Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎7v] (15/312)

THE MISSION TO CABUL. i
(FEOM A CORIIESPONDENT.)
SIMLA, AuotrsT 26. |
The sole topic just now is the mission to Cabul.
Years ago, in 1869 and 1873, the Ameer sent re
presentatives to this place, offering us his alliance
on certain terms, but we refused. That England's
masterly inactivity has much to answer for in the
present state of affairs in Cabul few doubt. The
Indian papers ask in what position we shall be if
the Ameer refuses to accept our mission. It will
be remembered that it was in 1873 that Sir John
Strachey was officiating Governor-General, and it
was then, I think, that the Ameer's representatives
predicted to our Government that the Russians
would advance; but they were not listened to.
Why the Government of India should have refused
the proposition of the Ameer of Cabul when so
little was to be lost and so much was to be gained
it is as impossible to say as it is to foretell the re
sult of the Afghanistan mission.
Sir Neville Chamberlain, who is now here, is to !
await the Ameer's reply, and if he goes will be
accompanied by Majors Cavagnari and St. John.
Both of them are very highly thought of. The
former made his mark some short time ago on the
frontier, while the latter is thoroughly well in
formed on the affairs of Afghanistan and Be-
loochistan, and the state of feeling in Central
Asia. The death of the heir-apparent to the
throne of Cabul will probably cause some little
delay in the departure of the mission; in conse
quence of the public mourning:. At whatever
lime Sir Neville Chamberlain starts on his
journey he is sure to have powerful assistance
close at hand, the number of troops accompanying
him being 400. Rumours are flying about that
instead of having manoeuvres this year we shall
send an army of observation into Al -
ghanistan, its probable destination being
Herat I That we could be so weak as
to send a force, large enough to take care of itself,
to Herat, I cannot bring myself at present to
believe, considering the great difficulty in feeding
inch a force so far from Peshawur. The Kyber
Bass, which we shall probably occupy, would also
intervene. But if the Government out here only
come to the belief that things could not be worse
than they are in Afghanistan, they may do any
thing, without reference to the past or the
future.
The leading Liberal paper in this country says,
with reference to our advance to Quetta and our
mission to Cabul, that the latter is only " the
next step in the development in our Imperial
policy," and that we shall " advance to Candahar
and Herat, for which our Imperialists have only
been biding their time." It points out
that the "attitude" of "unconcern and
non-interference" assumed by our Indian
Government in '73 is " now pronounced a
mistake," and that "the mission is likely to be
not the culmination" of anything, but " the begin- 1
ning of serious complications and troubles to us,
on which Russia from Central Asia will look on in
quiet and safe enjoyment." That our commis
sariat arrangements in this country would enable
us to furnish supplies to the number of men re- j
quired to hold Herat, Candahar, and Quetta is a
question that few men would like to answer posi
tively in the affirmative. The country round the ,
two latter places failed to supply 9,000 men in !
1839 when the mustered establishment of the army
of the Indus, amounting to that number, had
to remain on half rations for two days
on their arrival at Candahar, after having
been forty-two days on half rations. What
assistance we could now derive from the supplies
of the countries of Afghanistan and Beloochistan
if they were required is yet to be learned, but all
the points I have mentioned would have to be
taken into consideration before anything like a
force could be launched so far from Sindh and the
Ptmjab, for the only two big roads by which to
supply any number of men from India lie through
the Kyber and Bolan passes.
- /(^l£; la ~
The Indian Weekly j
Review says with reference to the Russian move- I
ments : " There is another point to be considered, i
which is that it would be hardly worth the while !
of the Russians to go some 250 miles out of their
way to Herat in order to turn the Bamian while a
tolerably direct route exists from Balk or from
Khulm lying just south of the ferries to Cabul.
This route crosses the Bamian certainly, but that
is not a very formidable pass, if Afghanistan were
not generally hostile. Such a movement would
certainly be the best they could make, for at the
worst they could establish themselves north of the
Oxus, whgn there are no forces sufficiently well
armed to oppose them, while if they had any luck i
they might get hold of Balkh or Khulm, and thus
form a tete de pont across the Oxus, from which
they could keep up a constant irritation and annoy
ance to the Government of India. Moreover, a
move by Herat or to Herat would at once rouse
England to its centre, for every one at home has
been taught to consider Herat as a point which
must be kept out of the hands of Russia; whereas
in the case of Balkh or Khulm, although absolutely
nearer to our frontier, the names of the places are
unknown to the majority of Englishmen at home,
and the danger might not be seen until the seizure
had been accomplished."
I The new departure that is apparently contem-
I plated in Indian foreign politics in the mission
that has actually started for Cabul, the capital city
of Afghanistan, and which is only the first step in
the scheme vaguely foreshadowed, induces us to
lay before our readers a map of the Central Asian
countries. It will be in the memory of some of
our readers that we gave a map of this region on
April 6, 1876, in which the mountain section was
prominently shown. Following that idea, we give
here considerable prominence to the country, which
has an absolute elevation of more than 5,000 feet.
In t&e notes which illustrated that map we
pointed out that the Kashgar Yarkand Plain, then
in the possession of the Atalig Amir, or Atalik
Ghazi, to whom we had but just sent a mission,
and with whom we had concluded a commercial
treaty, was an integral part of the Chinese Empire,
and that we might expect the Chinese sooner or
later to endeavour to recover this province from
the rebels. This event has come about somewhat
sooner than we expected. On December 19, 1877,
the Chinese troops entered Kashgar. Beg-Kuli-
Beg, the son of the Atalik Ghazi, Yakub Beg, who
died in June, 1877, fled into Russia (Khokand),
and the Chinese Government was re-established.
We also stated that Russia wanted a mer
cantile marine for the development of her
commerce, and for this purpose she required
ports that are open all the year round;
and we added, "It is in the direction of
warm water that her next moves will probably be,
and the disruption of Turkey, with purchases or
exchanges with Persia, might give her what she
seeks." How far we were right in this, the his
tory of the Berlin Congress helps to elucidate. :
She has got Batum, a port open all the year
round, and she has conciliated Persia by insisting
on the restitution of the Kotur Valley, that has
been in Turkish occupation for many years. Russia
is essentially a plain country. She has not a hill
of 2,000 feet high within a thousand miles of her
capital, and you may travel the whole breadth of
her vast and thinly-populated empire, a distance
of more than 4,000 miles, without seeing a moun
tain. Except the drals, which are really but an
insignificant ridge, the mountains are only found
on her extreme borders. It is like a vast garden
bounded by a wall of from one to five miles high.
Over this expansive plain large bodies can move
but slowly, and the habits and customs of, and
appliances suitable for, a plain country have all
to be unlearned or altered in the mountains.
The frontier of Russia has not altered within
the area that our map illustrates since 1876, it is
therefore unnecessary to go over the ground again
in describing it. The thick broken lines used for
the boundaries of India and Russia are sufficiently
distinct of themselves, while the scale in t he ri ght
bottom comer will enable our readers to measure !
roughly how near England and Russia approach
each other in point of direct distance;