Scrapbook of newspaper cuttings about Afghanistan [‎2v] (4/312)

CORRESPONDENCE,
PROSPECTS OF AN AFGHAN WAR.
To the Editor.
Sir ,—It is manifest that our relations with Shere Ali are now in a
f very critical state; that they have been so for some time is well known to
sucl^ as watch the course of events beyond our Indian frontier. But it
is difficult to understand why persistent efforts have been made until very %
| recently to obscure the facts. Even the Government, which in certain
eventualities would have needed the fullest support of the English
people as well in India as elsewhere, thought secrecy was the best way
to go to work, and proclaimed, long after the breach had taken place,
that never was our understanding with the Cabul chief more satisfactory.
The truth is at length open to all men, and is not the more reassuring for
having been so long held back. At the time when, in my humble judg
ment, a bold and resolute policy would have settled the question as to
whether Russian or English influence should be dominant in Afghanistan
for a generation, you were good enough to allow me to put forward some
reasons in favour of determined action. The very people, however, who
then pooh-poohed all danger, and laughed Lord Lytton's frontier policy to
scorn as foolish and unnecessary—who declaimed against the advance to
i Quettah, and asserted that the arrangement with Khelat gave Shere Ali just
ground for quarrel, as if that move had not been made in answer to his
doubtful manoeuvres—these very people are now all for energy and vigour,
assert that non-intervention of which they have been the chief supporters
is and always has been an utter failure, and, in short, swallow their own
arguments against interference in Afghanistan with the same alacrity as
they did a short while before their mass of rhetoric on the European phase
of the Eastern Question.
But it seems to me that men who thus rush from one extreme to
the other, merely to save the appearance of utter discomfiture, are not !
the safest guides in times of danger and difficulty. The Times corre- l
spondent at Calcutta—who, when our vakeel at Cabul, Atta Mahomed,
was warning the Indian Government that Shere Ali bid fair to become
more Russian than the Russians themselves, telegraphed that there was
no cause whatever for uneasiness—is now wiring to his newspaper whole ^
columns of leading matter, which, if they mean anything, signify that
we are on the eve of another Afghan war. Will you allow me to depre ,
cate this sudden access of unreasoning vehemence on so grave a ques
tion? Since the little army of observation was collected at Rawul
Pindi at the period of the trouble with the Afreedees of the Kohat Pass, ,
the situation in Afghanistan has changed markedly and altogether for the I;
worse as regards ourselves. The question of the succession really does \
not much signify. Perhaps if Lord Mayo had consented to recognize
Abdulla Jan as the heir at the Umballa durbar A public or private audience held by a high-ranking British colonial representative (e.g. Viceroy, Governor-General, or member of the British royal family). ; perhaps if we had j
continued Shere Ali's subsidy regularly; perhaps if we had decided
unjustly in his favour in the matter of the boundary arbitration—had
each and all these peradventures been settled according to the wishes
of the Cabul chief, possibly our influence might have then weighed
in favour of this or the other candidate to the throne as Shere Ali's j
nominee. But even so, the probability of an undisputed succession,
unless we showed we should support the chosen heir by force, would be i
exceedingly small. No one could have taken more pains than old Dost 1
Mahomed did to secure Shere Ali the throne. He made all his brothers
and all the principal sirdars Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. acknowledge him. Yet five years passed in
constant warfare before Shere Ali could secure his position; and one of
his chief complaints against us to this hour is that, though we were the
allies of his father, we never lifted a finger to help him. The point as to the
succession comes in, therefore, merely as an ad dition al element of confusion.
The main question is. Can we peaceably wean the Ameer from what
is something very like Russian alliance, or is it worth while to go to
war to force him to break with his new friends ? I venture to suggest
that just now we are placing ourselves in a false position, and one which
may easily lead us further than we should desire unless we fully
calculate all the chances beforehand. It is stated that the mission
to be sent to Cabul, with Sir Neville Chamberlain at its head, is waiting
until news arrives from Cabul as to whether the Ameer will receive it.
