Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎6v] (13/312)

LONDON, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1878.
Our Calcutta Correspondent supplies further de
tails this morning as to the mission to Cabul. It will
be composed of infantry and cavalry detachments
which,with camp followers,will bring up the number
of the mission to 1,000 men. A safe conduct through
the Khyber Pass has been secured, and hostages
have been given by the native tribes who hold
the pass in proof of their good faith. Thus
S here A m will very soon have to choose his part.
As to the words said to have been uttered by him
in open Durbar A public or private audience held by a high-ranking British colonial representative (e.g. Viceroy, Governor-General, or member of the British royal family). , they no doubt bear evidence
jof the passionate animosity towards the British
I Government which is attributed to him by our Cor
respondent. Much depends, however, upon the
time at which they were uttered and the influences
which gave rise to them. It will be the duty 0£
Sir N eville C hamberlain to counteract these in.
fluences, and to show, as the fact is, that the
A mejee's interest is really bound up with our
own, and that his independence can only
be upheld by the maintenance of British
s rule. Those further measures which Indian
rumours proclaim will follow a refusal to re
ceive Sir N eville C hamberlain have probably
bean scarcely yet definitely shaped in the councils
of Simla or Downing-street. The necessity for
them iw not likely to arise. To withhold from the
V iceroy the courtesy extended to the C zar would
be a policy in which the A meer must Know that
England could not acquiesce. But that cloud will,
we hope and we believe, break, and not in tem
pest. It is of more permanent import
ance, perhaps, to compute the British strength
and weakness within India than without.
Scares like this from Cabul have their use
in compelling Great Britain to essay her
own armour while estimating the shock it might
possibly have to resist. The survey we have lately
published of the armies maintained by the great
Indian feudatories contributes an element too
often overlooked to the consideration. An empire
resting on 200,000 bayonets cannot afford to be
indifferent to the significance of other 300,000
soldiers garrisoning India, but not paid or officered
by England. The Princes whom they serve are the
Q ueen's very good friends, and receive with loyal
gratitude from her bounty salutes of cannon and
ribands and crosses. If their troops are troops
bound and certain to uphold whatever cause Great
Britain may take up, nothing but pleasure
could be felt at their efficiency. If there
is any room for doubt in that respect, it
is as well to compute the danger and the
means of meeting it. Such peril as there is
in the neighbourhood of native armies owning alle
giance to hative Indian Princes varies indefinitely
in its kind and degree. No one acquainted with i
India has any fear of direct attacks on the British I
dominion by Rajpoot soldiery. Rajpoots are ;
brave and manly, and their Princes are unap-
proachable in India for nobility of descent. But 1
their ambition is not likely to kindle unless the !
whole peninsula should be in flames ; and in such a
contingency we should like to feel sure that if their I
troops did not swell the British army, neither would
they paralyze its movements. The rulers of Nepaul i
and Cashmere occupy no such negative position, i
They help to guard our frontier, and they might i
assail it. The M aharajah , however, is sufficiently ,
persuaded of the completeness with which his !
power is bound up with English supremacy to be |
Incapable of disloyalty. The same reasons which |
necured the friendship of Nepaul in the days of
J cnq B abadoor and the Indian Mutiny may
be supposed to operate still. It will be the
fault of Anglo-Indian diplomacy if they do
not. In any case, the danger, little or great, is
there before us. Nepaul is an independent Power,
and we can measure its strength, whether as friend or
foe. When we come to the N izam and the Mahratta
Princes the problem is more complex. The N izam
arms 50,000 soldiers, and the three Mahratta States
between 50,000 and 60,000. In addition, S cin-
mah has borrowed the policy of S tein , and is pass
ing through his army of 22,000 men the whole male
portion of his three million subjects. To the
ordinary English mind, S cindiah, H olkar , the
G uikwar , and the N izam are in much the same
class as the Maharajah of B urdwan . That they
possess armies may be known, but the fact makes
little impression. Their military apparatus is
regarded either as all pomp and parade, or the
troops of Indore, Gwalior, Guzerat, and Hyderabad
ere merely English troops under another name.
In truth, it is still hanging in the balance what j
should be the head under which to classify them.
Native foundries cast can non for their forts and
field batteries, and every improvement European
skill can devise is introduced forthwith into their
tactics. The pacification of old family feuds which
has been effected by the native Ministers of Scindiah
and HolkaR more than doubles the striking power
of the two Sovereigns. There is no necessity for
Imagining a formed conspiracy against British
dominion in India in order to feel the danger there
might be in such a condition of things. Both the
three prominent divisions of the Mahratta people
and the Nizam's subjects come of warlike races.
