Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎8v] (17/312)

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OUE AFFGHANISTAN POLICY.
to the bditok of the daily news.
S ir ,—Your excellent article of this date on our
Affghanistan policy gives a very necessary warning as to
a very serious danger into which we are being led by
our julers. It is with the utmost concern that we must
view the total abandonment of their policy of " masterly
/inactivity" in respect of Affghauistan which was the
key-note of the foreign policy of Sir John Lawrence, and
which has been approximately maintained by his suc
cessors, until the present Viceroy of India, under the
inspiration of Lord Beaconsfied, takes up the lines of
the old policy of forty years ago, which led to
the miserable blunder and diacomliture and ruin
ous expense of the Affghan war. When Mr.
Owen Meredith reproduced, without acknowledgment,
lor the benefit of the English public, the German of Tann-
hduser, there was some justification of the performance in
the excellence of the original, but to plagiarise Lord Auck
land is altogether unworthy of Lord Lytton's adaptive
powers. If it is vain to hope that we shall peaceably
acquire a paramount influence over fcihcre Aii and his tur
bulent subjects it is still more vain to expect
that such influence, acquired by physical force,
could add to the strength of our "position in India.
If, as I believe, the present Government have for the last
It wo years been successfully playing Eussia's game in
Europe, much more will Russia rejoice to see us leave
our natural military base in Asia, and advance more
than three hundred miles across a wild and hostile coun
try, to within easy striking distance of her armies. The
military pretence' that the Hindoo Xhoosh range is a
mora defensible barrier-line than the Suleiman, is not much
to the purpose. Per se, it may be a better strattgic posi
tion propter alia, it certainly is not. As Sir Jolm Kaye
said in his admirable article in the Edinburgh Review,
January, 1867, " Alfghanistan is a land, in Lord Welles-
ley's contemptuous phrase, of rocks, sand, deserts, ice, and
i snow. Take a small force into the country and you are
beaten; take a large one and you are starved."
It seems to be the one object of the Government, con
trary to all recognised rules of statecraft, to diffuse the
national resources as widely as possible, as if we had a
'plethora of men and money, and as if the motto
1 " Livide et impera " were to be understood as inculcating
a minute subdivision of the forces of the Imperial aspirant.
To me it appears that we are by this course creating, of
our own accord, a grievous hazard to the stabihty of
our Indian Empire. And especially is it unwise
at the present juncture. If 1 may aslc the ques
tion without incurring Mr. Hanbury's wrath, is
our Indian Empire so well knit together that we can
afford thus voluntarily to disturb its peace ? Have we
dealt so justly and so generously with the Nizam in the
matter of the Berars that we can confidently expect his
Prime Minister to prove himself the ardent ally of 1857 i'
Are the native princes as well satisfied with the dignities
accorded to them, and so sure of their permanence under
the present regime, that they would with their large
armies cover our retreat in case of reverses, or even ab
stain from active co-operation with the foe, whether
Russian or Affghan ? Doubtless the reed upon which the
English Government lean, both in Europe a&d Asia, is
Mohammedanism. But is it not a reed of uncertain
character, which,whether it breaks under the strain or not,
; is likely to pierce the bearer'shand? Any enforcement of our
| suzerainty over Atfghanistan would certainly shatter the
; reed at once. At present all the fervour of Islam is hot
against Russia, but if by high-handed measures we arouse
the ill-will or the fears of Shere Ah, will not the English
giaour be equally hateful throughout the East ? One
more question I would submit for the consideration of a
nation*that is content to be led blindfold by statesmen
falsely so called. Does the ill-gotten revenue from opium
weigh so- heavily on the conscience of the counsellors of
the Empress of "India that they cannot take to themselves
the Biblical assurance—in quietness and confidence shall
be your strength ? Otherwise no motto could at the
piesent moment be more appropriate, none more'Con-
ducive to our true welfare.—"Xours, &c.,
Bouroemouth, Sept. 17» E. I. SANDARS-
1 INDIAN PRESS AND THE CABUL
, MISSION.
i The Calcutta Englishman of August 26 thua
I writes concerning the mission of fcsir Neville
Ohanvberlain to the Ameer of Cabul;
Whether the approaching mission to Cabul should ba
j the forerunner of a hostile expedition, or whether-.it
should result in an amicable understanding between^ th®
j Vmeer and the British Government, it is absolutely iudSj
r pensable that British influence should henceforth 1V6 a
1 much more potent factor in Afghan poKtics than hitherto.
However weighty may be the arguments in favour of tha
policy of masterly inactivity, that policy is tenable only*
as long as no other Power intervenes. This fact
has long since been recognised, and is admitted
in principle by even the staunchest advocates
of non-intervention. The Manchester school themselves ,
would scarcely maintain that, without being false to, our
own interests, we could allow any foreign influefi.ee to
dominate Cabul politics : and whatever difference of
opinion may exist on the subject merely concerns the
question at what point interference would become neces
sary. It is notorious that we should long since have
entered into much closer relations with Cabul but for the
reliance, real or factitious, which the British Foreign
Office placed upon assurances from St. Peters
burg. In 1873 the Ameer Sheer Ah, who either
understood better than ourselves the true value
of such assurances, or was less disposed to
dissemble his real opinion of their value, sent an envoy
to Lord Northbrook, at Simla, to seek a defensive alii-'
ance with England. This envoy foretold, step by step, the
subsequent Russian advances in Asia, and spared no argu
ment to disabuse the Government of India of its misplaced
confidence in Russian promises. But Prince GortschakofE
had just then, for the hundredth time, solemnly reite-
^ „ rated the old pledge that the Russian Government abso
lutely repudiated all concern with Cabul affairs, and con- ^
sidered tha temtories of Afghanistan entirely out
side its sphere of action. The envoy was con
sequently dismissed with a polite refusal, and re
turned to Cabul marvelling at British gullibility.
