Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎11v] (23/312)

LORD CARNARVON ON GOVERNMENT
POtl CY.
On Saturday Lord Carnarvon entertained a por
tion of his Nottinghamshire tenantry at 'dinner in the
village school-room, Teversall.
In reply to his health, proposed by Alderman
crompton, of Derby,
Lord CARNARVON, after some words of advice to his
tenantry, said : I have been asked to make the present
occasion one on whic h to offe r some remarks of a public
character. Now I have always
been a strong advocate for full and effective armaments,
and 1 look upon them as necessary, not merely
tor the honour and credit of the country, but
a l t-, an d only insurance at a time
when Europe is filled with^large armies, and na-
tions go to war with each other on a colossal scale
at a week s notice; and in the same way I have
always been an advocate for a dignified policv, which
secures credit and honour abroad : and enables English-
men to walk erect amongst the other peoples of the
world. (Cheers.) But at the same time, to use a
homely proverb, " We must not ride the young horse
too far.' There are limits to everything. Fireworks
are very convenient and very fine, and sometimes very
desirable, but they ought to be displayed only occasion-
ally. (" Hear, hear," and a laugh.) If fireworks are
let off every year there is some risk of, the house itself
being burnt down. I remember that very wise king,
Leopold of Belgium, once said of the Jate Emperor
Napoleon, when he was in the height of his
prosperity and power, that nothing could apparently
affect or hurt him if he would only remain quiet. Un-
fortunately, however, the Emperor felt himself con
strained to go on from one surprise and from one ad
venture to another, and the result, as we know, was the
loss of his own crown and thej temporary collapse of
his own country. I don't say that applies to the present
state of things, but the moral may, of course, be drawn
from it; jand; I should be sorry indeed—feeling every
good disposition towards the Government—if they al
lowed the country to think that they were engaged upon
a sensational and restless policy ; that we were
scmmbling from peace into the probability of war, apd
from the probability of war back again into an uncer-l
tain peace. (Cheers.) Well, now, gentlemen, there is
one thing to give point to these remarks. I have always
noticed, when India becomes very prominent in thei
people's minds, it generally means that there is some
trouble going on there. During the last two or three
weeks we have heard a great deal about India. I do
not pretend to know what precisely is the case with
which her Majesty's Government have to, deal, but
one or two things are easily to be seen. The first
is, we are making suddenly a very great and important
change in-our policy as regards those great Indian
feudatory princes who own large armies. We desire,
apparently, to take those armies more or less into our
control, and virtually to a bsorb them in our Empire,
Well, that is a very natural thing. But, on the other
[ hand, it is equally natural that the Indian princes
i should object to be stripped of their power. I
| don't say that her Majesty's Government are
j not^ right in their desire to consolidate these
nations, _ but I do say it is a very delicate,
a very difficult, and very hazardous task to undertake,
which should be taken not only with the greatest pre
caution,- but at a time when we are satisfied we shall
I not be met by serious difficulties. (Hear, hear.) Now,
[ what is the time that is taken for it ? To my mind, a
I very questionable one, because, whilst these operations
! are going on, we hear reports on all sides of* possible
I war in Afghanistan. Now, what does that mean ?
Afghanistan, as every one knows, is a large tract of
country lying on the north-west frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. of India, oc
cupied by vast races who have been untamed for gene
rations and generations past, and have been trained up
from father to son in one sole occupation. Afghanistan
is best remembered by Englishmen in memory of the
greatest disaster which our army sustained in modern
days. Some thirty-six years ago the English army was
cut to pieces between Cabul and the Indian frontier.
That history is the saddest in some respects, and one of
the noblest in others. It is a history which is in portions
full of mismanagement and incompetence, and in others
of memorable displays of heroism which the English
army may boast of. There is nothing finer, in my
mind, than the part Sir Robert Sale and his brigade
took at Jelahabad. It was in the ramparts of that
town, in the winter of 1842, that a solitary horse
man, bowed down with fatigue and anxiety, was seen i
advancing across the plain. That solitary horseman
was the one, man who had escaped from the wreck of |
the British/Army. That terrible disaster—a disaster |
for which there has been no precedent before, and I
which, thank God, had found nothing of a similar
nature since—that disaeter was avenged and washed out
very speedily ; but from that time to this, one and the
same policy had been observed—we have had nothing
to dp, with entangling ourselves with Afghanistan,
and it has been laid down by a succession of men
that the policy of abstention was the wise one. His
lordship concluded as follows : Well, now, and not for
the first time, we are sending a mission to the capital
of Afghanistan. It goes under the command of a very j
skilful and ex p erien ced office r, and perhaps t frft mission '
is very powerful in point oT numbers, i am not sure
that there id much advantage in that. One might be
inclined to Bay of the numerical strength of the
mission, at was said of another army in the East
in ancient times, that it was too large for
a mission and too small for an army. The ex
pedition goes, however, and goes, it is said, with
stringent terms. Now I shall deeply regret it if the
result should be hostilities, I don't know what the
terms are that Sir Neville Chamberlain is required to
propose, but I think a war with Afghanistan would be,
to say the least of it, a very great disaster. But if war
is a disaster, the result of war, to my mind, would be an
infinitely greater disaster. I dread much more than
wa J ttie conquest and occupation of Afghanistan,
and I am satisfied it gives none of the con
ditions which are essential to military or political
supremacy. If, indeed, we are jealous of the influence
and intrigues of Russia, it would be far better to meet
in fair fight in Europe than to entangle ourselves in
such a theatre of war as Afghanistan. (Hear, hear.)
