Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎4r] (7/312)

August 21, 1878.]
future to be reckoned as made up of two parts :
the one part consisting of the food conceived
to be necessary for the support of healthy life,
the other of a lump sum, not subject to fluctua
tion with the price of grain, to cover the cost
of vegetables, salt, firewood, &c., and to be
available for reduction as a penalty for short
work. The system so prescribed has been in
troduced all over these provinces, but the re
sults have not been at all satisfactory. The last
.general returns from relief works revealed an
increase of numbers going on concurrently with
an improvement of agricultural conditions. We
believe that in due time the returns for the
period now running on will show this unfortunate
result in a still more striking manner. The rates
established are such that the people actually
prefer the relief works to the legitimate labour of
the fields. They can get enough to eat, doing
nothing; if they like to work the lump sum
supplies tbem with luxuries. Let well alone is
their motto. From all directions we hear of
protests being sent up to Government by district
officers. They are disgusted at having to admin
ister a system which leads to these palpably
absurd results. And it is easy to conceive
what the financial consequences must be for
the province. The expenditure on relief ought
to be contracting now to a minimum. True
there are some districts where trouble still
prevails, or has still prevailed up to a very
late period. But considering the conditions
which now exist over the North-West as a
whole, it would be absurd to say that the burden
of having to support over 150,000 of the la
bouring poor is one which at this date presses
legitimately on the G-overnment. The Govern
ment of India, in ordering an enhancement of
the wages rate, has clearly been influenced by a
wave of feeling which may have had its origin
in generous philanthropy, but is certainly not
compatible with the facts of Indian life.
I
liana:
t i
[.
ALLAHABAD
AUGUST 21
., 1878.
X THE CABUL MISSION.
/ Tke Cabul mission about to set forth from
India is the complement of the Cyprus occupa
tion. It is a measure for which the way has been
carefully paved by the policy of the Indian Gov
ernment during the last two or three years,
and it should begin the establishment of our
relations with the most important state on our
northern frontiers on a satisfactory basis.
Everything that Lord I^tton has done in con
nection with the North-West Frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. hitherto
has been directed towards undoing the blunders
of the past. That work has been one of time,
because the way had to be picked rather care
fully. There has been a powerful though
wrong-headed opposition at home to circum
vent. Old-fashioned theories of masterly in
activity have still maintained their tyranny over
many minds. The bloodless pacification of
Khelat itself has been the subject of uncalled-
for sneers ; as, while still a project, it was the
subject of preposterous apprehensions. The
negotiations which led to the Peshawur con
ference were dsnounced as foolish meddling
before their character was understood, and even
after this had been thoroughly explained,—
after the confusion of our previous entanglement
with the Ameer had been laid bare, and the
great practical advantages secured by Sir Lewis
Pelly were made apparent for all who had eyes
to see,—the old delusions were still brought to
^ the front, the old fears regalvanised, the whole
mass of general nonsense with which Central
Asian politics have been clouded, blown in
t)
been prompted by the occupation of Cyprus so I
that the present mission is, as we say, the com- 1
plement of Lord Beaconsfield's great coup
tee eival embassies.
The fretful questions already asked in Par- I
j iiament concerning the Cabul mission, fore-
shadow an effort on the part of Her Ma
jesty's unpatriotic opposition to throw ob-
1 stacles in its way, as far as they can. Pro-
1 bably, however, the Government will be
spared the only reproach which, under the cir
cumstances, would have a certain force the
i only attack it might be difficult to parry. The
ekirmishers of the left will, no doubt," freely
1 denounce the present enterprise, on the'general
j principle that denunciation is their metier, but
J they will not be likely to see that in one of its
< aspects it really is discreditable. It has been
< postponed too long. The Eiissians have got in
i advance of us, and British emissaries are now
< hurrying forward to counteract an aggressive
i movement which they might, with greater digni-
3 ty at an earlier opportunity, have rendered
1 impossible. We have already traced the course
c of events leading up to the present mission.