Apart altogether from subsequent grounds, real or imagi
nary, of dissatisfaction, it is hardly to be wondered at il
the Ameer has turned from those who would neither help
nor beheve him to a Government which has given such
convincing proofs of its power to strike in his immediate !
neighbourhood, which shows no signs of halting in its
career of aggression, which is troubled by no scruples
about smooth promises, and which courts the alliance we
have scouted. Had we not rejected Sheer All's ad
vances in 1873, we should not now have bad to ■
elect between humiliation none the less toler
able for being merited, and the risk of being drawn
into an attitude of aggression, none the less, ungensrous'
under the circumstances, because dedicated by imperious
political necessities. The tone which the mission may
adopt towards Sheer Ah, in the first instance, will depend ,- j ,
largely upon the extent to which he may have compro
mised himself in the negotiations with Russia. Every
disposition will no doubt be shown to treat with leniency
past errors, which we have in a measure forced upon ,
him, but only on conditions regarding the futura
which he may or may not accept. There is, in
short, no disguising the .fact that, in sending '
this mission, we must be prepared, should occasion ;
require, to offer Sheer All his choice between accepting,
at our bidding, an alliance which we refused to entor
into at his invitation, and the sword. Should he receive
the mission, and should he unreservedly throw in his lot
with ourselves, all will be well; but should he refuse to
receive the mission, or should he reject our overtures, wa
shall be compelled, for our own protection, to adopt .
measures in regard to which his interests will be a
subordinate consideration, and which, if he resists" them,
wa shall have to carry into effect by force. Hie tone oS
public opinion in England is a sufficient guarantee that
there will be no retreating or wavering in the policy of
the Government, even if that were otherwise possible.
The delay in the despatch of the mission, necessitated by
the death of Abdullah Jan, will be but slight, its arrival at
Cabul being so timed as to take place in the beginning
of October, when the period of forty days' mourning will
have terminated.
The Simla Correspondent of the Engliahman,-
writes:
Opinions on the subject seem most varied. Many of
the military men seem to think that we are late in tha
field, and that we ought to have been there long before tha
Russians. But it is difficult to see how thia could have been
carried out, as long as the Ameer objected to our doing so.
It is quite true it might have been done by force, but
then it is questionable whether the game would have been
worth the candle, as now the Ameer has admitted Euro
peans and a mission with escort from Russia, it is thought
out of his power to refuse to grant a similar position to-
the English, without coming to an open rupture, which
does not seem to be generally considered a probable oc--
currence. Of course there are many ardent soldiers what
look upon the latter as a consummation devoutly to ba
wished, just as there are men of an opposite school of
thought who look upon our having anything to do with
Afghanistan in any way as an error, and with whom tha
remembrance of our misfortunes in that country ia
much stronger than that of the victories which followed, •
A paragraph in the same paper states:
| It is generally beheved in Cabul that Sardar Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. Shejj
Dil Khan, Shahghasi, the late Governor of Balk, was
| poisoned, having fallen under the Ameer's suspicion of
intriguing with the Russians. His property was forfeited
to the State. The Ameer is said to be becoming more and
more the slave of a savage and .ungovernable temper,
and hable, whilst under its influence, to sacrifice the lives of
subjects on the faintest pretext; and the death of hia
favourite son and heir is not likely to improve hia
temper.
An article in the Timed of India, of August 30,
SciyS l
The selection of Sir Neville Chamberlain as chief of th«
mission has given great satisfaction in India, fpr it
would be difficult to find anywhere a man bfitt^r fitted
for the trust. Majors Cavagnari and St. ooh* ^ equaUy-
well chosen, both officers having given abundant promise
of a distinction which may one day match that of Sir
Neville himself. Our Simla correspondent writes .—
" The chief topic of interest which is discussed here
at present is the mission to Cabul and its members.
The news of the Ameer having received the Russian
Embassy, while admission to our representatives has
all along been so rigorously opposed, has startled, as it
well might do, our statesmen not only here but at home.
They have at last woke up to the fact of the ridiculous,
not to say dangerous, position that would result from
Cabul becoming a tributary State to Russia, and hava
determined, though somewhat late in the day, to put
matters with the Ameer on a more satisfactory basis. la
doing so, however, the task is anything but an easy
one, owing to the laissee /aire policy with;
regard to Central Asian matters that has latterly
been adopted by the Home Government. Our last
negotiations with the ruler of Cabul did not occur so
long ago but that they are still well remembered, and
the sudden change of policy so marked as to deserve a
word in passing.