The acknowledged rulers of Gwalior and Indore,
and the actual rulers of the other two States, are
not sunk in apathy and indolence, like many Indian
Princes. We cannot wish that they should be,
though their energy disturbs the repose of the
Calcutta War Office. They have their rivalries and
emulation with each other. Scindiah in multiply
ing his soldiers may not be thinking of their effi
ciency so much against an English army as against
his fellow feudatories. Statesmen so sagacious as Sir
D inkur Kao in Gwalior, Sir Salar Jung in Hy-
darabad, and Sir Mahdava Rao in Baroda appre- '
1 ciato the worth of friendship with the Indian Govern
ment. When they countenance the expenditure of i
native resources on forces which are utterly useless 1
so long as Great Britain guards the peace of India,
it is not necessary to assume that they are medi
tating an assault upon British rule. It is believed
that they are in fact looking forward to a possible
occasion when British protection m ar be no lousier.
available, and when the present feudatory States
may be left directly confronting one another. To
Englishmen the prospect must appear visionary.
Symptoms are,happily,altogether wanting in favour
of a suspicion that the administration of India is
dropping from the grasp of England. It might be
wrested out of English hands by main force ; and
England would survive the loss, as she has survived
the secession of her North American colonies. She
would not survive the listless abdication of such
a splendid trust as chat of her Indian Empire.
Native principalities, as Sir Salar Jung and Sir
Dinkur Rao must know, would be far from gain
ing independence by the forcible substitution of
another foreign sceptre for that of Great Britain.
On the other hand, they are strangely deceived
if they think that India is growing ripe for being
left to itself. Short of such a fancy they may yet
consider it their duty to develops the military as
they do the other resources of their countries. An
able Minister of a feudatory State, in proportion to
his consciousness of his own capacity, is likely,
without any definite calculation of British eclipse,
to regard as more or less accidental the connexion
with England which Englishmen naturally hold to
be essential. He administers his State, so far as he
may, as if it were not so much independent
as self-dependent. What he would desire most to
encourage among his Prince's subjects is a sense of
nationality ; and an efficient army is one among
the means towards this end.
The sentiment we respect. Attempts to culti
vate an instinct of political unity in the
native States ought not to be frowned
down. But the idea, however good in itself,
can scarcely be permitted to develope inde
finitely in the direction of increasing the local
troops and arming the population. In the first
place, India is tasked sufficiently by the charge of
200,000 troops in the Queen's service, Directly
eouuysxp eptfM Gty/ -aAup qotJoo
-do ea® iseej sanot| Jnoj Jtatfto ^nq
raojti jo M-oSsBif) too j j sonoq anoj ui epBtn si Tl™ ^
iCeuxnot eqj, l 4qo moaj
xei sb pg^erdraoo avou si qoiqM. treqo P
aopuBTT'BO 0t {^ ^ a^q^ 'asinoo jo 'si ll® J 0 e^no-t
asajjoinb qttt •psnot^tretn jCpvQJjv saqinoJ oq^
jo aeq^ta Xq tffiqo o? no oS putt qo^oo
XreaeAuf pu^ ^eq-nsj, eqij qo^o e-teq^ SUOT;
qoorj jo pBaq eq^ 'aBipoaay o^ ■jBaqraBO^s
e^rej. Avva nojf 'ejora oouf) uepuBag o^
q^tav uo o# pub 's^uueq^bq ^ ^0 ubqobuorj
^dtOjj ^b jeureo^s 9Ay iporj eq^ Xq du peloid oq
2 bui noX jo f UBqo o? eouoq^ puB jfflBuqBff o^ qo«oo
si ©jeq^ WOTiaqM o^ 0u£,ij qocq dft Saqtfss
Xq peuBA eq aeq^anj Abui e^noj stqj, -ubqq o^
uo sjoSu9Ssbq ej^Bq. o^ Sui^ibm si qoboo b eieq^. puB
euiBu euiBs eq^ jo ssbj; suouibj eq^ uo 'jepuBag; o^
ojpq ^Bq^ du Jaurea^s a^B} noA aouaqAV 'aAvy
qooq; jo jtyioiejpca uia^saAi-q^nos aq^ qB 'paoj
oq. qoBoo ajjBq A bot noX 'qi aBau pBaqd^i*) qooq;
jo 'SiBqsupjy raoj j •qoaitp UBqo <4 no ^
oq. ifpBaa'jeuiBaqs q S jbj jaqqou« pug noA QJOqq. puB
'ubutjq oq.SiBqBijpjY raojj ^ bubq ubuuq aqq qSnojqq
ssbd "noj^ -bqranioq aqq q josuoo jaq jo 'buoj suoutbj
eqq ttt opbux st aSB ^oa aqq qoxqM. oq ' jbubq ubuuq
aqq Aq qBqq bi ' aqnoj jB-[ndoa jCjpaAJasap qsora eq j
•souauba r&ieAas jo pub luaraim-mo jo sq.unpB *J9A9
LONDON, MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 16, 1878.
