Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎20r] (40/312)

CORRESPONDENCE.
POPULAR DELUSIONS ABOUT THE AFGHAN WAR.
To the E ditor of the P all M all G azette.
S ir , Lord Carnarvon is reported to have said, in his recent speech
at Teversall, that a British " army " had been destroyed in Afghanistan.
It may be useful, therefore, to say that the "army" in question contained
exactly one European battalion and a couple of batteries of European
artillery, and amounted altogether, Europeans and natives, to what would,
according to Continental ideas, make up an ordinary sized brigade.
The troops which occupied Afghanistan, taken altogether, did not
make up an " army," but only a single division of three brigades; and
Elphinstone was not, as the Daily News styles him to-day, its commander-
in-chief, but simply a major-general commanding a division. One of these
brigades was destroyed, not in open fight, but under circumstances brought
about by a combination of cowardice, indecision, and stupidity on the
part of its leaders such as happily has never been exhibited by British
officers either before or since. The other two brigades at Candahar and
Jellalabad held their ground with perfect ease and small loss. And why does 1
Lord Carnarvon stop at this point of his story, and why does Mr. Baxter,
in his speech at Bervie, propose that a curtain should be drawn across the
scene, as if the rest of the story would not bear telling ? The Afghan war
did not end with the destruction of the Cabul brigade, or even with the |
subsequent defence of Jellalabad and Candahar. The country was reoc-
cupied by our troops in the following summer, and all resistance put down.
Never was there a more completely successful operation than Pollock's
advance on Cabul—the " battles " on the road being in reality little
more than insignificant skirmishes. The work was hard, but the fighting
was slight, the whole loss sustained by Pollock's division from first to
last hardly amounting to what might be looked for from an ordinary
skirmish. We may all of us have our opinions as to the propriety
of this or that policy; but at least let us stick to facts. When
Mr. Baxter says that " there was nothing more terrible in the history of
our Indian possessions than the results of the last campaign in that quarter
of the world," he is talking sheer nonsense. Our last campaign in that
quarter was an almost bloodless one, in which the enemy were driven from
one position after another and the country reoccupied with almost ridi
culous ease.—I am, Sir, your obedient servant, „
September 24. ■ ^ |
LONDON, WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 25, 1878.
The assertion has been made in several quarters
that our conduct in relation to Afghanistan has
undergone essential change during the course of
the last few months. We are, it has been said, no
longer satisfied, as we once were, to leave the
A mekr alone. We have entered with more or less
of disguise upon a policy of aggression, undefined
in its aim, and certain to bring trouble with it in
whatever way it may end. We are now only at the
commencement of the difficulties we have thus
brought upon ourselves. We are threatened with
an Afghan war, but there are greater evils than this
to come afterwards. We shall hear by and by that
Afghanistan is to be occupied and annexed to our
Indian Empire. This will be the result of our
Cabul Mission ; and if we did not intend this result,
it is hard to see why we should hive sent the
Cabul Mission at all. It may be worth while to
inquire into the correctness of these assertions.
That they are not wholly baseless we may
admit without hesitation. We have just done
what a year ago we had no intention of doing,
and we have elicited proof of an unfriendly feeling
on the part of the Ameer of Cabul which a year
ago we were willing to persuade ourselves did not
really exist. Our Afghan policy is, neverthtsless,
the same now that it was then. Its aim has never
varied, and the changes it has undergone have
been brought about under the pressure of changed
oircumstances. That Russia, with the possibility be
fore her of a war with this country, should have done
her utmost to obtain a preponderating influence at
the Court of Oabul was natural enough. That she
•hould persist in her endeavour now that the dan
ger has gone by is another matter. She has
engaged herself not to meddle with the afiairs
of Afghanistan, and it is by her breach of
this engagement that she has forced us to
a course which we should not otherwise have fol
lowed. Our desire is and will be to respect the
Afghan ruler, and to maintain as far as we can the
integrity of his dominions. This was our Afghan
policy as it was stated last year by Lord S alisbubt,
then Secretary for India, and this it is still. But it
is one thing to leave the Afghan ruler to himself,
and another thing to leave him to Russia. If there
is interference from the one side, there must be
interference from the other too. We cannot allow
• Russian Envoy to be received at the Court of
Crtbul while we ourselves are not represented there,
and while the determination thaUwe shall not be
represented not only exists, but has been displayed
with open discourtesy. That it has been at
the instigation of Russia, indeed, that our Oabul
Mission was turned back we cannot believe.
Whatever may be the ultimate views of Russia,
we may at least credit her with a better choice
pf means than this, and with a better sense of
what is and what is not opportune. If our hand
was to be forced, the present moment is as con
venient to us as any could be. It would be a
blundering diplomacy which would seek to bring
about a rupture in Afghanistan at a time when
our whole force, if necessary, can be devoted to
Indian afiairs.
Our essential policy towards Afghanistan is, it
must be remembered, not of our own choosing. It
is imposed upon us by circumstances to which we
cannot be indifferent. We have no wish to be
aggressive neighbours. We should be only too
well content to remain inactive if others were in
active too. But the case is altered when our
boundary line has been passed already, and when
Russian diplomacy has entered on a forbidden field.
We are compelled now to assert a counter-
influence, and to make sure that it shall prevail.
To do nothing would be to surrender Afghanistan
to Russia, or, in other words, to allow the gateway
of India to pass into the hands of a rival and pos
sibly an unfriendly Power, who could select his
own time for turning his position to account. We
have every wish to respect the independence of
Afghanistan, but we must make sure first that it
exists. It is threatened at the present moment by
Russian intrigue as certainly as it could be by
Russian arms. We will not affect to dread a conquest
of India fromAfghanistan or from any other quarter,
jit is a leas danger against which we are driven to
take precautions, but it is one which may prove ex-
ceedingly troublesome if we neglect it in its early
growth. We hold at present an insecure frontier
|line, which we could not defend effectually against
•an enemy on the other side. We are bound, there-
lore, to prevent an enemy from establishing him-
•elf there. Russia may extend herself as she
'pleases in another direction. She must leave
Afghanistan alone. If the Ameer of C abul is not |
•ensible of the danger which he is courting by his
intimacy with Russia, we must be wise for him
and for ourselves. He may be as independent as
he pleases ; but he must so use his rights as not to
invade ours. We should feel it necessary in any