the
solid beams and massive masonry of the gate and
its supports, and in rushed the English soldiers.
; The surprise was complete, and our advanced com
panies made good their entuance into the outworks
of the city. After a brief delay, caused by a mistake,
the supports pressed on also, and a desperate
hand-to-hand encounter took place in the narrow
outlet. The Afghans, driven into a corner, and
finding their only avenue for escape barred by the
English soldiers, fought well and stubbornly, and
rushed like wild mountain-cats upon our men. But ■
their desperation served them to little purpose.
■ Ghizni was ours. This great success cost us only
seventeen men killed and one hundred and sixty-five
wounded. The Afghans lost close on one thousand
killed and wounded, in addition to sixteen hundred
prisoners.
But the greatness of the blow is not to be
realised by a comparison of the loss alone on
either side. Dost Mahomed's fortunes were closely
intertwined with the fate of Ghizni, and his whole
plan of campaign was founded on the assumption i
that to capture Ghizni would be a task of months
instead of an affair of a few short hours. The
moment Afzul Khan leamt of its capture
he lied to Cabul with his division, and
earned the ill tidings to his father there.
As our army advanced northward beyond .
^ Ghizni confusion and panic went before it. 'Dost
Mahomed advanced to meet us, and he took up a
position at Urghundeh to bar the road to the
capital. But there was treachery within his army. •'
One by one his sirdars Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. deserted him, and the Ameer
j found himself left with a mere handful of personal £
retainers to check the progress of the victorious
English army. He resigned himself to his fate,
and fled northwards through Cabul. Close on his
track pressed Outram and his five hundred horse- j
men as far as Bamian ; but there they learnt that -
the fugitive Ameer had crossed the Sighan Valley, -
and was passing into the dominions of theUsbeg
ruler of Kundus. Through the treachery of an
Afghan sirdar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. , by name Hadji Khan Khaukur, who
accompanied Outratn, and pretended to be our true
friend, Dost Mahomed escaped the pursuit of the
gallant Outram. The Afghan's treachery did not go
unpunished, and he was for manyyears kept in a state ~
of imprisonment in British India. On the 7th of j
August our army entered Cabul, and Shah Shuja
was placed on the throne he had occupied more
than thirty years before, and upon which his father
and grandsiro had long been seated. With the !
flight of Dost Mahomed and the entry into Cabul
the first act in the Afghan drama terminated. In
the short space of three months a great country had
been conquered, and the resistance of a turbulent <