Our Calcutta Correspondent supplies further de
tails this morning as to the mission to Cabul. It will
be composed of infantry and cavalry detachments
which,with camp followers,will bring up the number
of the mission to 1,000 men. A safe conduct through
the Khyber Pass has been secured, and hostages
have been given by the native tribes who hold
the pass in proof of their good faith. Thus
S heee An will very soon have to choose bis part.
As to the words said to have been uttered by him
in open Durbar A public or private audience held by a high-ranking British colonial representative (e.g. Viceroy, Governor-General, or member of the British royal family). , they no doubt bear evidence
|of the passionate animosity towards the British
| Government which is attributed to him by our Cor
respondent. Much depends, however, upon the
time at which they were uttered and the influences
which gave rise to them. It will be the duty Of
Sir N eville C hamberlain to counteract these in.
fluences, and to show, as the fact is, that the
A meer's interest is really bound up with our
own, and that his independence can only
be upheld by the maintenance of British
rule. Those further measures which Indian
rumours proclaim will follow a refusal to re
ceive Sir N eville C hamberlain have probably
been scarcely yet definitely shaped in the councils
of Simla or Powning-street. The necessity for
them k not likely to arise. To withhold from the
V iceeov the courtesy extended to the C zar would
be a policy in which the A meer must Know that
England could not acquiesce. But that cloud will,
we hope and we believe, break, and not in tem
pest. It is of more permanent import
ance, perhaps, to compute the British strength
and weakness within India than without.
Scares like this from Cabul have their use
in compelling Great Britain to essay her
own armour while estimating the shock it might
possibly have to resist. The survey we have lately
published of the armies maintained by the great
Indian feudatories contributes an element too
often overlooked to the consideration. An empire
resting on 200,000 bayonets cannot afford to be
indifferent to the significance of other 300,000
soldiers garrisoning India, but not paid or officered
by England. The Princes whom they serve are the
Q ueen's very good friends, and receive with loyal
gratitude from her bounty salutes of cannon and
ribands and crosses. If their troops are troops
bound and certain to uphold whatever cause Great
Britain may take up, nothing but pleasure
could be felt at their efficiency. If there
is any room for doubt in that respect, it
is as well to compute the danger and the
means of meeting it. Such peril as there is
in the neighbourhood of native armies owning alle
giance to hative Indian Princes varies indefinitely
in its kind and degree. No one acquainted with
India has any fear of direct attacks on the British
dominion by Bajpoot soldiery, Rajpoots are ;
brave and manly, and their Princes are unap- |
proachable in India for nobility of descent. But
their ambition is not likely to kindle unless the :
whole peninsula should be in flames ; and in such a i
contingency we should like to feel sure that if their '
troops did not swell the British army, neither would
they paralyze its movements. The rulers of Nepaul ;
and Cashmere occupy no such negative position, j
They help to guard our frontier, and they might
assail it. The M aharajah , however, is sufficiently
persuaded of the completeness with which his
power is bound up with English supremacy to be
incapable of disloyalty. The same reasons which
secured the friendship of Nepaul in the days of
J ung B ahadoor and the Indian Mutiny may
be supposed to operate still. It will be the
fault of Anglo-Indian diplomacy if they do
not. In any case, the danger, little or great, is
there before us. Nepaul is an independent Power,
and wo can measure its strength,whether as friend or
foe. "When we come to the N izam and the Mahratta
Princes the problem is more complex. The N izam
arms 60,000 soldiers, and the three Mahratta States
between 50,000 and 60,000. In addition, S cin-
diah has borrowed the policy of S tein , and is pass
ing through his army of 22,000 men the whole male
portion of his three million subjects. To the
ordinary English mind, S cindiah, H olkar , the
G uikwar , and the N izam are in much the same
class as the Maharajah of B urdwan . That they
possess armies may be known, but the fact makes
little impression. Their military apparatus is
regarded either as all pomp and parade, or the
troops of Indore, Gwalior, Guzerat, and Hyderabad
are merely English troops under another name.
In truth, it is still hanging in the balance what
should be the head under which to classify them.