] It is the culmination of the policy which paci
fied Khelat; It is the final raison d'etre of
1: the occupation of Quetta. And General Chatn-
f berlain will be spared the disagreeable work of
t clearing up past misunderstandings. All that
i was done at Peshawur in advance. There
] would be nothing wanting to the completeness
< of the whole process, but for the interference !
1 of the Eussians at Cabul. To reach a sound
1 estimate of the present situation therefore, two I
< currents of thought must be followed. We
1 must take note of the skilful and far-sighted way
1 in which the mission, now so necessary, has been
i rendered possible by previous arrangements;
1 and we must keep in view the circumstances
i which have given rise to a result it would be
( affectation to treat in otherwise than mortifying,
i —not to say ignominious,—the anticipation of
our embassy by the Governor of Samarkand.
\ Eussian progress in Asia is not necessaril}'
i opposed to British interests. It goes without
< saying that there must be a line beyond which
w the unwholesomely rapid growth of Enssia's
1 mere nominal supremacy must be stopped. But
1 if common sense had always prevailed in English
< councils, this unreal development would never
i have given us any trouble. The consolidation
"C of Eussian power iu tracts of Central Asia,
f where it finds a proper field for activity,
|P should be regarded by Englishmen with sym-
s pathy. Eussian civilisation is of a low order,
t' but it is an advance on the indigenous civilisa-
c tion of Turkistan. Eussian activity in Asia has
I only been regarded with annoyance by English
v statesmen worthy of the name, when it ran into
^ mere flag-planting. There is no end to that
P process, if it is not checked by some external
u force. And if there is one kind of activity
d worse than flag-planting, it is intriguing with
^ native states to facilitate flag-planting in future,
a But the truth is, that though of late the
^ energies of Eussian governors and generals in
® Central Asia have been spent almost entirely
l£ in this way, Eussia herself is hardly more
t*to blame for that result than England. Flag-
li planting can only be checked by an external
c j force, but the application of a very little exter-
tl nai force is enough for the purpose. Looking
tj jback over the whole course of Central Asian
Cl politics for the last ten or fifteen years, it is im-
a : possible not to feel that every annoyance Eng-
8 land has experienced in connection with them
& l^aa been due to her own stupid inactivity. In
? a dull-witted way the Liberals accepted Lord
Lawrence's doctrines as an unchangeable creed,
i! We are very far from contending that they were
0 wrong at the time, but no one can go home from
^ India, stereotype the views of Indian affairs he j
August 21, 1878.]
THE PIONEER MAIL.
future to be reckoned as made up of two parts :
tlifl one part consisting of the food conceived
to be necessary for tho support of healthy life,
the other of a lump sum, not subject to fluctua
tion with the price of grain, to cover the cost
of vegetables, salt, firewood, &c., and to be
available for reduction as a penalty for short
work The system so prescribed has been in
troduced all over these provinces, but the re
sults have not been at all satisfactory. The last
general returns from relief works revealed an
increase of numbers going on .concurrently with
an improvement of agricultural conditions. We
believe that in due time the returns for the
period now running on will show this unfortunate
result in a still more striking manner. The rates
established are such that the people actually
prefer the relief works to the legitimate labour of
the fields. They can get enough to eat, doing
nothing; if they like to work the lump sum
supplies them with luxuries. Let well alone is
their motto. From all directions we hear of
protests being sent up to Government by district
officers. They are disgusted at having to admin
ister a system which leads to these palpably
absurd results. And it is easy to conceive
what the financial consequences must be for
the province. The expenditure on relief ought
to be contracting now to a minimum. True
there are some districts where trouble still
prevails, or has still prevailed up to a very
late period. But considering the conditions
which now exist over the North-West as a
whole, it would be absurd to say that the burden
of having to support over 150,000 of the la
bouring poor is one which at this date presses
legitimately on the Government. The Govern
ment of India, in ordering an enhancement of
the wages rate, has clearly been influenced by a
wave of feeling which may have had its origin
in generous philanthropy, but is certainly not
compatible with the facts of Indian life.
mm Hail
ALLAHABAD :-AUGXJST 21, 1878.
