Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎18r] (36/312)

LONDON, TOESDA Y. 24.
"We publish to-day a map of the Suliman range
of mountains which intervenes between India and
, Afghanistan. The map shows the Khyber Pass,
at the entrance of which Sir Neville Chamberlain
has bee n refused admission into Afghanistan.
| T he news of the return to Peshawur of our Oabul
mission, which our Simla Correspondent enabled us
to publish so fully and clearly yesterday morning,
does not seem to diminish in importance as it is
more deliberately considered. A carefully-matured
plan, undertaken by the Viceroy of I ndia , acting
with the entire approval of the Government here,
has been foiled at its first movement. We have
formally applied to the Ameer of C abot , for per
mission to enter into communication with him ;
and his answer has been to bar the door against
us, and threaten to fire upon us if we come any
nearer. If this were the action of some
uncivil or capricious European prince it
might very well be passed over with con
tempt or indifference. We had offered
i to enter into friendly commuuication. and
our offer had been decliuea, Ac.d there would be
nothing more to be done or said on our part. The
discredit of the incivility would fall upon the
uncivil personage, and it would not be regarded
as any business of ours to teach him better
manners. But the English Government cannot
afford to deal thus with an Asiatic prince, and
more especially with the Ameer of C abul . Our
statesmen in office have drawn the attention of
Asia and the whole world to the mission they
were setting on foot, and it is only too certain
that if they now put up with the rebuff they
have received it will become an article of
faith all over Asia, and especially throughout
India, that we can no longer make our will a
power in the East. There is more than this.
When A mphitryon in the great comedy finds
the door closed against him which he bad counted
on finding invitingly open, the bitterness of the
repulse does not lie only or chiefly in the fact that
: he is shut out. The pain is that while he is ex-
| eluded another is welcomed; the gate-which has
been closed in his face shelters the other, who has
found a cordial reception within. It would be
impossible to doubt that already rumour is
announeing all over India that S here A li has
turned back our representatives while he
was entertaining the officers of the Emperor
of E ussia . Unless, then, events should take a
very unexpected turn, unless S here A li should
disavow the act of his servant, and explain and
apologise in some satisfactory way, we presume
that the Viceroy of. I ndia will have to prove that
when England invites herself to a conference with
an Asiatic prince it is not in the power of such
a prince peremptorily to decline the interview.
What does this mean ? War with S here A li,
we must suppose; a war which will cost us many
lives and much money; which cannot possibly
bring us glory or safety, which cannot, however it
end in the present, bear any "finality" with it, and
which may set half Asia aflame. The first move
ment in such a policy is, to use a celebrated com
parison, like a cannon ball fired at random and in
the darkness.
As yet we have no means of knowing whether
| S here A li is acting on his own counsel merely
and in reliance upon his own strength, or whether
he counts upon a force behind him greater than
his own. He was, as we ali know, well inclined
at one time to be our friend—he was even eager
for our friendship. His alliance seems then to have
been renounced by Eussia as hopeless, so certain
did it appear that he had entered into a close
relationship with England. There may have been
sound and substantial reasons for England not
pledging herself to any positive alliance with a
prince like S here A li , but for every such reason
there could certainly be found many far more
valid and clear against converting him into an
enemy first, and endeavouring to force our friendv
ship on him afterwards. AJ1 this is, no doubt,
part of a plan concocted in the enterprising minds
of some of our statesmen. It cannot be merely a
chance incident, an isolated and inconsequential
controversy. It is evidence of the stirring of
Imperial instincts along every frontier line of
ours. We confess that we look with pro-
TOund distrust and even dismay to the
development of Lord Beaconsfield's Asiatic
policy. This first overt act is peculiarly ominous.
^ e are stirring the slumberiHg fires of Asiatic
jealousy and fear everywhere by our recent
doings. The fatal mistake which our Govern
ment made in Europe seems likely to
, be repeated and greatly exaggerated in Asia.