Native foundries cast can non for their forts and
field batteries, and every improvement European
skill can devise is introduced forthwith into their
tactics. The pacification of old family feuds which
has been effected by the native Ministers of S cindiah
and H olkaR more than doubles the striking power
of the two Sovereigns. There is no necessity for
Imagining a formed conspiracy against British
dominion in India in order to feel the danger there
might be in such a condition of things. Both the
three prominent divisions of the Mahratta people
and the N izam's subjects come of warlike races.
The acknowledged rulers of Gwalior and Indore,
and the actual rulers of the other two States, are
not sunk in apathy and indolence, like many Indian
Princes. We cannot wish that they should be,
though their energy disturbs the repose of the
Calcutta War Office. They have their rivalries and
emulation with each other, S cindiah in multiply
ing his soldiers may not be thinking of their effi
ciency so much against an English army as against
' his fellow feudatories. Statesmen so sagacious as Sir
D inkur K ao in Gwalior, Sir S alar J uno in Hy-
darabad, and Sir M ahdava R ao in Baroda appre-
( ciato the worth of friendship with the Indian Govern
ment. When they countenance the expenditure of
native resources on forces which are utterly useless
so long as Great Britain guards the peace of India,
it is not necessary to assume that they are medi
tating an assault upon British rule. It is believed
that they are in fact looking forward to a possible
occasion when British protection mar be no longer,
available, and when the present feudatory States '
may be left directly confronting one another. To
Englishmen the prospect must appear visionary.
Symptoms are,happily,altogether wanting in favour
of a suspicion that the administration of India is
dropping from the grasp of England. It might be
wrested out of English hands by main force ; and
England would survive the loss, as she has survived
the secession of her North American colonies. She
would not survive the listless abdication of such
a splendid trust as that of her Indian Empire.
Native principalities, as Sir S alar J ung and Sir
D inkur R ao must know, would be far from gain
ing independence by the forcible substitution of
another foreign sceptre for that of Great Britain.
On the other hand, they are strangely deceived
if they think that India is growing ripe for being
left to itself. Short of such a fancy they may yet
consider it their duty to develope the military as
they do the other resources of their countries. An
able Minister of a, feudatory State, in proportion to
his consciousness of his own capacity, is likely,
without any definite calculation of British eclipse,
to regard as more or less accidental the connexion
, with England which Englishmen naturally hold to
[ be essential. He administers his State, so far as he
| may, as if it were not so much independent
as self-dependent. What he would desire most to
encourage among his Prince's subjects is a sense of
nationality ; and an efficient army is one among
the means towards this end.
The sentiment we respect. Attempts to culti
vate an instinct of political unity in the
native States ought not to be frowned
down. But the idea, however good in itself,
can scarcely be permitted to develope inde
finitely in the direction of increasing the local
troops and arming the population. In the first
place, India is tasked sufficiently by the charge of
200,000 troops in the Q ueen's service. Directly
and indirectly, the N izam's and S cindiah's
soldiers are so much dead weight added to
Indian burdens, India, it cannot be too often re
peated, is a poor country. Individuals are rich
but their riches are simply the riches of the
whole peninsula concentrated in a few hands.
The expenditure of this so-called private wealth
on superfluous soldiers and artillery is an absolute
loss and impoverishment to the land. The mere
wastefulness of armies in States guaranteed by the
power of Great Britain against assault both from
without and from within is not a ground on which
the discretion of the N izam's or the Mah
ratta Governments could, perhaps, be questioned
though it may obviate any sentimental objection
to interference with the growth of such a feeling of
national unity as the possession of a national army
encourages. The reason, however, why Eng
land is entitled to require to be taken into coun
cil when military changes are introduced by a
native Government cannot be set forth too clearly
and frankly. Sir D inkur R ao and Sir S alar
J ung know and acknowledge that the military
guardianship of India is the duty and the right of
England. Their military energy need not be
abruptly checked, but they should be invited them
selves to suggest how it can be made to com-
bina with, and play its proper part in, the general
scheme of Indian defences. S cindiah is showing
himself receptive of the fruitful idea by which
Prussia fitted herself to renew her military vitality
from the midst of political death. Good rather
than harm both to England and to himself might re
suit from the change if he would also in some shape
or other incorporate his local soldiers in the Imperial
Army of India, which Great Britain leads. The
final choice of the feudatory States must be be
tween no army and one which should be a wing of
the confederate Indian forces. Officered jointly by
natives and by Englishmen, and manoeuvred on
proper occasions as part of an Imperial army,
native forces might, perhaps, be made a new source
of internal strength to India. At present they are
a motive and a nucleus for disturbing conjectures
and delusions, which injure none more than the
princes and populations whose resources are squan
dered upon them.