THE CABUL MISSION.
/ Tke Cabui mission about to set forth from
India is the complement of the Cyprus occupa
tion. It is a measure for which the way has been
carefully paved by the policy of the Indian Gov
ernment during the last two or three years,
and it should begin the establishment of our
relations with the most important state on our
northern frontiers on a satisfactory basis.
Everything that Lord I^tton has done in con
nection with the North-West Frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. hitherto
has been directed towards undoing the blunders
of the past. That work has been one of time,
because the way had to be picked rather care
fully. There has been a powerful though
wrong-headed opposition at home to circum
vent. Old-fashioned theories of masterly in
activity have still maintained their tyranny over
many minds. The bloodless pacification of
Khelat itselt has been the subject of uncalled-
for pneers; as, while still a project, it was the
subject of preposterous apprehensions. The
negotiations which led to the Peshawur con
ference were danounced as foolish meddling
before their character was understood, and eveu
fj er ^ a d been thoroughly explained,—
after the confusion of our previous entanglement
with the Ameer had been laid bare, and the
great practical advantages secured by Sir Lewis
irelly were made apparent for all who had eyes
to see, the old delusions were still brought to
> the tront, the old fears regalvanised, the whole
mass of general nonsense with which Central
Asian politics have been clouded, blown in
clouds of smoke about the subject over again.
Nor can we hope that the new theory of our
relations with Central Asia has yet been finally
grasped by the rank and file of writers on the
.subject. The Cabul mission will be, in its turn,/
I the object of as many misconceptions as the J
Peshawur negotiations. Afghanistan has beenl
a of nightmares for many Anglo-Indian
politicians. Shah Sujah and Lord Auckland
are names not merely of melancholy remini
scence but of gloomy import. The disasters of
the Cabul campaign are regarded as fearful
lessons which should warn every Indian Vice
roy to keep his face for ever averted from the
Khyber Pass, and the bare wish to see our re
lations with the Ameer put on a more satisfac
tory footing is held to be tantamount to a reck
less desire that the whole empire may be plung
ed in hopeless warfare with a nation of uncon
querable warriors and unlimited means. A few
months will reduce many of these terrors to the
condition of very ragged scarecrows^ but there
are politicians of the parochia l school in
India as well as in England," "and we cannot
hope to see a spirited progressive policy ac
cepted with unanimous approval in reference to
Indian any more than to Turkish affairs.
The general unity of design, however, which
has distinguished Lord Lytton's treatment of
frontier diplomacy, and its success, will go far
to give reasonable men confidence in his new
undertaking. At the commencement of the
present regime the situation as regards the in
dependent states on our north-west border
was anything but creditable to a Government
with the prestige of our own. On the side
of Beloochistan the condition of all territory
beyond our border was one of perpetual distur
bance. Intercourse with the people was impos
sible. As regards the dominions of the Ameer the
position was infinitely worse. The public may
merely have been under the impression that the
country was closed against us by the jealousy of
its rulers, but the Government was alive to an
embarrassing state of facts, besides which
the mere inaccessibility of Afghanistan waa a
matter of no consequence. It was impossible
to say bow far we were in alliance with the
Ameer, how far we had claims upon him, how
far we were under heavy obligations to defend
him from attack. The anomalous character
of our relations with him was due to the way
in which one Government of India after an-
-other had been desirous of establishing a better
Understanding with Cabul, but had always been
pulled up by the authorities at home acting them-
teelves in deference to the ever-ready outcries of
the old partisans of inactivity. Now up to a
certain point there was much to justify the
Lawrence policy, while the advance of Kussia
was still concerned with the conquest of very
distant territory ; ^shile the feeling which
prompted interference in Afghanistan rested
upon the wild fancy that Kussia might some
day be in a position to invade India, there
was no object to gain by taking too active
an initiative in Central Asian affairs. There
has never been a moment at which the dread of