The Russian envoy, General Abramoff, is at Cabul already, and it is more
than probable that the Russian expedition is still advancing—even if, as
reported, the troops have not already crossed the Oxus. That the Indian
Government fears a rebuff, either by Shere Ali declining to receive our
envoy or by his refusing to assent to his proposals when he reaches the
Afghan capital, is clear from the determination to form a winter camp on
our side of the border. If now the Ameer does show his indifference to
English influence war becomes almost inevitable. We could not submit
to be bearded at a time when Russian prestige has been so enormously
enhanced in Asia by the results of the Turkish war. If we invade Afghanistan
( v ^[ho u t understanding with the frontier tribes and such of
-Tjuog b unj i „ •ooiofaj sapujuioo siq mq '■ X]p30T»j9urBqs
SJ9MSUB ^'s^iqdojsuiq JOiBusg si 51 oj :jx9u'puT3 x^dojd s^aqno^ 'M
'X90JI3 'ityAV „ <! J9pnoX si 9iT3:jS9 ssoq^v •3J3qM9sp punoj
9q sdi3qj9d X bui ;jods iBq; isgSSns pus 'twdduq fliM siu9m;uioddBSip
^qi 9§p9 {m0u2p , b Xpjipd ;nq ' j 9 uios p9j spu9ijj siq i Xxios" X j 9 a si
9q sXus puB sgqsnjq S9inf UTOq p^iM jo 9§puiiBd jo'u S is b ?o^ 'uns
9q; ui §aiu9dii s90i'Brao; pun smoj psoii ^muixs m sgs ^qq^o 9iiuipB
'qo^ip ytrepunoq 9qj 01 SapnEApij < a9uis;iods 99jqi 9^ •n9pjBS-u9qo?i5[
■e 03m P91I9AUOD puu uavop U99q ST3q ' oSb siB9/( 99iqi 'g^q 9un3D sgpif
9tuii isiq p9punoq'B 901138 9J0qAi pooM 9q; inq 'o^ ^ U9q4 pgqsiuBA 9^iS9
s^pun 9qi ST3H -ssgaugj^q ;nq ^qSnou s9uos9p 9q 'aremop s^pun siq
inopu qoiqM S99J1 9qi jo qoJB9S ui uoziioq 9q5 Suiuubds v joj < 9DaBU9;unoo
S9SO^U9ppnS 9q S9pf IOJ SB f JO j[jnui U 9>{BIU 01 UI^SXOJ U q:iIMp9ST39ld%Bnb9 ;
9q ppoM ;nq 'sjiqq^j u95[ods9q s^q oqM lune us 9Ai3q 01 ino smn; joid 9H
, ss9A\ojd siq jo s91qdo.11 9aios upourav ^ siuib 9uaoq„ siq oj X jjbo oj|
p.9siuiOJd SuiA^q ^Spi-qxed 9iuos 9uioq Suuq 01 punoq si 9q i^qi s9Ai9sqo
9niqoV "spun s < s9[nf jo 9^S9 9q} oj X bav jpq; uo '^ouma; jo 59911s ureui
9qi qHnoiqi qonjui Xpa9S9jd puB 'J9PI0 9j'oiS9.i o; u9isBq SJ91SBUI jpq;
'pjvo 9qi 9pisino 9aoq b J9A0 pxrenb 01 un§9q SuiABq sSop 99jqi 9qx
•sp^oi paB si^i isurexte inj9snf
—5B9S9B—■—BB 11 ■ ■ ■ ■ ■—■—■■■l
CORRESPONDENCE.
PROSPECTS OF AN AFGHAN WAR.
To the Editor.
Sir,— It is manifest that our relations with Shere Ali are now in a
I very critical state; that they have been so for some time is well known to
such as watch the course of events beyond our Indian frontier. But it
is difficult to understand why persistent efforts have been made until very
recently to obscure the facts. Even the Government, which in certain
eventualities would have needed the fullest support of the English
; people as well in India as elsewhere, thought secrecy was the best way
to go to work, and proclaimed, long after the breach had taken place,
that never was our understanding with the Cabul chief more satisfactory.
The truth is at length open to all men, and is not the more reassuring for
having been so long held back. At the time when, in my humble judg
ment, a bold and resolute policy would have settled the question as to
whether Russian or English influence should be dominant in Afghanistan
for a generation, you were good enough to allow me to put forward some
reasons in favour of determined action. The very people, however, who
then pooh-poohed all danger, and laughed Lord Lytton's frontier policy to
scorn as foolish and unnecessary—who declaimed against the advance to
B Quettah, and asserted that the arrangement with Khelat gave Shere Ali just
- ground for quarrel, as if that move had not been made in answer to his
doubtful manoeuvres—these very people are now all for energy and vigour, |
assert that non-intervention of which they have been the chief supporters
is and always has been an utter failure, and, in short, swallow their own
arguments against interference in Afghanistan with the same alacrity as
they did a short while before their mass of rhetoric on the European phase
of the Eastern Question.