Here we taught province^ and peoples who were
doubtful which way to turn for support
that they must not loolc to us for friend
ship ; there wo seem bent on teaching hesi
tating princes that they must consider us as
their enemies. In each case it is only too obvious
that Ave play the game of Eussia; we play it for
her better than she could have done for herself.
In the particular case of Cabul and S here A li,
Eussia is free to take any course that seems con
venient to her. We are pledged, or all but
pledged, to one particular course. If she has
really set on S here A li to the action he
seems determined on taking, she can afford
him support and comfort enough to vex
and obstruct us without seeming to assume any
actual part in the dispute. No support what
ever, so far as any historical evidence exists, was
given by Eussia to D ost M ohammed forty years
ago when once the struggle between us and him
had fairly begun. If' Eussia set the quarrel
going, she was probably well content to see it go
on as it did. If she has any sinister share in the
business this time, she might perhaps be quite
satisfied when she had seen us perplexed with
the harassing problem of how to deal with S here
A li , and what to do with Cabul, Should she
have any deeper and darker game to play, we
shall have thrown all the advantages into her hands.
We shall have allowed her to choose the
erround for us, and left her free to act how and
when she pleases for herself.
The public of this country would do well
to look the uncomfortable prospect fairly in
the face. It may be that we are in
for a war with S here A li , and such a
war could only close its earlier chapters in the
occupation of Cabul. We should get to Cabul
ao doubt; it would be only a question of so many
Englishmen killed. When we had occupied
Cabul, the question would arise, what we were to
do with it. No one believes that we could
turn the fierce Afghans into docile sub
jects of the British Crown. No one could
have much hope of any abiding advan
tage to come to us of a new attempt to settle
for our own convenience the sovereignty of Cabul.
We should find the business of defending our
Asiatic frontiers made more difficult and compli
cated with every day that we held the Afghan
State; and we should be in much perplexity as to
the possibility of safely renouncing it. We should
have the wolf by the ears; and the man who has
the wolf by the ears is not in good condition to
speak with his enemy, if he have one, at the
gate. , It seems to us that on the very
principles which we may assume Lord
B eacgnsfield and Lord L ytton to have adopted,
this new intervention in the affairs of Cabul is
especially indefensible. It is supposed that we
have a powerful enemy in Asia who is watching
for an opportunity to assail us, and we forthwith
thrust ourselves into a quarrel with a smaller
enemy, in order, it might seem, to give the greater
one the chance of deciding for himself whether
we are in a difficulty sufficient to tempt
him to make the attack. No matter
how the military operations required by
such a policy may end—and, indeed, we are con
fident that they could end but one way—the
effect upon our imperial system could not possibly
be satisfactory. Even Lord B eaoonseield him
self cannot seriously believe that he could beguile
the people of England into a vast scheme of
Asiatic annexations and conquests after the
fashion of A lexander , or some of the fierce
Persian sovereigns who once had the arms
of the Afghan tribes at their disposal. The
present temper of theatrical enterprise will die
away. Ehodomontade will not always pass in
England as the language of statesmanship. What
ever we may borrow from America, we shall not
^ bo rrow the theory o f the " manifest destiny," It
j .101^0 ■prns esnjaj Bjq poBS pmj" "
sv jaunt!; v bvm ^ireptrajap preb ssanjLM. 'aSpu^
o? JOiWsmi np- ^oy '^Aoraaa; "
o'n lopun Baoi^ou ij^sssoan Qrj; ^uupnajap 'oq;
uodn poAJog git pxrc 'atrq iflg* no po^sixa oonmna
^q^poAojd '/nspuotnjoft jo saotrcsmu jo jojoadsm otfl
's-boioujq -jpj—r&ioijox'j jpsuia -b sbm fi^nTjpnajap ^q^'pres
'diqs.io.VL Biq 0} JOAISUB ux 'jpBO'japi nre^dT;^—-ajqunioq
-un ^souqu STJAvaxnoa oq; ssmnautog •sapjXEd qu inoaj^tntqd
-moo ptiof pasmioptrn ^Aisnaqo^jaA ojqav souciom evfl hnv
LONDON, TUESDAY, SEPT. 24.