Russian advance as something that might at
last overwhelm the British regime in this coun
try has been otherwise than absurd. In that
light it has always been regarded by every arti
cle on the subject which has ever appeared in
these columns. But Government may some
times be put in a position in which they are
called upon to take notice of a menace which they
are very far from fearing. It is eminently de
sirable for the maintenance of a proper feeling
Wong the people of India, that the Government
ofthe country should not merely be, but show
itself, in a position to warn Russia ofl from any
impertinent familiarities with the minor states
on our frontier. A Central Asian policy may not
be a matter of vital necessity to the welfare of
India even now. Afghanistan itself might be
come a second Khiva, and still the British flag
would be perfectly secure at Peshawur. But
the people of India, instead of being proud of
their Government, would be justly ashamed
ot it under such conditions. Instead of grow
ing more and more identified with the country,
the Government of British India would have to
rely for the maintenance of its ascendancy on
force alone. The whole position would be ig
nominious. From these considerations it en
sues that the nearer Russia approaches, the
more necessary it becomes for us to assert
throughout an expanded zone of territory, the
supreme influence which it is incumbent on
Great Britain to maintain in the states ad-
jacent^ to her Asiatic border. The propriety
of doing this has not arisen yesterday. The
policy which now makes the Cabul mission
possible is not a growth of the present
season. But having been patiently matured for
the last three years, it now happens that a sensa
tional step forward may be taken at a moment
when the action of Russia, arising from the in
cidents of the late war, renders this step pecu
liarly appropriate.
The negotiations at the Peshawur Confer
ence prepared the way 'for the present mission
by giving the Government a clear field of oper
ations. Readers who remember the explana-;
tions we published at the conclusion of those
negotiations, will not have forgotten the nature
of the negative advantages they secured. The
encouragement given to the Ameer by Lord
Mayo and even by Lord Northbrook, the halt"
promises which appeared to have been made,
checked in each case by the dull-witted inter
ference of the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. , as already pointed out,
had left Lord Lytton and Lord Salisbury—pull
ing together in a way that had long been un
usual with Viceroys and Secretaries of State—
face to face with a condition of things in which
they did not know what they would be bound
to do and what they would be free to refuse
in the event of interference on the part of Rus
sia with the independence of the Ameer. "^Sic
Xowis Pelly was sent to Peshawur to cleat
away the fog. That it was neceseary, if the
Ameer could show himself fairly entitled to,
British support in certain contingencies, to ac
cept that liability frankly was self-evident.
But none the less was it plain that inter
national obligations are never one-sided. It
could not be that the Ameer had obtained
promises from Lord Mayo or from Lord North-
brook which would justify him in calling on
us to defend him if attacked, but refusing us
preliminary access to his country so as to ob
tain cognisance in time through our own agents
of any impending attack that it might become
our duty to resist. Sir Lewis Pelly was thus
empowered to put into the clearest shape any
neighbourly obligations w hich the Ameer could
show us to have incurred, but to insist on cor
responding rights in return, if that were done.
The Ameer, it will be remembered, would not
agree to receive British agents in his territory ;
it was explained to him that no obligations on
our part towards him could survive that refusal,
and then the negotiations were interrupted by
the illness of the Cabul representative and not
again resumed. A sponge had been passed over
the mistakes previously made. The Government
of India accepted for the time the fact that we
had no relations with Cabul, good or bad, and
the Ameer was left to think over the situation
by himself. That in progress of time such
thinking has been profitable, appears as the
broad conclusion to be deduced from the an
nouncement now made. With a happy coinci
dence as to time which cannot be too much
admired, Lord Lytton's frontier diplomacy is
bearing fruit just now, when this is a perfect
retort to the movements Russia is recently re
ported to have been making in the direction of
Merv. That movement is supfosed to have