Gentlemen, there have been of late rumours of some
further action in the East on the part of her Majesty's
Government. I know not what importance to attach
to them ; but I do say this, most distinctly, that if
eventualities of a more serious nature should arise, our
strength may be taxed to the utmost, and nothing can
be more impolitic or unwise than at such a moment to
entangle ourselves in an enormous difficulty of this
nature, and to take upon ourselves an unnecessary bur
den—(cheers)—in this country. Wrestling used to be
a favourite pastime ; but I apprehend no Nottingham
shire wrestler would, before the contest, have weighted
himself unfairly against his opponents. This is, how
ever, what we are doing if we give ourselves to this
scheme. I apprehend that neither profit nor glory can
be obtained from such a war. I consider rather that
it would be a great misfortune, and would result in a
very considerable blunder if it were allowed to go on.
I don t consider that a war of that sort could be carried
on by India and the Indian resources without
the help , of this country. In India you have
few sources of revenue, and those few sources
seem to have reached pretty nearly their
full power. You have an income which is com
paratively stationary, and you have an expenditure
which is growing; you have also, as you all know, a
great and exceptional call upon the revenue. Well,
gentlemen, I can only say that the result of all that, to
my mind, is that for all Englishmen who take an in
terest m these questions—and these questions are
very important to us in a hundred ways—
the one important thing to do is to watch very carefully
what is now going on. I need not say that 1 have per
sonally nothing but good feeling towards her Majesty's
present Government, amongst whom there were—in
deed, I may say there are—some personal friends of my
own. When I left that Government I left it because of
the course then taken, and when, at the end of the ses
sion, I condemned the Treaty of Berlin—and that was
the first and only time when I had "expressed censure—
I condemned it because I foresaw that it would turn
out exactly as it did turn out; and now I feel anxious
because, as it seems to me, we are undertaking duties
and obligations which it is wholly beyond our strength
to carry out. I think in all these things it is a matter
of the least importance which party is in office; but
what I do think as of great importance is that the
Queen's Government should be carried" on effectually
and for the safety and honour of the country. (Cheers.)
Gentlemen, tuat I believe to be the real feeling that
lies at the bottom of the hearts and minds of the majo
rity of the English people. (Renewed cheers.)
J
23-
LATEST INTELLIGENCE.
INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN.
THE MISSION STOPPED.
(By Indo-European Telegraph vid Teheran.)
(fiiom our correspondent.)
CALCUTTA, S ept . 22,10 22 p.m.
Our relations with the Ameer have assumed a very
critical character. The Cabul ruler has at last
thrown off every eerablance even of outward
friendliness and courtesy, and has chosen to adopt,
in preference,, an attitude of marked and open
hostility. Your Special Correspondent with the
Mission telegraphs that it left Peshawur yesterday
and proceeded as far as Jumrood, a place on the
actual frontier, though within British territory.
Thence it was recalled by a telegram from the
Viceroy, and accordingly it marched back to
Peshawur. This morning private advices from
Simla, upon which absolute reliance can be placed,
state that on the Mission being ordered to march
to Jnmrood Major Oavagnari rode forward to Ali
Musjid, escorted by Khyberries, in order to ask
for a safe passage. The Ameer's officer, however,
at Ali Musjid positively refused to permit the
Mission to advance. He threatened resistance,
and crowned the surrounding heights commanding
the route with armed men in order to dispute the
passage. The interview between the Chief and
Major Cavagnari lasted three hours, and, though
the former was warned over and over again that
the Ameer would be deemed responsible for his
conduct, he expressed an unflinching determina
tion to resist the passage of the Mission by force.
Not the faintest shadow of a doubt is entertained
that this officer was acting under full instructions
from the Ameer, inasmuch as Mufti Shah and
Akhor, two responsible officers of the Ameer, have
been despatched from Cabul to Ali Musjid within
the last few days. Both of these officers have
been mentioned in Cabul news-letters as favourably
disposed towards and engaged in direct communi
cation with the Russian Embassy. Two important
facts require to be noted—the first that this in
solent rebuff occurred in presence of the two
Indian Princes attached to the Mission, who were
personal witnesses of the interview between Major
Cavagnari and the Ameer's officer ; the second is
that the Russian Envoy is still residing at Cabul.