—— —
We publish to-day a map of tlie Suliman range
of mountains which intervenes between India and
Afghanistan. The map shows the Kliyber Pass,
at the entrance of which Sir Neville Chamberlain
has been refused admission into Afghanistan.
i T he news of the return to Peshawar of our Oabul
mission, which our Simla Correspondent enabled us
to publish so fully and clearly yesterday morning,
does not seem to diminish in importance as it is
more deliberately considered. A carefully-matured
plan, undertaken by the Viceroy of I ndia , acting
with the entire approval of the Government here,
has been foiled at its first movement. We have
formally applied to the Ameer of CABUii for per
mission to enter into communication with him ;
and his answer has been to bar the door against
us, and threaten to fire upon us if we come any
nearer. If this were the action of some
uncivil or capricious European prince it
might very well be passed over with con
tempt or indifference. We had offered
to enter into friendly communication, and
our offer had been decliuea, ccd there would be
nothing more to be done or said on our part. The
discredit of the incivility would fall upon the
uncivil personage, and it would not be regarded
as any business of ours to teach him better
manners. But the English Government cannot
afford to deal thus with an Asiatic prince, and
more especially with the Ameer of C abtjl . Our
statesmen in office have drawn the attention of
Asia and the whole world to the mission they
were setting on foot, and it is only too certain
that if they now put up with the rebuff they
have received it will become an article of
faith all over Asia, and especially throughout
India, that we can no longer make our will a
power in the East. There is more than this.
When A mphiteyon in the great comedy finds
the door closed against him which he had counted
on finding invitingly open, the bitterness of the
repulse does not lie only or chiefly in the fact that
I he is shut out. , The pain is that while he is ex
cluded another is welcomed ; the gate, which has
| been closed in his face shelters the other, who has
found a cordial reception within. It would be
impossible to doubt that already rumour is
announcing all over India that S here A m has
turned back our representatives while he
was entertaining the officers of the Emperor
of E tjssia . Unless, then, events should take a
very unexpected turn, unless S heee A li should
disavow the act of his servant, and explain and
apologise in some satisfactory way, we presume
that the Viceroy of, I ndia will have to prove that
when England invites herself to a conference with
an Asiatic prince it is not in the power of such
a prince peremptorily to decline the interview,
| What does this mean ? War with S here A li,
we must suppose; a war which will cost us many
lives and much money; which cannot possibly
bring us glory or safety, which cannot, however it
end in the present, bear any "finality" with it, and
which may set half Asia aflame. The first move
ment in such a policy is, to use a celebrated com
parison, like a cannon ball fired at random and in
the darkness.
As yet we have no means of knowing whether
i S here A li is acting on his own counsel merely
and in reliance upon his own strength, or whether
he counts upon a force behind him greater than
his own. He was, as we all know, well inclined
• at one time to be our friend—he was even eager
for our friendship. His alliance seems then to have
been renounced by Eussia as hopeless, so certain
did it appear that he had entered into a close
relationship with England. There may have been
sound and substantial reasons for England not
j pledging herself to any positive alliance with a
prince like S here A li , but for every such reason
there could certainly be found many far more
valid and clear against converting him into an
enemy first, and endeavouring to force our friendv
ship on him afterwards. A}1 this is, no doubt,
part of a plan concocted in the enterprising minds
of some of our statesmen. It cannot be merely a
chance incident, an isolated and inconsequential
controversy. It is evidence of the stirring of
Imperial instincts along every frontier line of
ours. We confess that we look with pro
found distrust and even dismay to the
development of Lord B eaconsfield's Asiatic
policy. This first overt act is peculiarly ominous.