But it seems to me that men who thus rush from one extreme to
the other, merely to save the appearance of utter discomfiture, are not
the safest guides in times of danger and difficulty. The Times corre
spondent at Calcutta—who, when our vakeel at Cabul, Atta Mahomed,
was warning the Indian Government that Shere Ali bid fair to become
more Russian than the Russians themselves, telegraphed that there was
no cause whatever for uneasiness—is now wiring to his newspaper whole
columns of leading matter, which, if they mean anything, signify that
we are on the eve of another Afghan war. Will you allow me to depre
cate this sudden access of unreasoning vehemence on so grave a ques
tion? Since the little army of observation was collected at Rawul
Pindi at the period of the trouble with the Afreedees of the Kohat Pass,
the situation in Afghanistan has changed markedly and altogether for the
worse as regards ourselves. The question of the succession really does
not much signify. Perhaps if Lord Mayo had consented to recognize
Abdulla Jan as the heir at the Umballa durbar A public or private audience held by a high-ranking British colonial representative (e.g. Viceroy, Governor-General, or member of the British royal family). ; perhaps if we had
continued Shere Ali's subsidy regularly; perhaps if we had decided
unjustly in his favour in the matter of the boundary arbitration—had
each and all these peradventures been settled according to the wishes
of the Cabul chief, possibly our influence might have then weighed
in favour of this or the other candidate to the throne as Shere Ali's
nominee. But even so, the probability of an undisputed succession,
unless we showed we should support the chosen heir by force, would be
exceedingly small. No one could have taken more pains than old Dost
Mahomed did to secure Shere Ali the throne. He made all his brothers
and all the principal sirdars Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. acknowledge him. Yet five years passed in
constant warfare before Shere Ali could secure his position; and one of
his chief complaints against us to this hour is that, though we were the
allies of his father, we never lifted a finger to help him. The point as to the
, succession comes in, therefore, merely as an ad ditiona l element of confusion.
m The main question is. Can we peaceably wean the Ameer from what
|| is something very like Russian alliance, or is it worth while to go to
war to force him to break with his new friends ? I venture to suggest
that just now we are placing ourselves in a false position, and one which
may easily lead us further than we should desire unless we fully
calculate all the chances beforehand. It is stated that the mission
to be sent to Cabul, with Sir Neville Chamberlain at its head, is waiting
. until news arrives from Cabul as to whether the Ameer will receive it.
'' The Russian envoy. General Abramoff, is at Cabul already, and it is more
than probable that the Russian expedition is still advancing—even if, as
1 reported, the troops have not already crossed the Oxus. That the Indian
|| Government fears a rebuff, either by Shere Ali declining to receive our
I envoy or by his refusing to assent to his proposals when he reaches the
I Afghan capital, is clear from the determination to form a winter camp on
our side of the border. If now the Ameer does show his indifference to
English influence war becomes almost inevitable. We could not submit
to be bearded at a time when Russian prestige has been so enormously
enhanced in Asia by the results of the Turkish war. If we invade Afghanistan
without a preliminary understanding with the frontier tribes and such of
the Durani nobles as are still hostile to Shere Ali—and it is of course
possible that with time this might be arranged—it would be open to
Shere Ali to throw himself and his people upon the aid of Russia for an
informal war to protect the independence of his country. The advance
on Cabul would thus bring about precisely that which we wish to avoid :
the appearance of Russia upon the scene as the more or less active
protector of Afghan independence. Two years ago this could not have
been. Russia was still at a distance; and the fortification of Quettah,
the mere threat of an advance to Kandahar and Cabul, and a nego
tiation with the disaffected sirdars Leader of a tribe or a polity; also refers to a military rank or title given to a commander of an army or division. , would very soon have brought the
Afghan ruler to reason. He was certainly not then prepared to
resist in any way. But at present a more cautious, though not
on that account less resolute, mode of operation seems advisable.
Although military authorities make light of an occupation of Cabul, and
maintain that it could be easily and safely effected in a few weeks, that
would not under existing circumstances be the end of the business by any
means, while the expense is a matter of serious moment to the Indian
Exchequer. The last Afghan war cost ^15,000,000 ; a fifth part of that sum
is more than India could now afford for the most successful campaign on
the other side of the passes. It would indeed be short-sighted to cripple
the finances of India still further if we can attain our main object more
cheaply in another way. This seems possible by pursuing the policy adopted
with so much success in Beloochistan. Major Sandeman is even now
being sent on a mission to the tribes beyond the actual Khelat territory,
and Sir Henry Rawlinson has always advocated a steady consolidation
of our hold upon this region, as well as upon the Kandahar district of
Afghanistan if necessary. By the fortification of Quettah and an
advance from that side towards Herat we can most surely counterbalance
the hostile Russian influence at Cabul. For this preparations can be made
without any serious additional expense or committing ourselves imme
diately to active operations. Should Shere Ali decline to receive our
mission we have an open enemy to deal with, and can choose the most
convenient moment to make our power felt. But to enter upon the
occupation of Cabul merely because owing to our own neglect we have
permitted the Russians to steal a march upon us would, I cannot help
thinking, be but to add another blunder to the grave ones we have already
made. If there be any dangerous disaffection, as some hold there is,
within our borders, nothing would suit the malignants better than to
see a portion of our army engaged in a campaign in Afghanistan.—I am,
Sir, your obedient servant, „
September 10.