We are stirring the slumberiwg fires of Asiatic
jealousy and fear everywhere by our recent I
doings. The fatal mistake which our Govern
ment made in Europe seems likely to
. be repeated and greatly exaggerated in Asia.
Here we taught province^ and peoples who were
doubtful which way Jbo turn for support
r that they must not loolc to us for friend
ship ; there wo seem bent on teaching hesi
tating princes that they must consider us as
their enemies. In each case it is only too obvious
that we play the game of Russia; we play it for
her better than she could have done for "herself.
In the particular case of Cabul and S here A li,
Eussia is free to take any course that seems con
venient to her. We are pledged, or all but
pledged, to one particular course. If she has
really set on S here A li to the action he
seems determined on taking, she can afford
him support and comfort enough to vex
and obstruct us without seeming to assume any
actual part in the dispute. No support what
ever, so far as any historical evidence exists, was I
given by Eussia to D ost M ohammed forty years !
ago when once the struggle between us and him i
had fairly begun. If Eussia set the quarrel :
going, she was probably well content to see it go ;
on as it did. If she has any sinister share in the :
business this time, she might perhaps be quite
satisfied when she had seen us perplexed with
the harassing: problem of how to deal with S here
A li , and what to do with Cabul. Should she
i have any deeper and darker game to play, we
shall have thrown all the advantages into her hands.
We shall have allowed her to choose the
ground for us, and left her free to act how and
when she pleases for herself.
The public of this country would do well
to look the uncomfortable prospect fairly in
the face. It may be that we are in
for a war with S here A li , and such a
war could only close its earlier chapters in the
occupation of Cabul. We should get to Cabul
no doubt; it would be only a question of so many
Englishmen killed. When we had occupied
Cabul, the question would arise, what we were to
do with it. No one believes that we could
turn the fierce Afghans into docile sub
jects of the British Crown. No one could
have much hope of any abiding advan
tage to come to us of a new attempt to settle
for our own convenience the sovereignty of Cabul. '
We should find the business of defending our ;
Asiatic frontiers made more difficult and compli- j
cated with every day that we held the Afghan ■
State; and we should be in much perplexity as to |
the possibility of safely renouncing it. We should
have the wolf by the ears; and the man who has
the wolf by the ears is not in good condition to
speak with his enemy, if he have one, at the
gate. . It seems to us that on the very
principles which we may assume Lord
B eaconsfield and Lord L ytton to have adopted,
this new intervention in the affairs of Cabul is
especially indefensible. It is supposed that we
have a powerful enemy in Asia who is watching
for an opportunity to assail us, and we forthwith
thrust ourselves into a quarrel with a smaller
enemy, in order, it might seem, to give the greater
one the chance of deciding for himself whether
we are in a difficulty sufficient to tempt
him to make the attack. No matter
how the military operations required by
such a policy may end—and, indeed, we are con
fident that they could end but one way—the
effect upon our imperial system could not possibly
be satisfactory. Even Lord B eaconsfield him
self cannot seriously believe that he could beguile
the people of England into a vast scheme of
Asiatic annexations and conquests after the
fashion of A lexander , or some of the fierce
Persian sovereigns who once had the arms
of the Afghan tribes at their disposal. The
present temper of theatrical enterprise will die
away. Ehodomontade will not always pass in
England as the language of statesmanship. What
ever we may borrow from America, we shall not
borrow the theory of the '* manifest destiny." It
would be well if English statesmen now in
office, and wno have still the proSpect of a tolerably
long career, were to consider whether they are I
doing wisely in making themselves responsible for
a policy which can have only a brief existence, and
yet may do incalculable mischief in its few and
i feverish spasms of life. Some day England will
come to count coldly the cost of such a policy, to
question its results, to ask whether the glory it
professed to bring is anything better than shame.
In that day it will not be altogether well with the
statesmen who are answerable for what was done ;
i that is, who took part in it, and are living to bear
1 their share of the consequences.